Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

LONDON TRANSPORT (GENERAL POWERS) BILL

Lords amendments agreed to.

BRITISH RAILWAYS BILL (By Order)

Order for consideration of Lords amendments read.
To be considered upon Monday 25 October.

BRITISH RAILWAYS (LIVERPOOL STREET STATION) BILL
(By Order)

Order for Third Reading read.

To be read the Third time upon Tuesday 26 October.

PRIVATE BILLS [LORDS] (SUSPENSION):

That so much of the Lords Message [18th October] as relates to the Hampshire Bill [Lords] and the Nottinghamshire County Council Bill [Lords] be now considered.

That this House doth concur with the Lords in their Resolution.

Order for consideration of the Lords Message [18 October] read.

To be considered upon Wednesday 27 October at Seven o' clock.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

Common Fisheries Policy

Mr. Brotherton: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a further statement about the common fisheries policy.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what progress has been made in securing a revised common fisheries policy.

Mr. Spearing: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a statement concerning the latest state of negotiations on a common fisheries policy of the European Economic Community.

Sir Patrick Wall: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a statement about the development of a common fisheries policy.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith): Since my right hon. Friend last reported to the House in July, the

Council of Fisheries Ministers met in Luxembourg on 4 October. No real progress was made because Denmark alone was not prepared to negotiate. The next Council meeting is planned for 25 October.

Mr. Brotherton: I wish my right hon. Friend a happy Trafalgar Day.

Mr. Foulkes: It should be Waterloo.

Mr. Brotherton: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the grave concern that is felt by the fishing industry about the failure to reach a solution to the problem? Will he give the House a guarantee that if by 31 December no solution is reached, foreign fishermen will not be allowed to fish up to our shores?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I appreciate my hon. Friend's good wishes. The one country that was holding out at the last Council meeting was not France, but Denmark. I wholly understand what my hon. Friend has said. The uncertainty in the fishing industry, not only in the United Kingdom, but in other countries, is extremely great. Therefore, there is a real incentive for all countries to find a solution. I assure my hon. Friend that no British Government—certainly not this Government—would tolerate fishing up to our beaches.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: To remove any possible doubt and uncertainty, will my right hon. Friend assist the House by publishing in the Official Report the legal powers that would be used to exclude foreign vessels after 31 December in the event of failure to agree? Secondly, will he give us an assurance that, in the agreed position of the nine members, there is provision for the phasing out of historic rights?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: With regard to my hon. Friend's first question, if he had experience of negotiations, he would not give away his negotiating position before he entered the negotiations. That applies to us in this matter.

Mr. Spearing: Even if the Minister triumphs on the Copenhagen front and the Danes withdraw from their present position, does he agree that the EEC provisions are for historic rights to be exercised up to our beaches, but that those historic rights, with modern equipment, will put our fishermen's livelihoods at stake and so are unacceptable, irrespective of any Danish objections?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is wrong. I emphasise that, in the proposals put forward by the Commission, there is no provision for any foreign rights within six miles. With regard to the six to 12 miles belt, the Commission has put forward a number of proposals that are based generally on the historic rights of other countries. That is the basis on which we shall negotiate next week.

Mr. Beith: Does the Minister realise that the continuing uncertainty places even greater financial pressure on the fishing industry? What recognition will he give in aid to the industry during this period?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am conscious of that fact. However, that is a separate issue from the vital and long term issue of settlement of the common fisheries policy. I remind the hon. Gentleman that in the past two years we have shown our recognition of the problems of the industry in the present uncertainty by giving it £42 million in aid.

Mr. Henderson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people will greatly welcome his assurance that the Government will not tolerate a scenario that would permit fishing up to our beaches? Will he treat with considerable scepticism some of the proposals for local fisheries plans formulated by bodies not expert in the fishing industry?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I made plain the Government's position about fishing up to our beaches. A similar view is shared by other EEC Governments. There is provision for a fishery plan off the north-west coast of Scotland in the Commission's proposals which we shall be considering in the context of the negotiations.

Mr. Donald Stewart: Is the Minister aware of the widespread suspicion among fishermen that the Government have delayed announcing the financial assistance until the result of the policy negotiations is known, so that it might be a sweetener at that time? The protracted negotiations and the uncertainty have not helped the financial state of the fishing industry. Will the right hon. Gentleman make an early announcement of the financial aid that the industry desperately needs?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: We made the position plain to the industry, although it may not be plain to the right hon. Gentleman. There is no connection between aid and the settlement of the policy, as I said in answer to the previous question.

Mr. Austin Mitchell: With the negotiating pressure on the Minister by the threat of fishing up to our beaches, why does he not announce his contingency plans to stop it by the end of the year, draft in trawlers to protect our fishing grounds and make it clear that the partial settlements which have been so unsatisfactory to the British industry will not be the basis of the measures that he will enforce unilaterally from 31 December?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I have not made such an announcement, because it would be foolish to give away our negotiating position. The hon. Gentleman shows his lack of appreciation of the situation. It was the Labour Government, in the Hague agreement, who caused the doubts about the powers that we have in national measures.

Mr. Buchan: Has the Minister not already virtually sold out to the Common Market? Is he not telling us that he has retreated from the 12-mile exclusive and the 50-mile preference limits to a 6-mile exclusive and a 12-mile preference? It would strengthen, not weaken, our hand if he told us his contingency plans to save the industry if no agreement is reached. Will he follow the example of Lord Boothby, who stated that if we cannot get our terms we should come out?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: In the same recent announcement the noble Lord supported the Government's efforts to reach a settlement. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will support him.
I thought that the hon. Gentleman was more knowledgeable than he appears to be. We also have historic rights in other waters. Some third country waters have had to be negotiated through the Community, and that has enabled our fishermen to continue fishing elsewhere. We also have historic rights within the Community on a reciprocal basis. It is unrealistic to believe that we can enter the negotiations without taking account of such rights.

Glasshouse Industry (Energy Costs)

Mr. Newens: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what progress has been achieved to date on the equalisation of energy costs incurred by glasshouse growers in EEC countries.

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Peter Walker): Under the agreement between the European Commission and the Dutch Government, the preferential gas tariff to Dutch glasshouse growers is to be phased out on 31 March 1983. I am extending the aid to United Kingdom growers using oil at the maximum rates permitted under new guidelines recently issued by the Commission. This additional aid will be worth up to £1 million to the industry.

Mr. Newens: I welcome the extension of the aid and recognise the Minister's stand. However, does he recognise the catastrophic position of many of our glasshouse growers because of the cumulative effect over many years of the Dutch advantage in fuel costs? Is it possible to make aid available to make up for the years when the disadvantage was greatest? Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to implement the Select Committee's recommendations for the industry, as, without them, there will be many bankruptcies in the years ahead?

Mr. Walker: The Government, in the absence of an agreement with the Dutch, negotiated that aid should be provided by national Governments. Britain, and perhaps one other country, has for a considerable time given the maximum aid allowable. I am continuing that right up to the moment when the Dutch gas subsidy is phased out.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: In view of the long start that the Dutch had and the fact that the capital base of our industry has been eroded by what the Commission has proclaimed to be the Dutch Government's unlawful actions, could we not continue the aid until next autumn so that the creditworthiness of at least part of the industry can be restored after a situation that is not of this Government's making? Can we not at least do what is within our power to assuage the ill-effects of the Dutch cheating?

Mr. Walker: No, Sir. Under pressure from the United Kingdom Government, the Commission negotiated to phase out the advantage that the Dutch had by a certain date and agreed that until that date aid should be provided. We are almost alone of all European countries in giving the maximum aid to our growers during the entire period.

Butter and Cheese

Mr. Knox: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to what extent the United Kingdom is self-sufficient in butter and cheese.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Production of butter and cheese represented 57 per cent. and 70 per cent., respectively, of total new supplies in 1980, which is the most recent year for which complete information is available.

Mr. Knox: Do not the figures show considerable scope for further expansion by the United Kingdom dairy industry? What steps is my right hon. Friend taking to encourage that expansion?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The United Kingdom dairy industry has already responded to the stimulus that the


Government have given. We have seen an increase in production both this year and over recent years. Its marketing in the United Kingdom and abroad shows it to be an extremely lively and effective industry.

Mr. Stoddart: Is the Minister aware that many of us are worried about recent press reports that the French Government are to block the importation of New Zealand butter if sales of cheap butter to Russia do not go ahead? Will that not have a catastrophic effect on the New Zealand economy, renege on assurances given during the passage of the European Communities Bill and—most important to me, as I have an Anchor butter packing station in my constituency—mean a loss of jobs in Swindon and the surrounding area?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I wholly share that anxiety, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman will express his appreciation of our achievement this week in Luxembourg of 87,000 tonnes of butter for 1983. That was agreed at the request of the New Zealand Government, who have publicly stated that they welcome the Council's decision.

Mr. Moate: Would we have the power to veto future arrangements that might reduce the importation of New Zealand butter?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The original protocol and special conditions agreed for New Zealand imports were on a degressive basis, which the New Zealand Government have accepted. I agree that, for a host of reasons, New Zealand butter is of particular importance. We shall continue to work in close co-operation with the New Zealand Government over what happens after 1983.

Mr. Buchan: May we have a categoric assurance that the agreement for importing New Zealand butter is not contingent on the French demands to sell off rock bottom surplus butter to the Soviet Union? New Zealand is, after all, an old trading friend and Commonwealth ally.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I give the hon. Gentleman that assurance. I managed to resist the attempt this week by the French Minister at the Council of Ministers to make the agreement conditional on the sale of butter to the Soviet Union. Agreement has been reached in principle. Various procedures have been followed through. The agreement should go through simply as a "procedure" point at a future Council of Ministers.

Marginal Land Areas

Mr. Hicks: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is the current position for additional financial assistance to marginal land areas.

Mr. Peter Walker: Discussions on the case for extending the United Kindom's less favoured areas have commenced with the European Commission, and the Government's present priority is to secure designation of the new areas.

Mr. Hicks: I appreciate the progress that has been made on the recognition of marginal land in this country, but when does my right hon. Friend hope that the negotiations will be completed in Brussels? In the event of the submission being successful, when will tangible financial assistance be made available to our marginal farmers?

Mr. Walker: My hon. Friend will understand that we must make our decisions when we know the exact

designation of the volume of land involved. We shall put on every possible pressure in Brussels to come to as speedy a decision as possible.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: is the proposed delimitation of marginal land in the United Kingdom, which has been published in the form of maps, final, or is it subject, to negotiation and modification?

Mr. Walker: It is subject to modification and negotiation if the Commission considers that there is some justification in doing so. We believe that there is every possible argument for the maps that we have submitted. On all the assumptions and past criteria, we believe that those maps will be accepted, but obviously I cannot guarantee that the Commission will not query any of those maps.

Mr. Wigley:: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Welsh farmers, for whom this is an important matter, feel that progress has been extremely slow? Will he give an assurance that any settlement on marginal land will not result in any erosion of benefits for hill land?

Mr. Walker: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will explain to Welsh farmers that the Government were unwilling to accept the procedures that were being adopted when we came to office, and we went to the Commission and asked for totally different procedures. Had we adopted the previous procedures, it would have taken another two to three years before we could have sent the maps. Therefore, we have done everything possible to speed up the process. I can only guarantee that we shall review the hill subsidies in terms of the problems of the hills themselves.

Sir Peter Mills: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that, if this matter proceeds quickly, it will be the next major step forward in British agriculture and will be of particular importance to the South-West of England? Will he also bear in mind that, given the present tremendous loss of agricultural land, if we could re-use some of our marginal land for food production it would help not only British agriculture but the consumer?

Mr. Walker: The importance of that is recognised in a number of areas. It is of considerable importance to Northern Ireland, Wales, the South-West and various other areas of the United Kingdom. That is why the Government have done everything possible, first, to prepare our proposals more speedily and, secondly, to negotiate them more speedily within the Commission.

Mr. Maclennan: Will the right hon. Gentleman study the findings of the Arkleton Trust, which have demonstrated that, in the less favoured areas, British farmers have done far less well under the Community arrangements than have other Community farmers? Will he therefore make more financial resources available to compensate for that?

Mr. Walker: That is undoubtedly why the Government have done superbly well in massively increasing the hill farm subsidy.

Sheep

Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many sheep have been killed as a result of sheep worrying during the last 12 months.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mrs. Peggy Fenner): There are no figures for the last 12 months.

Mr. Bennett: Does the Minister agree that one of the most sickening sights in the countryside is that of sheep that have been killed or savaged by packs of dogs? Why has the Government's only contribution to the problem been to stop collecting statistics rather than solving the chaos with the licence fee? Why do they not embark on a campaign to make all dog owners responsible for what happens in an effort to ensure that this practice ceases?

Mrs. Fenner: I agree with the hon. Gentleman's first concern about the damage that can be done. He has no doubt seen the graphic poster that we have produced as part of our publicity. The hon. Gentleman will know that we stopped collecting statistics because they were unreliable. Many incidents were not reported. We believe that education and publicity offer the most realistic solution to the problem, and our considerable efforts in that direction will continue.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: In considering any legislative measure for the control of dogs, will the Government bear in mind the importance of all parts of the United Kingdom moving together in this regard, as there is obviously an important fiscal aspect in which there should be no differentiation between one part of the country and another?

Mrs. Fenner: I note the right hon. Gentleman's concern, but there might well be different physical attributes.

Mr. Henderson: Is my hon. Friend aware that recently in my constituency there was a grisly incident of sheep being murdered by dogs? In addition to the ghastly experience of the farmer having to clear up the aftermath, no compensation was available to him despite the fact that the dogs' owner was convicted of failing to look after them properly. Will my hon. Friend consider creating conditions under which a dog licence must be accompanied, either under the householder's comprehensive insurance or other insurance, by insurance against third party risks?

Mrs. Fenner: The Government have at present no plans to increase the dog licence fee. Compulsory third party insurance is a matter for the Lord Chancellor.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Is the Minister aware that this is a special problem in the Lakelands and that the National Farmers Union, both in the Lakelands and nationally, has asked the Government to increase the penalties? Will she make a statement on those increases?

Mrs. Fenner: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the question of penalties is for the Home Office.

Common Fisheries Policy

Mr. Strang: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether he will now bring forward a contingency plan for the development of the British fishing industry in the event of failure to agree on a common fisheries policy.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Not at this stage. Negotiations on a revised common fisheries policy are still continuing.

Mr. Strang: As there are only two months to run of the 10-year derogation negotiated by the right hon. and learned Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon), is it not high time that the Government faced the fact that the industry now needs action, not words? Is it not clear that any settlement cobbled up before the end of the year will involve a sell-out of a fundamental British national interest? In the circumstances, will the Minister serve notice on other EEC Governments that the British Government intend to introduce a national plan to protect our waters from foreign vessels and to develop an onshore industry which will provide thousands of jobs in areas of greatest need?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Had the hon. Gentleman listened to my reply to question No. 1, he would have realised that Nine of the Ten are prepared to negotiate on a realistic basis. If he wishes to do a service to the industry, he will realise that we should not reveal our negotiating position in advance.

Mr. McQuarrie: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his statement regarding the three-mile limit up to the beaches. Like other hon. Members, he knows perfectly well that there was no fishing up to the beaches in 1973 prior to our entry into the Market. If, during the time that he is preparing his contingency plans, there is no common fisheries policy by 31 December, will he consider the restructuring of the fleet, as that will be necessary if we have to go it alone? I also hope that—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We have had the question. The hopes can wait.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I assure my hon. Friend that in any contingency plan we shall make sure that the interests of the British fishing industry are looked after, and we shall also consult the industry closely.

Mr. McNamara: What will be the legal position after 31 December? When will the right hon. Gentleman announce the Government's aid to the fishing industry? We were expecting it in July, but, according to a reply this week, the Minister said that he hoped to make the announcement shortly. How short is "shortly", because originally it meant last July?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I said "soon", and I stand by that. As the hon. Gentleman knows, under the articles of the Treaty of Accession, the Commission and Council have to come forward with proposals on access by 1 January 1983. There is, therefore, a responsibility on both the Commission and Council to reach a decision, and that is recognised in the Treaty of Accession.

Mr. Mark Hughes: If they fail to do that, when will the Minister present to the House and the industry the necessary contingency plans? Is he aware that their legislative enactment, if required, will have the support of both sides of the House? The industry and the public at large need reassurance now, not soon.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: If special contingency measures are necessary, I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that we shall bring them forward at the most appropriate time for the best interests of the British fishing industry.

Straw Burning

Mr. Home Robertson: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many tonnes of straw were burnt during the 1982 harvest in England and Wales; and how many acres were involved.

Mrs. Fenner: This information will not be available until January 1983, when I will be happy to send it to the hon. Member.

Mr. Home Robertson: I shall look forward to receiving that information. Does the Minister accept that all concerned agree that the burning of straw is a deplorably messy, dangerous and wasteful means of disposing of a potentially useful agricultural by-product? What have the Government done to assist the industries concerned to find a constructive use for the by-product?

Mrs. Fenner: For several years my chief scientist's group and ADAS have played a major role in the Oxford straw utilisation conference, attended by farmers, scientists and potential users. My right hon. Friend will be addressing the next conference in November. Research into disposal and utilisation has continued in collaboration with the Paper Industry Research Association, commercial interests and the joint consultative organisation for research and development in agriculture and food.

Mr. Haselhurst: From the information that may have been available to my hon. Friend's Department, can she say whether the number of complaints about straw burning this year has declined compared with last year?

Mrs. Fenner: With the damp weather in 1982, fewer incidents of damage or nuisance were reported than in 1981. A few farmers still disregard the code, but most are well aware of the need to observe it. I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate them on their responsible behaviour.

Poultry

Mr. Colin Shepherd: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what progress is being made in maintaining health standards of the United Kingdom poultry flock.

Mrs. Fenner: The health status of the national flock remains at a very high level. In particular, the freedom from Newcastle disease, which the measures introduced about a year ago were designed to protect, has been maintained. Following the recent judgment of the European Court on the import rules, introduced at the same time, revised measures have now been notified to the Commission and the other member States. Those measures, which will be implemented shortly, will ensure that our health standards are maintained.

Mr. Shepherd: In view of the immense importance of sustaining the health of the United Kingdom poultry flock, can my hon. Friend give an assurance that nothing will enter Britain from abroad until the rules are fully defined and all are aware of what is required of them? How can we be sure that there will be proper enforcement of the rules, bearing in mind that the work on the enforcement—for example, the certification—will probably be carried out abroad? What time scale does she envisage in bringing all that into effect?

Mrs. Fenner: The revised import rules are extremely detailed. In broad terms they are designed to safeguard the

stock, but would permit imports subject to certification. The press notice issued by my right hon. Friend shows that details of such certification are being sent to each of the member States, which will be asked to let us have specimens of their export documents. My hon. Friend asked how we could be sure that the rules would be properly enforced. We shall make the necessary administrative arrangements to implement the new measures and ensure that the rules are properly enforced. The time scale will be as soon as the countries have provided us with the certification requirements.

Goose Farming Industry

Mr. Dalyell: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a statement on the state of the goose farming industry.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: United Kingdom goosemeat production is expected to be about 860 tonnes in 1982. This represents a 15 per cent. increase over the levels in recent years.

Mr. Dalyell: In that case, what is the thinking behind the Minister's decision to despatch a goose ecologist to the Falkland Islands?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am sure that he will boost the current good trend in goose production, for which the United Kingdom is responsible.

Mr. Marlow: As it is possible to fatten geese on grass alone, would it lot be possible to persuade various nationalised industries and statutory organisations such as the roads, railways and so on, to make use of the grassland along their verges to fatten geese?

Mr. Buchanan Smith: I understand that geese are also very good watchdogs. I do not have responsibility for nationalised industries, but I shall draw my hon. Friend's interesting suggestion to the attention of my right hon. and hon. Friends who have responsibility for such matters.

Horticulture Industry

Mr. Nicholas Baker: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what recent representations he has received from horticulturalists about the state of the horticulture industry.

Mr. Peter Walker: I am in constant touch with the representatives of the horticulture industry.

Mr. Baker: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the news about the extension of adaptation aid will be especially welcome to that very hard-pressed industry? Will he maintain the vigilance that he has shown to ensure that fair and proper competition is maintained throughout the EEC?

Mr. Walker: Our horticulture industry makes an important contribution to the economy of Britain. The research programmes and the ADAS advice service and the capital grant programmes have all been retained and, in some cases, improved. We shall continue with that.

Mr. Newens: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the number of reports that are still coming in about lorries laden with produce coming to some of our east coast ports and selling produce on the roads, thereby evading VAT and health regulations? What is being done to stop that undesirable practice?

Mr. Walker: We shall quickly follow up any information about such practices. One encouraging aspect of horticulture is that on a legal basis some of our exports are improving.

Mr. John Wells: Can my right hon. Friend go further in his remarks about horticultural exports and give some indication of the recognition that he might give to those striving hard in that difficult area, especially bearing in mind the knock-on effect of an enlarged EEC? What steps does he mean to take to help the exporter?

Mr. Walker: We shall do everything possible to encourage those trends. From a recent visit to retailers in Belgium and Holland, I realised that there was considerable scope for improving our exports to those countries.

Mr. Maclennan: What principles will inform the Government's attitude to the difficulties that will be faced by the horticulture industry because of the enlargement of the Community to include the Iberian countries?

Mr. Walker: We shall study the impact of that in the negotiations. It will be varied. In terms of the enlargement, there is considerable opportunity for improving exports of some of the Northern hemisphere products which are not produced in the prospective new EEC countries.

Mr. Mark Hughes: Does the Minister accept that the level of bankruptcies and pending bankruptcies in the horticulture industry are disturbing? Is he aware that unless something akin to longer-term security in respect of the energy element is forthcoming from the Government, the basis of our horticulture industry could be destroyed during the next few years?

Mr. Walker: I consider the horticulture industry to be sufficiently sophisticated to notice the difference in the way in which we tackled the Dutch subsidy problem as opposed to the method adopted by our predecessors.

"Coal and the Environment"

Mr. Heddle: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is his policy towards the recommendations in the Flowers report "Coal and the Environment" which affect his responsibilities.

Mrs. Fenner: Our general policy is to try to ensure that agricultural land losses are kept to a minimum and that the interests of agriculture and the coal industry are properly balanced. My officials are participating in the interdepartmental discussions on the recommendations in the report.

Mr. Heddle: Does my hon. Friend agree that farmers suffer a grave injustice because they cannot claim compensation for consequential loss in the event of coal mining subsidence? In the light of the Flowers report will my hon. Friend urge my right hon. Friend to amend the voluntary code at an early date?

Mrs. Fenner: I am aware of my hon. Friend's concern that those affected by mining subsidence should be properly compensated, but while I am concerned to safeguard the interests of the agriculture industry, compensation for subsidence is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy, as my hon. Friend will know.

Intervention Foodstocks

Mr. Colvin: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will give the latest figures for stocks of intervention foodstocks in terms of the number of days of consumption.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Foodstocks—including animal feeding stuffs—held in intervention in the European Community in terms of days' consumption are:


days


beef
6½


butter
14½


cereals
28


olive oil
82


skimmed milk powder
140

Mr. Colvin: Does my right hon. Friend agree that these stocks are not excessive in relation to the total consumption of the EEC, and that in this day and age it is better to have a surplus than to have a shortage?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I endorse what my hon. Friend has said. When one sees what is happening in other countries, one realises that consumers, in particular, always benefit more from surpluses than shortages.

Mr. Spearing: At the same time, does the Minister agree that a more accurate and objective indication of a surplus would be in respect of the percentage of annual production? In that regard, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that throughout the EEC there is at least a 20 per cent. surplus of dairy products and milk production?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: We are concerned about continuing surpluses in particular products. As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have taken certain steps in recent price fixings to try to put some restraints on increases in production. I put the question back to the hon. Gentleman: would he rather have 5 million tonnes, as we have in intervention in the Community, in cereals, as against the 50 million tonnes shortage that Soviet Russia is experiencing?

Mr. Teddy Taylor: Does the Minister expect the stocks to increase or to decrease over the next 12 months? As he has firmly rejected the export of surplus butter to Russia, where should the surpluses go?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: If my hon. Friend understood a little more about agricultural production he would realise that this problem happens all over the world, and the effect on surpluses depends on world trade and prices. There are other factor, which are impossible to predict at this stage.

Mr. Eastham: As the Minister accepts that we have these surpluses of foods, does he think that his Department can prevail on the Department of Education and Science to take advantage of them to help local authorities, which are in the shameful position of having to end school meals?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I had hoped that the hon. Gentleman would welcome the fact that this Department has negotiated support for school milk. I am glad to say that many local authorities have taken advantage of that.

Commodity Prices

Mr. Marlow: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a comparison between


the current United Kingdom market price and world market price for(a)wheat, (b)beef,(c)butter and(d) sugar.

Mr. Peter Walker: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall publish the information in theOfficial Report; but my hon. Friend is aware that world prices fluctuate substantially—for example, only a short time ago the world price of sugar was 40 per cent. above the Community price.

Mr. Marlow: Does my right hon. Friend agree—we shall see later in theOfficial Report—that for most of these commodities the European prices are much higher than world market prices? Inasmuch as the United Kingdom is a net importer of European foodstuffs, is this difference in price not a heavy tax on the British consumer over and above our net budget contribution? Would my right hon. Friend—on a slightly different matter—

Mr. Speaker: Order. That is enough to get on with.

Mr. Walker: On the general scene of food prices, I am sure that my hon. Friend will be pleased to know that during the period of this Government farm gate prices have increased at only half the rate of inflation in general. With regard to the Community agriculture budget, whereas under the Labour Government this went up by more than 200 per cent. , under this Government it has gone up by only 26 per cent.

Mr. Buchan: Has the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs drawn the Minister's attention to the publication known as "The Budget Problem"? Does he agree with it when it states that Britain
buys food from other member states at Community prices which are higher than world prices because of the price support mechanisms of the CAP and …the resulting cost to Britain is not matched by equivalent gains on the industrial side"?

If the right hon. Gentleman agrees with that, why the hell do we not get out?

Mr. Walker: I know that that has been the constant view of the hon. Gentleman, but perhaps he should reflect on what my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Colvin) said. There may be many people in the Socialist economies of Eastern Europe who would prefer to have the surplus problems of the CAP to the shortages of the Soviet Union.

Following is the information:


£Tonne



United Kingdom price*
Estimated world pricer†


Wheat
113
74·7


Beef
1,769·82
923


Butter
2,307
1,224·1


Sugar
405·9
111·4

Notes:

*Average United Kingdom market prices for week ending 11 September 1982.
Wheat: First hand buying price for all types.
Beef: Certified cattle converted to deadweight using a killing-out percentage of 53·8
Butter: First hand price for sweet cream, salted, 10 kg cartons.
Sugar: Refined, granulated, in bulk: 50 kg paper sacks.
†"World prices" have been taken as minimum offer prices of imports underlying the calculation of the variable levies and have been calculated by subtracting the common levy in ecus applicable on 16 September 1982 from the appropriate threshold or guide price in ecus. The beef price is

also adjusted for duty. These "world prices" have been converted from ecus at the market rate used for calculating MCAs on 16 September: £1·183075 ecus.

Common Agricultural Policy

Mr. Ioan Evans: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a statement on any progress made to reform the common agricultural policy.

Mr. Peter Walker: A number of measures have been taken, and that is why under the previous Government, Community agricultural spending increased by over 210 per cent. , while under this Government the increase has only been some 20 per cent:.

Mr. Evans: Since it is possible for us to obtain dairy products from other countries more cheaply than we have been obtaining them under the intervention price scheme, what is now the Government's attitude? Are they seeking to abandon the CAP or do they think that they can bring about some real reform in the next Session?

Mr. Walker: Many measures and changes that have taken place have resulted in a dramatic improvement in cost savings. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to rely on the cheapest price that he can obtain in world markets for particular commodities, he should not argue in the same breath for full employment and stability. We have a stable food supply and a stable agriculture, and the contribution towards reducing inflation has been considerable.

Oral Answers to Questions — PRIME MINISTER

Engagements

Mr. Ray Powell: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 21 October.

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with in nisterial colleagues and others. 1M addition to my duties in the House I shall be having further meetings later today.

Mr. Powell: Is the Prime Minister satisfied with the disruption that her miserable Ministers, who are acting against the country, have caused to the police, Telecom workers and steel workers and the miners? Is not the right hon. Lady prepared to take some action against this disruption, and what will she do about the militants in her police force who disrupted the Home Secretary's meeting last night? Will she take time off today to listen to the new record "How does it feel to be the mother of 1,000 dead?". Will she take—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is being unfair to the rest of the House.

The Prime Minister: That is rather a lot of questions. The police have had a very good deal from this Government and I thought that the performance yesterday evening by the Metropolitan Police Federation was disgraceful. I do not believe that it will have found favour with the vast majority of the Metropolitan Police force, and I think that it have done it a great deal of damage The hon. Gentleman mentioned various other subjects With regard to competition, it serves the British consumer better than nationalised monopolies. With regard to steel, just a few moments before I came to the House I learnt that


agreement had been reached in the Community in Brussels on the limitation on steel exports to the United States. That is expected to take effect from 29 October. Once again our Ministers have done a good job.

Sir Paul Bryan: Will my right hon. Friend find time today to consider the recent reports that the Home Secretary is about to submit to the House new regulations regarding immigration? In the meantime, will my right hon. Friend give the House an assurance that no final decision will be reached before we have a full debate in the House on the matter?

The Prime Minister: I understand that the new immigration rules will be required when the new British Nationality Act takes effect. It is my right hon. Friend's intention to publish a White Paper next week, which will contain draft immigration rules. The White Paper, subject to agreement with my right hon. Friend the Lord President, will be debated for a whole day in the House. Final decisions on the new immigration rules will not take place until after that debate.

Mr. Foot: In view of the statement that the right hon. Lady has just made about the steel industry, and in view of the mounting crisis in that industry, even if the agreement with the EEC forms the basis for a settlement with the United States, will it not still cause a big injury to the British steel industry? What steps will the Prime Minister take to assist the industry in its immediate crisis?

The Prime Minister: Obviously if the EEC has reached agreement as reported, and countervailing duties are therefore not imposed, the situation will be much better than it would otherwise have been. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is still a great steel crisis the world over. We have to recover our home market, much of which was lost as a result of the disastrous 13-week steel strike in 1980, when those who had loyally purchased from the British Steel Corporation found that their source of supply was not reliable and had to go elsewhere for steel.

Mr. Foot: Britain's home market is suffering more than any other from steel imports and yet the British Government do less than any other Government about it. What steps will the Prime Minister take to try to deal with increasing steel imports, which threaten to close further major plants unless something is done to stop them?
The Prime Minister praises the agreement between the EEC and the United States. Will she confirm to me and the country that that agreement involves further injury to the British steel industry?

The Prime Minister: Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that he objects to the United States taking steps against imports, and at the same time wants us to take steps against imports? The two do not add up. Britain acts with the Community on steel and we must continue to do so. We must learn to compete in terms of our home market and exporters. Strikes cost jobs and the right hon. Gentleman has been the strikers' friend.

Mr. Foot: The right hon. Lady must face the facts about an industry which she is steadily ruining. Does she not understand that there is a great difference between the position in the United States and here? In the United States about 1 per cent. of the industry is affected by imports, whereas here the figure is about 30 per cent. The United

States took some action to deal with the problem, but the British Government have taken no action to protect British industry.

The Prime Minister: One-third of our gross domestic product is exported, so if we start protectionism in Britain as a general principle we shall lose jobs in every export industry in the country.

Mr. David Steel: Will the Prime Minister find time today to study the speech by the director-general of NEDC, in which he called for a truce over the frontiers of ownership and instead a concentration on efficiency?

The Prime Minister: I saw the speech. I wondered whether the director-general made the same speech when so many nationalisation measures were introduced. It would have been better if he had made the speech then.

Mr. David Atkinson: Has my right hon. Friend seen the reports in today's papers about the Polish refugee, Josef Samek, who, after 41 years, was reunited with his daughter who lives in my constituency and who believed him to have died in a Soviet labour camp? Is my right hon. Friend aware that the period that Josef Samek is being allowed to stay in Britain has been reduced from six to three months? Will my right hon. Friend ensure that he will be allowed to remain in Britain with his family for as long as he wants to?

The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend knows, we had a general rule that Polish people here at the time of the military takeover were allowed to stay and were not made to return to Poland, where they might have had a terrible time. If my hon. Friend provides details of the individual case, we shall consider it sympathetically.

Mr. Beith: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 21 October.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Beith: Will the Prime Minister take time to keep up to date with the work of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights? Does she regard the convention as having an important part to play in guarding civil liberties now that it has stood so firm in defence of the three British Rail workers and seems to have persuaded the Home Secretary that he must extend to women citizens the same rights in relation to foreign husbands as men citizens enjoy in respect of their wives?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman will have heard me say earlier that a White Paper is to be issued next week, which will be debated in the House before final decisions on new immigration rules are taken. The closed shop case would not have arisen but for the disgraceful legislation by the Labour Government, which the hon. Gentleman's party supported.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the TUC unions which are proposing another day of action in support of National Health Service workers would be better advised to say publicly that they will accept pay settlements lower than the National Health Service settlement? Does my right hon. Friend further agree that the best way to help the low-paid and families is to increase child benefit by more than the rate of inflation?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend never misses an opportunity to plead that cause. I agree that it would be


best if the National Health Service strike were ended now. That would be better for the patients, better for the reputation of the country and better for all those who hope to achieve orders from overseas and whose interests the strike damages.

Mr. Joel Barnett: Can the Prime Minister explain why we should believe that the economy will become much better with the fall in inflation when the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, for example, has been saying the same thing for the past two years and more and the situation has gradually worsened?

The Prime Minister: Many right hon. Members in the Labour Government said that the most important aspect was a fall in inflation. We heard that again yesterday. We must have a fall in inflation if we are to compete with other industrialised countries, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. He will be aware that in spite of being now much more competitive with overseas countries we have still a long way to go before output per man in Britain equals that in the United States, Japan, Germany and France.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor: Does my right hon. Friend share my regret that the European Community should send so much of its butter to the Soviet Union at heavily subsidised prices when our own people cannot afford to buy it? Will my right hon. Friend use her considerable powers to influence our colleagues on the Continent to change the rule?

The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend knows, Britain has voted firmly against subsidising food exports from the Community to the Soviet Union and will continue to do so.

Mr. Race: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 21 October.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Race: Is the Prime Minister aware of the proposed closure of the Wood Green and Southgate hospital in my constituency, which takes patients from Finchley, and which is being closed because of the Government's refusal to fund one-third of the wage rise for Health Service workers this year? In the light of that closure and other closures being contemplated, will the Prime Minister give a categoric assurance to the House that the Government will fund the whole of any increase to Health Service workers next year from the Treasury and not decide, as Ministers are discussing, to fund none of it?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman raises two points. It came out firmly in yesterday's debate that the

resources available to the National Health Service as a whole are 5 per cent. more in real terms this year. Therefore, the only question is the distribution of that increase over and above what the Labour Government provided in accordance  with priorities which all Governments must make and which every responsible person in the House and elsewhere should be prepared to make.
Next year's public expenditure figures have not been published. It would be reasonable, however, to expect some increase in efficiency in the National Health Service in view of the encrmous increase in numbers employed in the Health Service.

Mr. John H. Osborn: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that steel is a vital subject? Would it not be unfortunate if tomorrow's strike were to let in our competitors and take away our orders? Could the unfair competition from Spain be looked at again? Is the Prime Minister aware of the steel committee of the OECD? Will the Government refer our problems vis-a-vis Europe and the World to that committee following the meeting of the International Iron and Steel Institute in Tokyo, where the heads of the steel industry got together and provided much information for all Governments?

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend that if we have more strikes they will cost jobs. Strikes besmirch this country's reputation overseas. They stop investment and orders that would otherwise come here, and cost not only the strikers' jobs but jobs in other companies.
We must continue to work with the EEC on steel. The best thing we can do is to buy more British goods, assuming that their quality and suitability are equal to that of overseas goods. If people bought more British goods many of our problems would be solved.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We were one minute late in starting. I shall allow one more supplementary question.

Mr. Litherland: Will the Prime Minister explain why the Government are subsidising unnamed private steel consortiums, and giving vast sums of public money to buy out and close private steel firms such as Manchester Steel Ltd. in my constituency, with the loss of 810 jobs and a vital industry?

The Prime Minister: While the steel market is falling world-wide, and we are not competing as well as we should, we have to make the best possible arrangements for jobs as a whole I believe that that is what is happening.

Business of the House

Mr. Michael Foot: Will the Leader of the House state the business for next week?

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY 25 OCTOBER—Consideration of Lords
amendments to the Employment Bill.
Motions on the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order and on the Planning (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order.
TUESDAY 26 OCTOBER—Consideration of Lords amendments to the Transport Bill.
Motion relating to the British Gas Corporation (Disposal of Offshore Oilfield Interests) Direction 1982.
WEDNESDAY 27 OCTOBER—Remaining stages of the Industrial Development Bill (Lords) which is a consolidation measure.
Motions relating to the Education (Assisted Places) (Scotland) Regulations, to the Education (School and Placing Information) (Scotland) Regulations and to the Meat (Sterilization and Staining) Regulations.
The Chairman of Ways and Means has named opposed private business for consideration at 7 o'clock.
THURSDAY 28 OCTOBER—The House will meet at 2.30 pm for Prorogation.
The new Session will be opened on Wednesday 3 November.

Mr. Foot: I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman arranged the business before we had heard the Prime Minister's replies about the steel industry. Will he have further conversations, through the usual channels, to see whether we may have a debate on the steel industry next week? The Prime Minister does not seem to appreciate that the agreement that has been made between the EEC and the Americans—if it is concluded—involves a further cut in British steel exports to the United States of America and an intensification of the crisis in the British steel industry. It possibly threatens further jobs in that industry.
Tomorrow's strike is the result of the sense of desperation felt in the industry that is produced by the Government's policy and failure to do less than any other country in Europe to protect the steel industry. I urge the right hon. Gentleman to have discussions through the usual channels to seek a debate on that subject next week before the position deteriorates further.
I ask also for a statement next week on Britoil. There are conflicting stories in the newspapers and elsewhere about how the operation is to be mounted. The Amersham International precedent still leaves a bad taste in everyone's mouth, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will arrange for a statement on that subject to be made next week.
I do not know whether the Prime Minister proposes to make a statement to the House about her visit to the Far East.

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): indicated dissent.

Mr. Foot: The Prime Minister shakes her head. After such visits, the Prime Minister normally makes a report to the house. There were many matters that arose during that tour that should have been reported to the House.

Will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that we shall have a full six days for discussion on the Queen's Speech? A host of industrial matters are crowding for discussion. The steel industry is only one of them. Other industries are threatened by Government policy and the general position. I trust that the right hon. Gentleman will allow the opportunity for a full debate on the Queen's Speech.

Mr. Biffen: I shall take in reverse order the points that the right hon. Gentleman makes. I acknowledge that there is great interest in having a full debate upon the Queen's Speech as it gives an opportunity to discuss a range of domestic economic issues, including the steel industry. I am happy to confirm that there will be a six-day debate as he requests.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has given a written answer which sets out the points covered by her Far Eastern tour. I am certain that that answer can be supplemented during the debate on the Queen's Speech.
I take account at once of the right hon. Gentleman's anxieties about Britoil. Those anxieties are not confined to the Opposition. I shall do my best to ensure that a statement on that matter is made next week.
I recognise the right hon. Gentleman's anxiety to have a usual-channels discussion about the talks that have been conducted over the past 24 hours by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry. I know that the House will want to be apprised of what is decided. I shall certainly see what can be done.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Will the right hon. Gentleman be putting down a motion to give more than one and a half hours for the consideration of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order in view of its great importance to that Province and the unique nature of the legislation? If he does not put down such a motion, does he understand that it will be taken as yet another instance of the cold and unremitting hostility of the Government to that Province and its people?

Mr. Biffen: The hostility is in the eye of the beholder. It is proposed that the motion shall be taken on Monday evening following the normal rules of procedure for a 90-minute debate. It is a matter which has been widely discussed by the Northern Ireland Office—

Mr. Powell: "Office"?

Mr. Biffen: —by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his Ministers with those in the Province. I am certain that there will be a constructive debate if there is a constructive attitude of mind.

Mr. Edward du Cann: Following the publication of the Treasury's comment on the report from the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee on efficiency and effectiveness in the Civil Service and certain other much more controversial comments, will my right hon. Friend arrange a debate on the Civil Service early in the new Session?

Mr. Biffen: I cannot make any such arrangement for next week, but I shall bear in mind my right hon. Friend's point.

Mr. A. J. Beith: Because of the evident anxiety felt by police officers about the sudden announcement of a 4 per cent. pension contribution


increase, will the Leader of the House arrange for a debate on the prayer on that matter tabled by my right hon. and hon. Friends?
Will the right hon. Gentleman also make arrangements for the bound copies of Hansard to be supplied more regularly to the Prime Minister so that she can see that my party consistently opposed the closed shop provisions in Labour Government legislation and attempted to persuade the Conservative Party to do so?

Mr. Biffen: I shall certainly look into the first point raised by the hon. Gentleman, but I cannot give such an undertaking for next week. On the second point, I am certain that the hon. Gentleman, as a political advocate, does not have to rely on bound copies of Hansard to secure his point of view.

Mr. Dafydd Wigley: In view of the controversy in Wales surrounding the possibility of health expenditure cuts, especially following yesterday's announcement by South Glamorgan area health authority, and in view of early-day motion No. 703 standing in the names of myself and of all four Opposition parties in Wales—
[That this House condemns the proposals outlined in the Welsh Office paper entitled 'Health Service Resources in Wales, 1983–84', dated 23rd August 1982, which implies cuts in health authority expenditure in Wales of £56 million; notes that the Welsh Health Authorities Chairmen Meeting, held on 24th September at Brecon, has reacted strongly against these proposed cuts, and has indicated that they would imply the closure of hospitals at such speed as would make the normal consultation procedure impractical, would dramatically increase waiting lists for in-hospital treatment, and would require the shedding of staff to an extent that would cause the deterioration of the health service in Wales; furthermore, this House expresses grave doubts as to whether the area health authorities in Wales will be able to meet their statutory duties if such cuts are imposed upon them or to limit the effects of the cuts to non-priority areas; and concludes that the cuts in area health spending outlined in this document are unacceptable to the people of Wales and instructs the Secretary of State for Wales to issue a clear and unequivocal withdrawal of these proposals.]—will the Leader of the House find time for a statement to be made next week by the Secretary of State for Wales on the status of the document "Health Service Resources in Wales, 1983–84" that the Welsh Office produced on 23 August?

Mr. Biffen: I shall draw that point to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Wales.

Sir Paul Bryan: does my right hon. Friend recall early-day motion No. 531, signed by 150 hon. Members?
[That this House welcomes the report of the Overseas Student Trust as a basis for an enduring policy for overseas students' fees; recognises its recommendations as a responsible balance between British interests and obligations, and the needs of overseas students; urges Her Majesty's Government to accept in particular the recommendation that students from British dependent territories should pay the home level of fees thus removing the anomaly by which a student from, for example, Hong Kong or the Falkland Islands, can be asked to pay up to

12 times as much for a course as a student from the European Economic Community; and supports the proposal that concessionary levels of fees should be considered for Cyprus.]
When will there be an opportunity to discuss this matter now that four months have elapsed since the report was made?

Mr. Biffen: I am sure that my hon. Friend, with all his skill and ingenuity, will be able to raise this subject in the debates on the Queen's Speech which will clearly include a range of topics such as this.

Mr. Andrew Faulds: Since the Prime Minister's visit to Hong Kong caused dismay in the colony and damaged our relations with China, is it not incumbent on her to come to the House to make a statement and to answer questions on that subject?

Mr. Biffen: As I do not accept the premise, I do not accept the conclusion.

Mr. John G. Blackburn: Will my right hon. Friend give serious consideration to whether there should be a statement or possibly a full debate on the expenditure of over £81 million of public money on the De Lorean car company, especially as its collapse has had such an impact on suppliers in the West Midlands and two companies in my constituency?

Mr. Biffen: I am sure that my hon. Friend will join me in welcoming the news that the Public Accounts Committee is to examine this matter. I shall, of course, draw the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to the point that my hon. Friend makes.

Mr. George Foulkes: Will the Leader of the House say when the Government's response to the recommendations contained in the Shackleton report will be published? Will the House have the opportunity to discuss the report and the Government's response?

Mr. Biffen: No. I shall, however, consider the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. I shall be in communication with him.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Does my right hon. Friend intend to allow the press to have a copy of the Queen's Speech in advance of its delivery with a "Stop" notice on it? If so, will he let me have a copy if I promise not to leak it?

Mr. Biffen: In the real world, I have a much more passive role in all these matters than my hon. Friend supposes.

Mr. A. E. P. Duffy: Will the right hon. Gentleman give serious consideration to the request by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition for a debate on steel next week? It is not only a question of the EEC agreement concealing certain misunderstandings and even incipient threats to British steel from across the Atlantic. The chairman of British Steel is also expected to announce, long before the Queen's Speech and the debate on it, the conclusions of his current review. The chairman is not merely wrestling with demand, as the Prime Minister seems to think, or even the future configuration of British Steel; he AS considering whether there will be a steel industry at all.

Mr. Biffen: The hon. Gentleman speaks on this topic with all the authority of an hon. Member representing a


Sheffield constituency. He will understand, I am sure, that I cannot go beyond the answer that I gave the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Sydney Bidwell: Before the onset of winter, will the right hon. Gentleman consider arranging a debate on fuel prices and fixed standing charges for electricity and gas as they affect the aged poor? These people are terrified about the prospect of another winter like last winter.

Mr. Biffen: I fear that I cannot offer the prospect of a debate next week.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Membersrose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I propose to allow questions to run until 4 pm in the hope that all those wishing to put questions will be accommodated.

Mr. R. A. McCrindle: On the issue of trade policy, on a basis wider than that relating to steel, will my right hon. Friend arrange to have repeated in the House the statement made yesterday in the other place by the Secretary of State for Trade who seemed to imply that the Government were moving towards a change of policy in respect of the protection of this country's vital interests? Is it not desirable that his statement should at least be repeated if there cannot be a debate before the House prorogues?

Mr. Biffen: I am certain that my right hon. and noble Friend made a very important speech earlier this week. I cannot believe that a Queen's Speech debate can take place without a great deal of it being devoted to trade topics.

Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: Is the Leader of the House aware of early-day motion No. 707 relating to the privatisation of the National Maritime Institute?
[That the transfer of the undertaking and assets of the National Maritime Institute to NMI Ltd., as set out in the Treasury Minute dated 30 September 1982, be not proceeded with until long-term arrangements beyond 1987 have been agreed with the Shadow Board of NMI Ltd. and with the Institution of Professional Civil Servants for the capital and revenue support for fundamental research into the areas of maritime technology, ocean engineering and civil engineering aerodynamics, that are of strategic national importance, on terms and conditions no less favourable than those enjoyed by competing foreign establishments.]
I appreciate that there is no obligation on the Government to have a debate on the issue on the Floor of the House. However, will the right hon. Gentleman draw to the attention of his right hon. Friends the immense importance of strategic research by that institute in key areas related to the long-term future of this country and see that arrangements are made for safeguarding it?

Mr. Biffen: The hon. Gentleman makes a serious, albeit contentious, point. I shall ensure that the appropriate Secretary of State is made aware of his views.

Mr. James Wellbeloved: Will the Leader of the House find time for an urgent debate into the horrifying death of Lucy Gates who lost her life while in the care of the local authority? Is he aware that the urgency

of a debate is magnified by the refusal of the council of the London borough of Bexley to publish the results of the inquiry that has been held into the little girl's death?

Mr. Biffen: I cannot give any guarantee of Government time for a debate on that subject next week. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be the first to acknowledge that it is exactly the type of topic that can be pursued with success and vigour by a Back-Bench Member.

Mr. Richard Needham: Is my right hon. Friend aware of early-day motion No. 705:
[That this House congratulates the Electrical and Engineering Staff Association, a section of the E.E.P.T.U., on its decision not to support the 24-hour strike in the steel industry on 22nd October on the grounds, first, that the strike can only damage the industry further and, secondly, that the TUC Steel Committee did not fully consult with members before calling for action; asks the Government to consider urgently the steps requested by the Electrical and Engineering Staff Association to help British Steel, notably, effective licensing and monitoring of foreign imports, tighter EEC Regulations and investigation of unfair subsidies; and urges the Trades Union Congress not to call for any further damaging national strikes without fair and secret ballots of all trade union members affected.]
It shows that many of my hon. Friends would also welcome support for a debate on the steel industry to show their backing for the brave stand of the Electrical and Engineering Staff Association in deploring the strike later this week that can only do even more damage to the steel industry. Does my right hon. Friend accept that many hon. Members would welcome a debate in order to point out that American steel workers cost an average of $amp;23 an hour and are earning four to five times more than a British steel worker, without, in many cases, any corresponding increase in productivity?

Mr. Biffen: I note my hon. Friend's desire for a debate on the steel industry. I admire the manner in which he has given a trailer of his speech, should he be called to make one.

Mr. David Winnick: Does the Leader of the House recognise the urgency of obtaining a statement from the Home Secretary on Operation Countryman? Is he aware of the considerable public disquiet over remarks made by the former chief constable of Dorset, the first head of Operation Countryman, that there had been some obstruction over inquiries into allegations of corruption in the police force? Will the right hon. Gentleman try to ensure that a statement is made by the Home Secretary before the new Session begins?

Mr. Biffen: I shall certainly ensure that my right hon. Friend is made aware of the point made by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Tony Marlow: In view of what the Prime Minister has said, will my right hon. Friend confirm that the White Paper on the immigration rules to be issued next week will be more along the lines of a discussion document than a statement of Government policy?

Mr. Biffen: The description "White Paper" means that it is bound to be a statement of Government policy. That it will give rise to plenty of discussion I have no doubt.

Mr. John Home Robertson: Would it not be for the convenience of the House if the specifically and exclusively Scottish business set down for debate next Wednesday was referred to the Scottish Grand Committee sitting in Edinburgh? Would it not also be for the convenience of the people of Scotland, who are suffering education cuts, to know that the Government intend to spend even more in support of private education?

Mr. Biffen: The decision to have Scottish Grand Committee sittings in Edinburgh is one of such delicacy that it is better undertaken as a result of widespread consultation and agreement in this House rather than as a result of unilateral action on my part.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: Would it be possible to have a debate next week or subsequently on the intimidation of trade union members? People who stop three-year-old babies having operations may find that their branch gets a letter from the union, but those who choose to work when they have been told to go on strike find that the intimidation is much greater, more personal and comes much quicker.

Mr. Biffen: I note my hon. Friend's point. This is not the first time that he has made it. I have to tell him that there is no likelihood of Government time being made available next week for a debate of that character.

Mr. Dennis Skinner: May I add my voice to the request already made by two of my hon. Friends for a statement from the Prime Minister on her glorified Far East tour? Is it not a fact that when she went to Japan she found them in a financial crisis and left with a flea in her ear and that she left Hong Kong in a constitutional mess? After she turned her back on the Chinese, they started talking to the Russians for the first time in 30 years.

Mr. Biffen: I cannot helpfully add to what I said to the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds).

Mr. Laurie Pavitt: Will the Leader of the House ask the Secretary of State for Social Services to make a statement next week about the chaos and demoralisation in the NHS following the most recent reorganisation? This has nothing to do with the pay dispute. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that thousands of senior nursing officers are still not aware, six months after the appointed day, whether they have a job. The demoralising effect runs through every hospital in the country. May we have a statement?

Mr. Biffen: I will draw the hon. Gentleman's comments to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman accepts that yesterday's debate went wider than merely the industrial dispute. Nevertheless, I will ensure that his remarks are passed on.

Mr. James Lamond: Will the Leader of the House keep in mind, at least for the new Session, the fact that we have not had a debate on the United Nations special session on disarmament and that the Madrid conference on European security is about to reopen? It would be good for his party to begin to show a little interest in disarmament, because it is a very big vote catcher.

Mr. Biffen: I had not forgotten the topic and I knew that the hon. Gentleman would not let me forget it. May

I suggest, in a friendly spirit, that he makes his speech in the debate on the Queen's Speech. There is more likelihood of his being able to put his views on the record then than there is that we shall have a specific debate on the matter.

Mr. Timothy Smith: Will my right hon. Friend give us an assurance that there will be an opportunity to debate the recommendations of the Hunt committee on cable broadcasting before the Government reach a decision on the proposals?

Mr. Biffen: I am certain that it would he most appropriate for the House to consider that matter in the early stages of the general deliberations on the topic.

Mr. Stanley Newens: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that, whatever may be his view of the effects in the Far East of the Prime Minister's pronouncements on the future of Hong Kong, a written reply on the matter is inadequate? Will he tell us the terms on which we are to expect the Prime Minister to make statements after such visits? In vew of her refusal to make a statement, what other opportunities will we have to discuss the important matters relating to the future of Hong Kong?

Mr. Biffen: I believe that the hon. Gentleman will find that there are precedents for a Prime Minister to report in a written answer on a visit undertaken during a recess. However, there will certainly be every opportunity in the debate on foreign policy, within the ambit of the Queen's Speech debate, for all these matters to be considered further.

Mr. Dennis Canavan: Has the Leader of the House forgotten that the first Order of the Day for next Wednesday is the Second Reading of my Scottish Parliament Bill, which is in the hands of the printers and ought to be available in the next few days? As it is a fairly simple, straightforward Bill, will the Government grant time for the Second Reading, Committee stage, Report stage and Third Reading on the Floor of the Howe next week so that we can have a Scottish Parliament passing Scottish legislation in the next Session, instead of the rubbish that has been passed by this Tory Government over the past three and a half years?

Mr. Biffen: When the hon. Gentleman commends something as being simple and straightforward, it is consensus politics at its most dangerous.

Mr. Bob Cryer: Will the Leader of the House arrange for a statement on the De Lorean car company, in view of the recent serious developments? He knows that some of us have been following that matter for many years.
Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman, as a former Secretary of State for Trade, will know of the anxiety felt throughout the textile industry about the multi-fibre arrangement. As he knows, 18 agreements have been made, 19 are outstanding and there are serious questions whether the mandate will be retained for the remainder and whether contingency plans are being made to withdraw from the MFA if necessary. The textile industry AS beleaguered and is anxious for a statement and a debate in the House.

Mr. Biffen: On the hon. Gentleman's first point, I will pass his remarks to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of


State for Northern Ireland. The MFA negotiations are a matter of great concern and could suitably occupy a place in the debate on the Queen's Speech. I will, of course, draw to the attention of my hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Trade the points made by the hon. Gentleman.

Orders of the Day — Criminal Justice Bill

Lords amendments considered.

Clause 1

GENERAL RESTRICTION ON CUSTODIAL SENTENCES

Lords amendment: No. 6, in page 2, line 14, at end insert

"because it appears to the court that he is unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties or because a custodial sentence is necessary for the protection of the public or because the offence was so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified".

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Patrick Mayhew): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Clause 1 provides that no court shall impose a custodial sentence on a young offender unless it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate. The amendment elaborates on that provision by requiring the court to base its opinion on one of three possible grounds, which are the failure of non-custodial penalties, the need to protect the public, and the seriousness of the offence.
Amendments on these lines were debated at considerable length during the passage of the Bill through this House. The Government have throughout sympathised with the intention behind the amendments, but we take the view that they place no further effective restriction on the passing of custodial sentences on young offenders. That is because they reflect accurately the existing principles by which the courts already exercise their sentencing jurisdiction custodially.
Our preference would be to leave the courts to develop their sentencing practice according to the guidance that they will undoubtedly receive from the Court of Appeal on the basis of the application of the legislation to actual cases. Nevertheless, the Government do not seek to disagree with the Lords amendment.

Dr. Shirley Summerskill: As there are 295 Lords amendments to the Bill, I should assure the House that the Opposition Front Bench will not speak on them all. However, it is important to speak on those that make significant changes in the Bill, and amendment No. 6 is one of the most significant.
The Minister of State said that he had reservations about the amendment, and the Government voted against it in another place. So strong were their reservations that they became positive opposition. Fortunately, right prevailed and the Government were defeated on the first amendment debated in another place. Many other successes followed.
It is an important amendment because, although the Opposition have taken the view throughout the passage of the Bill that no offender under 17 should receive a custodial sentence, we feel that the amendment will help young people who are put into custody.
There must be a range of facilities, regimes and punishments—alternatives to custody—to provide education, training and preparation for the future. That will also


serve to reduce the numbers held in custody, which is still over 44,000. We want to save as much money as possible by keeping as many people as possible out of custody.
Although the Government rejected the view that we should keep the under-seventeens out of prison and custody, the next best thing is to ensure, as I hope the amendment will, that unless the offence is extremely serious courts will take more time to satisfy themselves that the alternatives to custody will not be responded to by the young person concerned. The recidivism of young people who are sentenced to custody in borstals and detention centres is notoriously high. It is clear that for most of them custody is not a deterrent, because 76 per cent. of young people leaving detention centres, and 83 per cent. of those leaving borstals, are reconvicted within two years.
We therefore welcome the fact that courts will now have to apply their minds—far more, perhaps, than they do at present—to the nature and background of the young persons being sentenced. It will not be easy to make this assessment and judgment, but surely it is worth making every effort to decide whether that person is either unwilling or unable, by his or her nature, to respond to non-custodial penalties.
Let us put the first emphasis on non-custodial care and control and use custody only as a last resort when non-custodial penalties fail. That, after all, was the philosophy of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, with its emphasis on prevention and welfare. We hope that the amendment will put that into practice.
In its reference to the necessity to impose a custodial sentence to protect the public, the Lords amendment echoes the view expressed by the Home Secretary, who said that custody and prison should be reserved for those who are a danger to the public. Among European Community countries, this country has the highest number of children and young people in custodial care. We lock up three times as many young people under the age of 17 as we did 20 years ago, yet there is no evidence that we are more successful than those other countries in reducing crime. The guidelines to the courts provided by the amendment could lead to a gradual shift from custodial to non-custodial care and a far more sensible approach to the treatment of young offenders.

Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk: The Minister and the House will be aware that, for the past 10 years or more, a fairly unanimous opinion has been expressed by all those who are concerned and knowledgeable about the penal system that we should shift the emphasis and resources away from custodial care to treatment in the community, and that that is particularly appropriate for young children and juveniles. Nevertheless, while making that commitment, the practice has been for an increasing number of younger and less delinquent young people and juveniles to be committed to custodial care.
It was for that reason that I and some hon. Members from both sides attempted in Committee to lay down strict statutory criteria which had to be complied with before the courts could impose a custodial sentence. Throughout the Committee stage, the Government resisted such amendments. They did not argue against the terms or the principles of the amendments either here or in the other place. The amendments that we are now discussing, which were made in another place, were eventually accepted on a Division against Government opposition. Therefore, I

wholeheartedly welcome the amendments, which lay down detailed statutory criteria for the imposition of custodial sentences on young people, which were proposed in another place by members of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group.
As I said, those amendments were carried on a Division against the wishes of the Government. It is fair to add that, although the Government opposed the amendments, they did not oppose them on their merits. They took the view that it was better for the Court of Appeal to lay down the criteria than to include them in legislation. Having lost the vote, the Government, to their credit, announced their acceptance of the principle underlying the amendments. If the criteria in the amendments are to be strictly adhered to in future and applied by the courts, they could have a significant impact, as my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) pointed out, on the number of young people given custodial sentences.
There is a myth, to which Government spokemen sometimes give credibility, that courts resort to imposing custodial sentences only as a last resort: that it is only when all other options have failed and all other alternatives have been explored and found wanting that the courts resort reluctantly and unenthusiastically to custodial sentences.
The facts demonstrate that the practice is different. For example, Home Office studies have shown that more than one-third of young people received into borstals have not received a previot s probation or supervision order made against them. The percentages of those entering detention centres who have not had a previous probation or supervision order are even higher. The studies show that we are prepared to impose, and in fact do impose, custodial sentences on younger and less delinquent young people today than we did 10 years ago, even when we have not attempted to use non-custodial measures such as supervision or probation orders. The Home Office figures clearly demonstrate that fact.
The figures also show that offenders who have not been subject to a previous attempt to deal with their difficulties or delinquency in the community are convicted of not particularly serious offences. For example, only one in five offenders under the age of 21 years given custodial sentences have committed serious offences involving violence, sex or robbery.
It is common ground among all parties that penal institutions do not reform or rehabilitate. They are largely ineffective in turning offenders into law-abiding, positive and constructive members of the community. Again, the figures on recidivism bear that out, with well over 70 per cent. of young people sent to penal establishments committing further offences within two years of their release. The evidence clearly shows that putting young people into penal establishments does them no good. Nor does it do anyone else any good. The real way to deal with their problems and difficulties and to turn them away from their lives of delinquency and criminality is to deal with their problems where they have their roots—in the community.
Thus, any measure, such as the one we are debating, that is designed to restrict the conditions under which a number of young people are put in custodial establishments is to be welcomed. These amendments should help to guard against what I believe is one of the greatest dangers in the Bill involving the new short detention centres. It is desirable in principle that young people may


be sentenced for three weeks instead of three months, but it may have the potential of ensuring that more young people who otherwise might receive a non-custodial sentence will now be given a detention sentence. At least these criteria may prevent that and ensure that fewer young offenders receive custodial sentences in future.
Of all the changes that have been made to part I in this place and in another place, this amendment, in my view, is by far the most important and the only one which has any prospect of reversing the disastrous and inappropriate trend of the past 10 years of putting more young people in custody. For that reason alone, I welcome and endorse the amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 7, in page 2, line 18, leave out subsections (6) and (7).

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker Mr. Paul Dean): With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 8, 246 and 273.

Mr. Mayhew: These amendments give effect to an undertaking which the Government gave on Report in response to pressure to provide that a court should always and invariably consider a social inquiry report before imposing a custodial sentence on a young offender. That created difficulties, because there could sometimes be cases in which a rigid requirement of that kind would be inappropriate. Such a case might arise where, for example, the court, after a long trial, had a great deal of information about the offender and his circumstances and where the offence was so serious that a substantial custodial sentence was unavoidable.
It would clearly be wrong if, in such circumstances, the court had to adjourn the case before passing sentence simply because that information did not happen to be in the form of a social inquiry report. After long debate, there was general agreement that a court should normally consider a social inquiry report before passing a custodial sentence on a young offender, but that it should be able to dispense with the requirement where, in the circumstances of the case, it thought such a report unnecessary. That is the provision which the new clause makes.
We took the opportunity offered by these amendments to rearrange slightly the opening clauses of the Bill. The new clause incorporates the provisions which appear in subsections (6) and (7) of clause 1, and those are accordingly deleted by amendment No. 7. Clause 1 sets out the general principle that a court may not impose a custodial sentence on a young offender unless it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate. The new clause elaborates on that provision by providing that the court should usually consider a social inquiry report and that it must take into account any information before it which is relevant to the offender's character and his physical and mental condition. A magistrates' court must state and record the reasons for its opinion that no other method of dealing with the offender is appropriate and, if necessary, its reason for dispensing with a social inquiry report.
The clause improves and strengthens the Bill in a way that will be apparent to the House. I do not think I need say more.

Mr. Matthew Parris: My hon. and learned Friend thinks that we should agree with the amendment, and I shall take his advice. However, I have one slight misgiving which I should like to take this occasion to express.
When I was at university, a group of rowdies from the boat club got drunk, smashed up a restaurant and assaulted several people in the town. To everybody's surprise, they were sent to prison for a short while. That was an excellent idea. It helped to repair relations between the university and the town and it set a good example to other undergraduates who might have considered behaving in a similar way.
A social inquiry report on those young men would probably have concluded that they came from good backgrounds, with supportive families, and that that was errant behaviour and that they were unlikely ever to offend like that again. Yet that seems to me to be a good example of where a custodial sentence is appropriate.
I realise that if the courts think that a custodial sentence is necessary for the protection of the public they can still impose such a sentence without a social inquiry report, but the Lords amendment goes even further than the Bill towards discouraging all but the most strong-minded of magistrates' courts from imposing custodial sentences in any circumstances. As I say, I have a slight misgiving about that.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 8 agreed to.

Clause 4

CONSECUTIVE TERMS AND AGGREGATE PERIODS OF DETENTION

Lords amendment: No. 9, in page 5, line 15, leave out from "that" to " ; and" in line 17 and insert
the only appropriate method of dealing with him is to pass a custodial sentence on him.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment harmonises the wording of clauses 3, 4 and 5. Clauses 3 and 5 require a court, in dealing with an offender, to be satisfied that
the only appropriate method of dealing with him is to pass a custodial sentence on him".
Clause 4, on the other hand, expresses the same provision in the words
a custodial sentence would be appropriate for the offence.
The amendment deletes those words from clause 4 and replaces them with the expression used in clauses 3 and 5, which are in negative terms.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5

YOUTH CUSTODY: OFFENDERS AGED 15 TO 20

Lords amendment: No. 10, in page 6, line 19, at end insert—

"(2A) If a court passes a sentence of youth custody on an offender because it considers that his detention in a detention centre would be unsuitable because of his mental condition, it shall certify in the warrant of commitment that it passed the sentence of youth custody for that reason."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 17.

Mr. Mayhew: The purpose of these amendments is to ensure that where a young offender is sentenced to youth custody because his mental condition precludes a detention centre order, and that fact is recorded on the warrant of commitment, he may be held in a youth custody centre or remand centre but not in a prison. There are two limited exceptions. Power to hold in a prison for temporary purposes is retained and the amendments do not apply to people whose sentences are below 21 days. That is because they go to allocation units in local prisons after sentence. There will not be time to assess and transfer some of them to youth custody centres at all, and, by definition, others could go there for only a matter of days, sometimes travelling great distances to do so.
Taken together, therefore, the amendments will exclude as many of those young people from prisons as is possible in practice. I should add that we undertake that those serving less than 21 days who do have to remain in prisons will be properly assessed by the medical officers concerned and placed in the establishments' hospitals where necessary.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I welcome the amendment, which provides that offenders who are given a short youth custody sentence because they are considered mentally unfit for detention centres should not in future be placed in adult prisons to serve their sentences.
The Minister, on behalf of the Government, initially opposed a similar amendment which was proposed by members of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. The Government now deserve credit for bowing to the weight of all-party opinion that was expressed in the House and in another place by agreeing to amend the Bill along the lines of the amendment then proposed.
Under the original form of the Bill, it would have been possible for young, mentally ill people, whose mental state demands that they should receive the best possible nursing care and treatment, to be dumped instead in adult local prisons. The local prisons are institutions which are currently the most overcrowded, which have the most appalling conditions and where the resources and facilities for dealing with young people—particularly young people who have a mental illness or disorder—are wholly lacking. They are the penal dustbins of the whole penal estate.
The amendments will prevent such young people being put in inappropriate locations and will therefore remove a serious imperfection.

Mr. Charles Irving: I support the speech of the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). He paid tribute to the Government for what has been a remarkable week. Early this week we had a dramatic and radical Bill on mental health. That was a significant step, which should be applauded, and which Ministers and the Government have taken the initiative in promoting.
We are now debating the Lords amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. In his usual courteous way, the hon. Gentleman paid tribute to the Government and I join him in his fulsome tribute to Ministers who have spent a great deal of time on the variety of views that have poured in

upon them from various organisations, some wanting this and some that. To compromise and to find a solution, as they have done, is commendable, and I say that not only as a Member of the House but as vice-chairman of the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders and chairman of the Stoneham housing association.
I welcome any steps that are now being taken to help those who are suffering from mental disorders or youngsters who are in danger of spending a considerable time in adult penal institutions. I welcome any law that provides a stricter criterion for imposing a custodial sentence on a young offender. As the hon. Member for Ormskirk said, the amendment received overwhelming support from the all-party group and from the other place.
It is valid to point out several factors involved in dealing with those young people who have mental problems. Many of those who spend much of their time in such work are disturbed by the ineffectiveness of custodial sentences on many young people. Each year. that ineffectiveness is dramatically illustrated by the reconviction figures published by the prison department. For example, over the past six years the reconviction rate for young adults leaving prison has risen from 64 per cent. to 69 per cent.; for those leaving borstals from 63 per cent. to 68 per cent.; and, most strikingly of all, for those leaving detention centres from 54 per cent. to 63 per cent.—an increase of nearly 10 per cent. in just over six years. Those are the overall reconviction rates for offenders under the age of 21.
The figures for juveniles under the age of 17 are even more alarming. Indeed, 72 per cent. of juveniles leaving detention centres and 78 per cent. of those leaving borstals are reconvicted within two years. In December 1979., the former Minister of State, Home Office, now the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, spoke in Derby and gave the main reason why penal establishments for young offenders had such high failure rates. He said:
our aim must be to leach the young offender to live freely in the community without indulging in unacceptable behaviour. And it is obvious, from common sense, from experience and from research, that teaching anyone to come to terms with the community in which he lives must for the most part better be done in that community than in an artificial institutional setting providing supports which will be removed as soon as the youngster returns to his own home.
Sad to say, many of those in secure accommodation in prisons are there mainly because of mental disorders. We should provide constructive alternatives for non-violent offenders. The amendment will open up a new vista and remove—as the hon. Member for Ormskirk said—from the dustbins of our penal institutions those who should not be there and who could be better cared for and looked after elsewhere. Many constructive options are available to the courts, including community service orders, intermediate treatment, probation and supervision order, attendance centres, and so on. To those of us involved, they all appear to have a much better chance of helping young offenders than custodial measures.
There is a further, very powerful argument for reducing the use of custody. The sheer cost of imprisonment is colossal. It never does any harm to remind ourselves that it now costs £177 per week to keep one person in prison, £180 per week for a borstal place and £156 for a place in a detention centre. For a residential home with secure accommodation it can cost up to £400 per week. In comparison a probation order with conditions costs about


£350 per year and a community service order costs about £400 per year. The annual cost to the Home Office of a place in a hostel run by the Stonham housing association—of which I am fortunate enough to be chairman—is about £1,200 per year. Such comparisons must surely impress the Home Office, the Home Secretary and, in particular, the Departments in which those involved are sadly having to scratch around for savings in their budgets. Alternatives make not only penological, but humanitarian sense. In addition, they must surely make economic sense.
I shall refer later to any criticisms that I might have of the Bill. Indeed, if I have any criticism it refers not to what the Bill does, but, perhaps sadly, to what it is unable to do at the moment. We must ensure that a decisive switch away from custody and towards alternative measures is adequately funded. For example, probation orders must be supported by adequate resources, especially for hostels.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon >: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for hon. Members to make long, prepared speeches supporting an amendment from the other place that is approved of by the Government and that is not disputed by any other hon. Member? If so, our debates on the Bill will continue until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. There are 240 amendments.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have not yet heard anything that is out of order from the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Irving), but perhaps I should take this opportunity to remind him and the House that it is not in order to debate the Bill. Contributions must relate directly to the Lords amendments.

Mr. Irving: I said earlier that I would want to say more about the Bill generally. I am sorry if I have upset the hon. Gentleman, but there is nothing to stop him going home if he does not want to listen. However, I should be sorry to find him missing, because I seldom have an opportunity to look at him.
My points relate not only to the mentally sick but to those suffering from temporary disorders. Most of the young people involved have committed offences against property, involving sums that are generally much less than £100. That fact must be related to the cost of custody. Probation officers have immense problems. Many of those young people who suffer from such disorders could be looked after properly in hostels provided by some housing associations. There must be options available to the court. Hostels and day centres play an important part but they are scarce and, in some areas, non-existent. The amendment rightly seeks to accommodate the growing numbers of those involved, but there are still far too few facilities available. It is particularly important to develop hostels and other forms of supportive accommodation so that we can meet the growing problem of homelessness among young people.
NACRO has estimated that homeless young offenders are twice as likely to re-offend as those with a home, and, because it disrupts youngsters' ties with the community, custody itself helps to promote the very homelessness that so often leads back into crime. This makes the Home Office's decision—perhaps a slight word of discord here—to impose a standstill this year on finance for new

schemes run by voluntary organisations tragically shortsighted. The Home Office has found it difficult to take advantage of the opportunity to expand the number of hostel places for offenders presented by the availability of extra Housing Corporation finance. The standstill could well mean that 500 new hostel places which would have been made available this year—about half of them to be managed by the Stonham housing association—will not, or may not, be established.
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Parliament has not yet seen the public expenditure Estimates for the next financial year, and it is possible that there may be a small amount of money available, but it will not be easy to undo the demoralisation caused to local committees whose hard work and planning has been wrecked by this year's standstill. If we are talking about alternatives for youngsters with mental disorders and mental health difficulties, we are talking about voluntary organisations such as Stonham that can only be managed and run without astronomical costs to the community because they are supported and run by volunteers. In this one organisation alone, we are dependent upon 3,500 voluntary workers to keep our 180 local management committees going. In financial terms, this must be an immense saving to the State.
Far worse, however, is the likely effect in the blighted lives of the homeless people who will unnecessarily end up in custody because of the lack of suitable alternatives.
The cost to the Home Office of financing these extra hostel places would have been small in comparison with the massive resources that, it is proposed, will be devoted to the establishment of increased prison facilities. It would need a transfer of only a tiny fraction of the money devoted to the prison building programme, which will provide 5,000 new prison places by 1990 at a capital cost of £40,000 to £50,000 each, to provide more humane, effective and economical alternatives for many of those now totally and unnecessarily committed to custodial sentences.
It is successive Governments' neglect of the penal system that has led us to the very sad and sorry position in which we now find ourselves, and Labour Governments must fully share the blame. Nor am I impressed by the behaviour sometimes of our own colleagues—Members of Parliament—who profess enlightenment in speeches in the House but betray their fine words by their actions in their constituencies when they return and find that they are being placed, so to speak, in the dock by the community because they are seeking to establish either a hostel or a home. That is so particularly in mental health matters.
Let hon. Members who have not done so try to establish a small home with half a dozen psychiatric or ex-psychiatric places for youngsters in a residential community. They will find a problem. We have done it; we do it; but everyone must be prepared to stand up and be counted. Again, this is where we owe such great gratitude, not only to the probation and after-care service, but to the social services and to those dedicated people in the community who, often with not even a word of thanks, are ready to be among those who will stand up and be counted. I am glad to say that there are a number of good colleagues on both sides of the House who are prepared to take exactly that line.
I am grateful for this opportunity to address a few brief words to the amendment. I support the amendment


although I consider, generally speaking, that the Bill still does too little. Nevertheless, it is a step forward and the amendment will contribute to it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9

COMPUTATION OF CUSTODIAL SENTENCES FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS

Lords amendment: No. 11, in page 8, line 19 leave out "subsection" and insert "subsections".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Paul Dean): With this we shall also discuss Lords amendment No. 12, in page 8, line 27, at end insert—
(6) The reference in subsection (1) above to an offender being committed to custody by an order of a court includes a reference to his being committed to a remand centre or to prison under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 or section 37 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 but does not include a reference to his being committed to the care of a local authority under the said section 23",
and the amendment standing in the name of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley), at end add
save where the offender is placed in accomodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty for the period or part of the period of commital to care, which period shall be treated as a period of custody for the purpose of subsection (1) above.".

Mr. Mayhew: Section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides that a period of imprisonment shall be treated as reduced by time spent in custody on remand before sentence. That provision does not apply to detention centre orders and sentences of borstal training. The announcement made in the White Paper on young offenders that time spent in custody on remand would serve to reduce the new young offender custodial sentences was widely welcomed.
Clause 9 provides that section 67 of the 1967 Act is to apply to detention centre orders and youth custody sentences as it applies to sentences of imprisonment. Amendment No. 11 provides that when a juvenile is committed on remand to a remand centre or to a prison the time spent there on remand will serve to reduce a subsequent custodial sentence, but when he is committed on remand to the care of a local authority that will not count towards his sentence. The need for this amendment was discovered at a late stage of the passage of the Bill and it derives from complex statutory provisions with which I do not think it necessary to weary the House.
When a juvenile under the age of 17 is remanded to the care of a local authority under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 the local authority decides on the appropriate placement under the general powers applying to children in care. It may be placement in ordinary residential accommodation or in secure accommodation or it may be with a parent, guardian, relative or friend or boarded out. Although remanding in care means that the local authority takes over responsibility for the young person and may involve, to a greater or lesser extent, restrictions on his freedom, it is quite different from the position where a defendant is remanded in a custodial prison establishment.
Whereas an adult held in prison before sentence has spent a period in custody, this does not apply in the case

even of a juvenile who is placed by the local authority, in the exercise of its discretion, in secure accommodation. Certainly the restriction on his liberty may be severe, but placement in secure accommodation is a professional decision taken by the local authority social workers. It is a decision that may be taken in relation to any child in care and it has in itself nothing to do with whether the young person is an offender or on remand. We do not, therefore, agree that placement in secure accommodation should count towards sentence, which is the policy advocated in the Opposition's amendment.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The hon. and learned Gentleman says that the Government do not agree that placement in secure accommodation is comparable with remand in a remand centre or prison, but does he not accept that conditions in local authority secure units are virtually identical to those in remand centres or prison? The hon. and learned Gentleman is nodding his head. I visited the regional observaticn and assessment centre in Fazakerley in my region only last week. There the secure unit accommodation is referred to as cells. There are bars. The rooms are locked. The whole plan is probably drawn analogous to the precise plans that were laid down for the Risley remand centre. In those circumstances, while the hon. and learned Gentleman may not regard the placements as comparable, the young boys concerned see no difference between that kind of custody and the custody of a remand centre or an adult prison.

Mr. Mayhew: I shall cast my mind back as best I can to the question that preceded most of the hon. Gentleman's intervention and deal with it shortly. I was coming to that point. Of course I agree that secure accommodation is secure accommodation, and it imposes a greater restriction upon the liberty of the child in care than is imposed by the ordinary care order. But even the ordinary care order imposes some restriction on a child because he is not able to live in a way that conflicts with those conditions.
Having said that it is a professional decision taken by the local authority social workers, I was going on to say that remand in care is not in itself a reason to hold a youngster in secure accommodation. We have to consider who is placed in secure accommodation. More often than not it is someone whose conduct is so unruly, to use the words in the Act, that an order is made by reason of unruliness and he is placed in secure accommodation. Therefore, it would be invidious to provide by law that a period spent in secure accommodation by reason, for example, of unruliness while on remand should count towards sentence, while other remands in care, where the remanded young person had behaved well, should not count towards the subsequent sentence.
Having considered carefully what would be the best solution to the difficulty, the answer that we reached was that the place to draw the line in law was between custody on the one hand and care on the other. The placement in secure accommodation is used as sparingly as possible, and that is another practical and important point.
In some instances juveniles are placed in secure accommodation for short periods—perhaps for only a matter of hours. When youngsters are kept in security they may spend part of their time outside the secure accommodation. That flexibility is an important part of the arrangement and it is very different from the custodial


accommodation and the custodial orders mentioned by the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). Flexibility is a very important part of the arrangement.
Therefore, we think that it would be wrong to base the legal calculation of sentence length on a distinction between time spent in residential care and time spent in secure accommodation. That is not to say that we propose to remove the distinction between the two. We think that it is highly desirable that the courts should know the circumstances of the remand in care and that, for the reasons I have given, it would be wrong for such time or part of it to count towards sentence automatically, but the courts ought to be able to take it into account in deciding on the right sentence. Accordingly, that is why we propose that the local authority should inform the courts of the placement of youngsters remanded to their care when they come up in court for sentence, so that the courts will always know whether they are dealing with a case where a youngster has spent some time in secure accommodation. We think that that will ensure that the courts will be able to take adequate account of the offender's circumstances on remand in deciding the length of sentence.
4.45 pm
It would be easy to make a long speech, but I do not think that I would make the distinction between the two sides on the issue—the Opposition's amendment and the Government's acceptance of the Lords amendment—any clearer by doing so. I entirely understand what lies behind the amendment, but I believe that the practical difficulties will be best met if we ensure, as we propose to do, that the courts will always know whether a child or other young offender has spent time in secure accommodation. We are satisfied, and I hope that the House will accept, that in practice it would be wrong and not really workable to make the distinction that the amendment seeks.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I detected a little bewilderment in the House when I called the amendment. Perhaps it would be helpful if I were to explain the rather complicated procedure. It will be in order to debate amendment No. 11, amendment No. 12 and the amendment to amendment No. 12. At the end of the debate the House will come to a decision on amendment No. 11. If the Opposition then wish to move their amendment to amendment No. 12, I shall give them an opportunity to move it formally so that a decision can be reached on it. I hope that that is clear to the House.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for clearing up what seemed to me to be a procedural jungle. I shall address my remarks to the amendment to Lords amendment No. 12, which has been tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley).
We welcome the provisions in the Bill which state that time spent by young offenders in custody on remand shall count towards sentence in regard to detention centre orders and youth custody orders. We have no hesitation in supporting those very sensible provisions. However, we do not agree with the Lords amendment which establishes that remands in care are not remands in custody, so that time spent in care, whether in ordinary residential accommodation or in secure accommodation does not

count towards sentence—in other words, there is no time off the ultimate sentence in respect of the period spent on remand in care. We think that that is discriminatory and unfair. The Opposition's amendment seeks to ensure that remands spent in secure accommodation shall be treated in the same way as other remands which deprive the defendant of his liberty and shall count towards his sentence in the same way.
Our amendment deals with young people between the ages of 10 and 17. The deprivation of the liberty of someone that young, the curtailment of the freedom of someone that young, is the same to him in its effect whether his freedom is restricted as a result of being in secure accommodation or in a remand centre. The young person affected is most unlikely to understand the fine legal distinction between the two. He is unlikely to understand, for example, why a co-accused of the same age who is remanded in custody to a remand centre should be treated more favourably than himself with regard to remission. In our view, it could lead to an added sense of grievance and injustice at a very sensitive time in the young person's life. He will find it particularly difficult to understand why a young offender, whom he may well know, who has been sent to some place where the regime is more severe than secure accommodation because of his bad, unco-operative and unruly behaviour, should get a remission of sentence, whereas in his own case, although he had behaved well in secure accommodation, he will not be able to get it.
The European Court of Human Rights has laid down that the same procedural guarantee should apply to someone in detention, whatever the circumstances of the detention. Perhaps that will cover the point about envisaging that the right to remission should be the same in the various circumstances of detention.
I accept what the Minister said when he said that he intended that the court should be told of the fact that the accused, when he comes up for sentence, is in secure accommodation, so that the court should therefore be enabled to use its own judgment and take that into account when passing sentence. However, we believe that the matter is of such importance that it should be enshrined in legislation. Therefore, I hope that the House will accept our amendment to the Lords amendment.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Lords amendments Nos. 11 and 12, which I welcome, make it clear that time spent on remand in local authority care does not count towards a custodial sentence in the way in which remand in custody does. In our report entitled "Young offenders: A Strategy for the Future." which we published in 1981, the parliamentary penal affairs group accepted that it would be inappropriate to equate time spent on remand in local authority care with time spent on remand in prison department establishments. We recommended that the courts, nevertheless, should be asked to take into account time spent on remand in care when determining their sentences. In Committee the Minister of State agreed to consider issuing a circular to that effect. When the amendment was tabled in the other place the Government announced that they would ask local authorities to give the courts details of the placements of youngsters who had been remanded in care and that, if necessary, they would amend the court rules to the same effect so that that would be taken into account when the


sentence was passed. That announcement and that amendment met the recommendations of the parliamentary group and they are, therefore, to be welcomed.
I also support the amendment to amendment No. 12, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook and spoken to by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson). No one has used the word "child" yet. We are talking about individuals who are still legally children. The amendment provides that when a child is remanded in local authority care, any time that he or she spends in secure accommodation should count towards the later custodial sentence. Government amendment No. 12, which provides that remand in local authority care should not count towards a later custodial sentence, is reasonable. When a child is remanded into local authority care the authority can place him in a community home or with foster parents or it can leave him at his own home under supervision. Those circumstances are qualitatively different from a period spent on remand in a prison department establishment in prison department custody. We believe that the Government's view that time spent in those circumstances should not count towards a later custodial sentence but should instead be taken into account by the courts when passing sentence is right.
However, when the young person has spent all or part of his time on remand in local authority care in a secure unit or secure accommodation, which is cell-like, that, as my hon. and learned Friend has argued, should be equated with remand in custody because the overriding feature of both is the physical deprivation of the liberty of the individual.
As I tried to say in my intervention in the Minister's speech, when he supported Lords amendment No. 12, but opposed my right hon. Friend's amendment, those of us who have visited secure units either in local authority community homes or observation and assessment centres cannot but be struck by the enormous similarity of those secure units to cells in remand centres and prisons. I visited one last week, which was the last of many. The single accommodation is referred to as cells. Upon the walls is written "cell 1", "cell 2", "cell 3", "cell 4" and so on. The boys are aged 10 to 16. The cell doors are heavy metal, with a lock. There is a little spy-hole grill. The cell itself is bare and made of concrete. It has steel bars at the windows. By any definition that is a cell.
Some 2,000 boys a year aged 10 to 16 are housed in those circumstances at the discretion currently of a local authority social worker, not the courts. They are held for an indefinite period—not days, but weeks. In the unit that I visited the period was months. Those are prison-like conditions. There is no way in which the Minister can pretend that somehow that is similar to placement in an ordinary open local authority home, a foster home or the boy's own home under supervision. In those circumstances the boy is allowed out. He is allowed to watch television, to go out with his friends to the youth club and to meet his girlfriend and other friends. He is allowed out into the streets. In secure accommodation, in a cell, he has none of those opportunities. It is wrong for the Minister to suggest that the conditions are comparable.
My hon. and learned Friend is right. The House must agree with him that if we are to put young boys into cell-like accommodation in secure homes and if it is right that boys in remand centres in similar conditions will have that time spent on remand counted towards later sentences, it

is equally right that the time spent in secure accommodation in a single cell should be counted against the time given for a later custodial sentence.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: One of the arguments against remission for those serving in secure accommodation is that it would be invidious because the same would apply to anyone in care. Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a much more marked distinction between the regime in residential and secure care than there is between the regime in secure accommodation and a remand centre?

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I agree with my hon. and learned Friend. That is a variant of the point that I made earlier. The point that I am making, which my hon. and learned Friend made in a different way, is that the single principle by which we must be guided is whether the individual is being deprived of his liberty. Is he being locked up? We accept that there are different forms of deprivation of an individual's liberty. The Minister tried to suggest that placing a child in local authority care in a foster home is a deprivation of liberty. It may be, but only at the margins. None of us is arguing that that is in any way comparable to holding someone under lock and key for 24 hours a day in a cell in Risley remand centre or, in the same circumstances, in a cell in an observation and assessment centre 50 miles down the road. The latter two are virtually identical. Therefore, the same conditions should apply to both.
The Government's only real argument, which was adduced here and in the other place against the amendment, which is identical to the amendment debated in the other place, is that computing the time spent in secure accommodation would cause practical problems. I accept that. It is because children in secure accommodation are allowed out from time to time, either out of the cell into an association area or to visit their relatives or friends. That is different from remand centres. The difference is that they are allowed out of the secure unit only for hours at a time, certainly not for days.
Whatever the problems, they are not insuperable. If we have the will they can easily be overcome. There is no reason why the fact that a child has been allowed out of a secure unit for a specific purpose for a minimal time needs to be taken into account when the court is informed that he has spent a certain number of days in security. Local authorities should be told that the time spent in secure accommodation can be calculated to the nearest number of days.
5 pm
We all agree that the physical conditions in the institutions are virtually identical. The Government wish to be considered compassionate. For them to say that they would like to make the change but they cannot because occasionally a boy in secure accommodation is allowed out for a few hours does not further that image. The hours are so few that they can be ignored, or, alternatively, the local authority can be told to knock off a few days. If the Government have the will, the difficulty can simply be overcome.
Whenever society takes the grave step of physically depriving a child of his liberty, the period spent so detained should count against a later custodial sentence, whether he is locked up in a penal establishment, a remand centre or a secure unit within a community home system. Anyone who has talked to boys in such institutions—who


have often been in both types—know that they do not see the difference. They see it as unfair and unjust that the time spent in one institution does not count against time that they will have to spend locked up in another.
I hope that on reflection the Minister will feel that he has made a mistake and will accept the amendment. If not, I hope that we shall be joined in the Lobby by hon. Members on the Conservative Benches.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 12, in page 8, line 27, at end insert—

"(6) The reference in subsection (1) above to an offender being committed to custody by an order of a court includes a reference to his being committed to a remand centre or to prison under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 or section 37 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 but does not include a reference to his being committed to the care of a local authority under the said section 23."

Read a Second time.

Amendment proposed to the Lords amendment,at end add

'save where the offender is placed in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty for the period or part of the period of committal to care, which period shall be treated as a period of custody for the purpose of subsection (1) above.'—[Mr. Arthur Davidson.]

Question put,That the amendment to the Lords amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 83, Noes 126.

Division No. 316]
[5.00 pm


AYES


Abse, Leo
Jones, Barry (East Flint)


Alton, David
Kerr, Russell


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Leighton, Ronald


Atkinson, N.(H'gey,)
Lyon, Alexander (York)


Beith, A. J.
McCartney, Hugh


Benn, Rt Hon Tony
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Bennett, Andrew(St'kp't N)
McKelvey, William


Bidwell, Sydney
McWilliam, John


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Marks, Kenneth 


Bottomley, Rt Hon A.(M'b'ro)
Milian, Rt Hon Bruce


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Morton, George


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)
Newens, Stanley


Cook, Robin F.
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Crawshaw, Richard
Palmer, Arthur


Crowther, Stan
Parry, Robert


Cryer, Bob
Pavitt, Laurie


Dalyell, Tam
Pitt, William Henry


Davidson, Arthur
Prescott, John


Deakins, Eric
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Race, Reg


Dormand, Jack
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Dubs, Alfred
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Dunnett, Jack
Rooker, J. W.


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Eastham, Ken
Rowlands, Ted


Faulds, Andrew
Sever, John


Field, Frank
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Foot, Rt Hon Michael
Spearing, Nigel


Foster, Derek
Steel, Rt Hon David


Foulkes, George
Stoddart, David


Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


George, Bruce
Tinn, James


Graham, Ted
Wardell, Gareth


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Wainwright, R.(Colne V)


Hamilton, W. W. (C'tral Fife)
Welsh, Michael


Hardy, Peter
Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Wilson, William (C'try SE)


Haynes, Frank
Wright, Sheila


Hooley, Frank



Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Tellers for the Ayes:


Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Mr. James Hamilton and Mr. Joan Evans.





NOES


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; W'loo)


Ancram, Michael
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Aspinwall, Jack
Loveridge, John


Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)
Lyell, Nicholas


Bendall, Vivian
McCrindle, Robert


Benyon, Thomas (A'don)
McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)


Berry, Hon Anthony
Madel, David


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Major, John


Blackburn, John
Marlow, Antony


Blaker, Peter
Mates, Michael


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Mather, Carol


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus


Bright, Graham
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Mayhew, Patrick


Bryan, Sir Paul
Moate, Roger


Budgen, Nick
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Chapman, Sydney
Murphy, Christopher


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)
Needham, Richard


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Neubert, Michael


Cope, John
Newton, Tony


Cranborne, Viscount
Osborn, John


Crouch, David
Page, Richard (SW Herts)


Dickens, Geoffrey
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Pattie, Geoffrey


Dover, Denshore
Percival, Sir Ian


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Proctor, K. Harvey


Dykes, Hugh
Rathbone, Tim


Elliott, Sir William
Rhodes James, Robert


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Ridsdale, Sir Julian


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Rossi, Hugh


Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles
Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.


Forman, Nigel
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')


Gardiner, George (Reigate)
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Silvester, Fred


Goodhew, Sir Victor
Sims, Roger


Goodlad, Alastair
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Gorst, John
Speed, Keith


Greenway, Harry
Speller, Tony


Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)
Stainton, Keith


Grist, Ian
Stanbrook, Ivor


Gummer, John Selwyn
Stanley, John


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Stradling Thomas, J.


Hampson, Dr Keith
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Haselhurst, Alan
Temple-Morris, Peter


Hawksley, Warren
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Hicks, Robert
Thompson, Donald


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Trippier, David


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Viggers, Peter


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Waddington, David


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Ward, John


Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey
Warren, Kenneth


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Watson, John


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Wells, Bowen


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Wheeler, John


Knight, Mrs Jill
Winterton, Nicholas


Lang, Ian
Wolfson, Mark


Lawrence, Ivan



Lee, John
Tellers for the Noes:


Lester, Jim(Beeston)
Mr. Peter Brooke and


Lewis, Kenneth(Rutland)
Mr. Archie Hamilton.

Question accordingly negatived.

Lords amendment agreed to.

Clause 10

PROVISION OF PREMISES FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS ETC.

Lords amendment: No. 13, in page 9, line 35, after "Sections" insert "5A,".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we shall take Lords amendment No. 154.

Mr. Mayhew: Amendment No. 13 is purely a paving amendment for amendment No. 154 and simply makes provision in the few clause for the post of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales. As many hon. Members will recall, the committee of inquiry into the United Kingdom prison services, presided over by Lord Justice May, which reported in October 1979, recommended that there should be a system of inspection of the prison service distanced as far as may be practicable from the prison department. It recommended that there should be constituted within the Home Office an independent department called the prison inspectorate with a senior rank. When the post of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector was first created following this it was agreed that the appointment should be made by the Crown on the advice of the Home Secretary in order to emphasise its status and the holder's special relationship with the Home Secretary.
The appointments of the first Chief Inspector in England and the Chief Inspector of Prisons in Scotland were made in anticipation of legislation with the agreement of the Palace, the Civil Service Department, as it then was, and the Civil Service Commission, on the understanding that legislative cover would be sought at the next opportunity. This amendment is in fulfilment of that commitment. The amendment provides, separately for England and Wales and for Scotland, for a chief inspector to be appointed by Her Majesty. It sets out briefly the duties of the chief inspector and arranges that he should, as the May committee recommended, produce an annual report which the Secretary of State is to lay before Parliament.
Amendment No. 13 merely seeks to add reference to the new section inserted into the Prison Act 1952 by the new clause in the new section 43 for which clause 10 provides.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 14, in page 10, line 4, after "to" insert "detention in".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This is a purely drafting amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11

ACCOMMODATION OF YOUNG OFFENDERS AND DEFAULTERS ETC.

Lords amendment: No. 15, in page 10, line 8, leave out "the enactments mentioned in".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This is a purely drafting amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 16, in page 10, line 17, at end insert—
(1A) Subject to subsection (9) below, an offender aged 16 years or less who is sentenced to youth custody, other than an offender who falls to be detained in a youth custody centre by virtue of subsection (1) above, is to be detained in a youth custody centre or in a remand centre as the Secretary of State may from time to time direct unless—


(a) the term of his youth custody sentence is treated by virtue of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 as reduced to less than 21 days; or
(b)he has been sentenced under section 15(6) below to youth custody for less than 21 days; or
(c)the Secretary of State gives a direction for his detention in a prison under subsection (2) below."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 18, 19, 20 and 21.

Mr. Mayhew: The effect of the amendments is to restructure subsections (1) to (3) of the clause so as to restrict more narrowly the circumstances in which juveniles—that is, people under 17—who are subject to youth custody sentences may be held in prisons as distinct from youth custody centres or remand centres. Where a juvenile is not already subject to the main guarantee of placement in a youth custody center—as provided for in subsection (1) if he is serving between four and 18 months—he will, by virtue of these amendments, still have to be held in a youth custody centre or a remand centre. There are three limited exceptions to this: where the term of his sentence is reduced to less than 21 days by the counting of remand time in custody; where he has been sentenced for less than 21 days following a breach of supervision; or when he is held in a prison for a temporary purpose. Together, these amendments are designed to go as far as possible to meet the arguments put forward in this House—notably by the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk)—to the effect that juveniles should not be held in prisons for the duration of their sentences.
The effect of the last amendment is to go one step further in respect of juveniles serving very short detention centre orders, by removing altogether the power to hold in prison for the duration of their sentences those who have sentences shorter than 21 days. Those serving 21 days or more will already be excluded from prisons.
The Government were able to accept this change, but not to go as far in respect of youth custody sentences, because detention centre trainees are committed direct from court without first going to allocation units in prisons.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I welcome Lords amendments Nos.16, 18, 19 and 20, which, as the Minister said, are the result of assurances given to me. I know that they will also be welcomed by the Magistrates' Association which, when the Bill was first published, asked for an assurance that juveniles sentenced to youth custody would not be detained in adult prisons. The undesirability of detaining 15 and 16-year-olds in overcrowded, local adult prisons where, as everyone acknowledges, conditions are the worst in the penal system, is self-evident. In any event, neither the institutions nor the staff are properly geared for their training. Facilities are not available to them to deal with the needs of juvenile offenders. For those reasons alone, we welcome the amendments.
However, even with the amendments, it will still be possible for juveniles serving youth custody sentences to be detained in adult prisons on a temporary basis for certain purposes, including assessment and allocation. That is already the case under the present system for those sentenced to borstal training. They often have to await allocation to a borstal establishment in an inappropriate adult prison. I hope that we shall soon do away with that


practice by at least reallocating allocation centres and young offender establishments rather than having young offenders in adult prisons. I welcome the amendments as a step in the right direction. They are a considerable improvement on the original form of the Bill.
I also welcome amendment No. 21, which was sponsored by members of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group in another place. It provides that juvenile offenders who receive detention sentences of less than 21 days should not be placed in adult prisons to serve their sentences, as the original form of the Bill would have allowed. Again, to detain juvenile offenders with detention centre sentences in adult prisons would be unfair both to the young offenders and to the courts and magistrates who, in sentencing them—especially at such a young and vulnerable age—would not usually have intended that, as an administrative convenience by the prison department, they should be dumped into the penal dustbins of adult prisons.
The Government's original opposition to the amendment was regrettable. However, they deserve credit for having taken the time and trouble to reconsider their position and accept the amendment on Third Reading in another place.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments No. 17 to 21 agreed to.

Clause 14

RELEASE ON LICENCE OF YOUNG OFFENDERS

Lords amendment: No. 22, leave out clause 14 and insert the following new clause B—

"B.—(1) Subsection (5A) of section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 shall cease to have effect.

(2) Where a yound offender has been released on licence and that licence has expired he remains under the supervision of a probation officer under the terms and for the period specified under section 15 of this Act".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 23, the Minister's motion to disagree and Lords amendment No. 24.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendments that the Government have tabled to clause 15 and schedules 13 and 15 give effect to the undertaking that my noble Friend gave on Third Reading in the other place that the Government would consider whether provision could be made in the Bill to give effect to the proposition that, when a young offender is released on parole, his parole licence should run only to his remission date, at the same time achieving parity between the period of supervision under licence of those released on parole and the period of supervision of those released in the ordinary way with remission for good conduct. I am glad to say that satisfactory amendments have been prepared.
The House will recall the consideration that was given to this matter in Committee. The Government were anxious to ensure that those released on parole licence should not be liable to a lesser period of supervision than those released in the ordinary way. On Third Reading of the Bill in another place, the Government accepted an amendment moved by the noble Lord Mishcon, which,

although technically defective, would have met the Government's earlier objections by providing that a young offender released on parole licence should, after his remission date when his parole licence expired, be liable to supervision thereafter as if he had been released in the normal way.
The Government's amendment now seeks to leave out Clause 14, which makes provision for the release on licence of young offenders, and substantially to recast clause 15, bringing into that clause, which dealt previously only with those released in the normal way, the provisions dealing with those released on parole. In the revised clause 15, those young offenders, who are neither granted remission nor released under parole, will have, under clause 15(3A), three months' supervision. Those released with remission will, under clause 15(3B) be supervised until the end of the sentence, with a minimum of three months supervision. Those released on parole will, under clause 15(3C) be supervised after their parole licence expires until the end of their sentence. There will be a maximum of 12 months supervision. Those provisions are subject to the period of supervision ending at the twenty-second birthday, if that intervenes before the supervision period is concluded. A short custodial sentence for breach of supervision will not attract a further period of supervision.
I realise that all that sounds rather Byzantine. In fact, it is quite clear. I have worked out a way of making it much clearer, but I think that I might be wrong. Therefore, I shall not do so unless pressed.
The Government have gone a considerable way in a short time to meet the views expressed by the Opposition in the other place, and by the National Association of Probation Officers, and I commend the Government's amendments and the consequential disagreement to Lords amendment No. 23 to the House.

Dr. Summerskill: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman clarify one point? Am I right in thinking that a young person serving a 24-month sentence, released on parole after 12 months, will then be on parole for four months and on ordinary supervision for a further eight months? Will that be the consequence of what he has said?

Mr. Mayhew: It is generally unwise to answer "Yes", or even "No", to such a question. I am prepared, subject to revision, to answer "Yes". If a young offender is paroled, the parole licence will run to remission date and then expire. We all know that remission for good conduct means that an offender does not serve the last third of his sentence, but his supervision as a young offender runs to the end of the sentence, with a maximum of 12 months supervision, or until his twenty-second birthday, if that falls earlier. That must be put into the equation.
The hon. Lady did not say when the chap would be 22. If no remission or parole is applicable, there is supervision for three months. If there is remission, the supervision will run until the end of the sentence, with a minimum of three months supervision. I hope that is clear.

Question put and agreed to.

Amendments made in lieu of the Lords amendment last disagreed to:

Leave out clause 14.

In clause 15, page 13, line 29, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

'(1) Subject to subsection (8) below, if subsection (1A), (1B) or (1C) below applies to a person under 22 years of age who is


released from a term of detention under a detention centre order or a term of youth custody, he shall be under the supervision of a probation officer or a social worker of a local authority social services department.

(1A) This subsection applies to a person who was neither granted remission nor released on licence.

(1B) This subsection applies to a person who was granted remission.

(1C) This subsection applies to a person—

(a)who was under 21 years of age when sentence was passed on him; and
(b)who is released on licence; and
(c)whose licence expires less than 12 months after his release.'

In page 14, line 1, leave out from beginning to 'above' in line 14 and insert—

'(3A) Subject to subsection (2) above, where subsection (IA) above applies, the supervision period begins on the offender's release and ends 3 months from his release.

(3B) Subject to subsection (2) above and to subsection (4) below, where subsection (1B) above applies, the supervision period begins on the offender's release and ends—

(a)3 months from his release; or
(b)on the date on which his sentence would have expired if he had not been granted remission, whichever is the later.

(3C) Subject to subsection (2) above and to subsection (4) below, where subsection (IC) above applies, the supervision period begins when the offender's licence expires and ends on the date on which he would have been released if he had never been granted remission or released on licence.

(4) If the date mentioned in subsection (3B)(b)or (3C)'.

In page 14, line 33, at end insert—

'(9) In this section—

"licence" means a licence under section 60 of the Criminal Justices Act 1967; and

"remission" means remission under rules made by virtue of section 47 of the Prison Act 1952.'

In schedule 13, page 101, line 3, at end insert 'and

in subsection (5A), for the words "any of the preceding paragraphs" there shall be substituted the words "paragraph (a) above",'.

In schedule 15, page 115, line 46, after '(5A)' insert

(b) and '.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Lords amendment No. 23 disagreed to.

Lords amendment No. 24 agreed to.

Clause 17

ATTENDANCE CENTRE ORDERS

Lords amendment: No 25, in page 16, line 17, at end insert

"where the offender is under 17 years of age, or 36 hours where the offender is under 21 but not less than 17 years of age."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment is about attendance centres. It increases from 24 hours to 36 the maximum period for which a court may make an attendance centre order in respect of boys aged 17 and under 21. As indicated in the White Paper on young offenders, the Government are extending the provision of attendance centres for young men in this age group. In 1979 there were only two. There are now 14. At all these centres the usual duration of a session is three hours, which means that a young man undergoing a 24 hour order—the maximum that a court may impose under existing law and the Bill as drafted—must attend on at least eight Saturdays to complete the order. The effect of enabling the courts to

make orders for up to 36 hours is to require a young man to attend the centre a minimum of 12 times. For young men of the age in question, at least 17 and under 21, the longer order is compatible with the aims of the attendance centre order as we see them, which are to vindicate the law by imposing loss of leisure and to teach offenders something of the constructive use of leisure. This was a constructive amendment proposed in another place, which the Government were content to accept. I commend it to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20

REQUIREMENTS IN SUPERVISION ORDERS

Lords amendment: No. 26, in page 20, line 24, leave out

"aggregate of any periods specified in" and insert

"total number of day s in respect of which a supervised person may be required to comply with".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 27 to 38, 40 and 41 together with the motions to disagree with Lords amendments Nos. 32, 35, 37 and 41.

Mr. Mayhew: These amendments enable the courts to include a requirement, in a supervision order made in criminal procedures, or in a supervision order made on the discharge of a care order, to the effect that a young offender will be required to remain in a specified place for a specified time between six o'clock at night and six in the morning. This condition is to be known as a night restriction requirement. The House will recall that a proposal of this general nature was put forward by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell), as a new clause in Committee. The proposal was extensively discussed during the Committee and Report stages of the Bill. At that time, what was envisaged was a free-standing power, but I said that the Government had come to the conclusion that a free-standing power would not be an effective addition to the powers available to the courts to deal with young offenders, but that the Government saw more promise in a power forming part of a strengthened package of supervision that would come with a supervision order, and that if such a power proved practicable on investigation we should endeavour to provide for it in the other place.
Directly after I made that announcement the Home Office consulted interested organisations. In the light of those consultations, the Government came to the conclusion that it would be possible to provide for such a requirement for juveniles within the framework of the supervision order. The Government accordingly decided to amend the supervision provisions of the Bill to enable a court to include in a supervision order a requirement that the young offender on whom the supervision order was imposed should remain in the place where he normally lived during specified hours on specified days, the requirement being carefully drawn to enable it to be added to the supervision order as part of a constructive package of additions and requirements. The necessary amendments to add these provisions to the Bill were made on Report in the other place.
The proposals are now included in clause 20 of the Bill. This amends section 12 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, which is the section giving power to include requirements in supervision orders. The essence of the amendments is set out in paragraph (aa)which amendment 32 adds to subsection (3C). In summary, the court will be enabled, after consultation with the supervisor, and subject to certain consent, to require the young offender to remain at home for up to 10 hours between 6 pm and 6 am on up to 30 nights during the first three months after the supervision order is made. I should emphasise here the provision made for consultation with the supervisor. There are further safeguards to ensure that the requirement is not imposed in inappropriate circumstances by the court.
There is a requirement to obtain the consent of the young offender, or if he is under 14, that of his parent or guardian. Then there is a requirement to obtain the consent of the parent or guardian or other person with whom the young person lives. Where appropriate the requirement may apply to more than one place. The young offender will not be confined absolutely to his home, he will be able to leave it during restricted hours if he is accompanied by his parent or guardian or by his supervisor, or by someone else specified in the order.
I shall now explain why we have decided to include the night restriction requirement in the Bill. A major difference between the power as originally envisaged by my hon. and learned Friend and the power as it now stands is that it is not a free-standing power but one that may be included as an integral part of a supervision order. Whatever the criticisms that have been made of the concept of a night restriction order there is general agreement that this is a better approach. The Government recognise that a supervision order is designed with the positive aim of encouraging the child to take part in a wide range of activities, and clause 20 of the Bill is designed to provide a framework for extending the use of intermediate treatment. But the Bill has included from the start a power requiring the offender to refrain from certain specified activities, and subsection (3C)(b)is a development from that provision. For the court, it provides a specific power of restraint which can be imposed on the offender. By so strengthening the supervision order, the courts might now see the new power as a realistic alternative to custody in appropriate cases, which is something we all wish to do.
The Government have been anxious that the courts should see in the strengthened supervision order a real alternative to the custodial disposal which they might otherwise be inclined to make, and I hope that the importance of that point will be recognised in the House. Our consultations with the Magistrates Association have made it clear that the night restriction order will be widely regarded as a useful addition to the powers available to the courts. It is rightly concerned about the behaviour of youngsters who get into serious trouble in the early or late evenings, when the temptations to offend, particularly when smallish groups gather together out of boredom, may prove too great.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree with the estimate given by the Association of Directors of Social Services, which should know what it is talking about, that if each of the 1,000

magistrates' courts makes only one curfew order a month, the cost will be nearly £3 million a year? If the hon. and learned Gentleman agrees with that, does he not believe that we should use that money more effectively on other more proven methods of dealing with young offenders, such as intermediate treatment, which is kept short of funds by the Government? If he does not agree with that sum, what is his estimate of how much this inappropriate measure will cost?

Mr. Mayhew: If such a calculation were to be reliable, we should have to take into account the number of those cases—one a month in 1,000 courts—that otherwise would be awarded a custodial sentence and then study the cost of the custodial sentences.
I had already said, before the hon. Gentleman intervened, that it was our belief that a proportion of these can be used as genuine alternatives to custodial sentences. In other words, the offender would go into custody if it were not for the order. That has to be taken into account if we go in for the estimating business. We have to take into account whatever proportion we think is right of those who would go into custody, and what the cost of that would be. All that would be crystal-gazing.
The Government have never held that the scheme will be appropriate in each case, or even in most cases. However, it is an alternative to custody that is worth trying. We agree that it is dangerous, but sometimes necessary, to send a young offender into custody. We all want to find alternatives. The Government make this proposal as an additional alternative.
Some reservations have been expressed. I shall consider three main aspects—the role of the supervisor, the relationship within the family and the question of enforceability. The scheme requires the court to consult the supervisor as to the offender's circumstances and the feasibility of securing compliance with the requirement and to satisfy itself, having regard to the supervisor's report, that it is feasible to secure compliance with the order.
I sympathise with the misgivings about enforcement of the proposal, which has come to be called the curfew order. Such an order is not capable of being enforced 100 per cent. , any more than is the offence of driving while disqualified. All that one can say by way of sanction is "If you are caught, you are in further trouble".
It is important to bear in mind that the court must be satisfied that it is feasible to secure compliance. It must be satisfied on the basis of consultation with the supervisor.
The Government believe that this consultation with the supervisor will go a long way to meet the concern that many of the organisations consulted have expressed about the importance of taking account of the supervisor's views, and we hope that it will allay the fear that the inclusion of a night restriction requirement in a supervision order might be detrimental to the relationship of trust and goodwill between the supervisor and the offender and his family. That is important and common ground. Of course, there is a reciprocal element. The clause provides that the court may not make a night restriction order unless the supervised person consents or, if he is a child, his parent or guardian, consents to its inclusion in the order. This is crucial. The Government believe that the supervisor can build on the fact that consent has been given to develop a constructive relationship with the family.
The Government have considered very carefully the views of those who were concerned about the effect of a night restriction requirement on relationships within the family. These fears have ranged widely. Some have doubted whether the response of the parents in consenting to the order could genuinely take account of its implications; others thought that where relations between the parent and the child were bad, the night restriction requirement might merely make them worse and increase tensions within the home. There has also been a basic objection to parents having a formal part to play in carrying out the order of the courts. The Government have taken the fears seriously. We are anxious to promote in this Bill measures which will strengthen and not diminish the sense of parental responsibility, because we believe that a more effective exercise of parental control can do much to pull a child back from delinquent or criminal behaviour.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I am sorry to intervene again, but we are discussing an important matter. Will the parents of a child who is subject to a night restriction order be required or expected to report to the court any breaches by their child of the curfew order? If so, what are the likely consequences to parents who do not report breaches and to the relationship between parents and children if parents do report such breaches?

Mr. Mayhew: Parents will not be required to report. The problem involves what one means by "expected". If a parent has consented to an order one may reasonably hope that he will co-operate in enforcing the order, but there is no obligation.
We accept that in the case of a one-parent family, where there may be several children in deprived or difficult circumstances, a night restriction requirement will not have much to offer. In my lay opinion I think that only rarely would such an order be appropriate. Other examples can be thought of. That one can conjure up such examples does not invalidate the case for the power generally. They merely suggest that it is not right for every young offender. We accept that.
5.45 pm
The safeguards in the Bill will, in the Government's view, help the courts to identify those cases where the exercise of the power would be inappropriate. The judgment of the supervisor, with whom the court will work closely, and the consent of the parent or guardian in the case of a child, are essential here. In those cases where a night restriction requirement can with advantage be added, the parent will know that he is backed up by an order of the court. He will start with the knowledge that the supervising officer was able to satisfy the court that the night restriction order was feasible, and that thereafter he can turn to the supervising officer for support and assistance.
The probation and social services have experience in ensuring that juveniles comply with the requirements of supervision, and their enforcement of the order will be supported by the power to take the offender before the court in breach proceedings if he fails to comply with the requirement. We have had that power for ages as a sanction for breach of probation. That, of course, would be pretty much a measure of last resort. Well before that stage, the supervisor would be able to consider what advice he could give to the family who were experiencing difficulties arising from the night restriction requirement.
If he came to the conclusion that it was clearly not working properly—perhaps for entirely acceptable reasons—he could apply to the court for its cancellation.
We believe that the requirement in the form in which it is expressed is a useful addition to the non-custodial disposals available to the courts. As such it is well worth a try and may be safely entrusted to the hands of experienced justices. I commend it to the House.

Dr. Summerskill: The night restriction requirement is a polite way of saying "curfew". We are discussing a totally new form of sentence which, in certain circumstances, can be imposed on children as young as 10 years old. It can certainly be imposed on children between the ages of 10 and 16. The Opposition consider that at best the proposal is unrealistic, ineffective and impracticable and at worst damaging and harmful. The principle of curfew met with no positive support by Opposition Members in Committee. It met with strong opposition from Labour Party members in another place. I cannot speak for peers from other parties. It has been criticised by several bodies of people who work regularly with juvenile offenders. We shall oppose the proposal tonight.
The new form of sentence is fraught with problems, some of which the Minister appreciates. The problems centre around securing compliance. They involve the feasibility of requiring the co-operation of parents, the offender and the supervisors. The amendment is different from that which we discussed in Committee. It is objectionable for different reasons, mainly because of the enforceability problem.
The proposal will create serious problems involving the relationship between probation officers and social workers and young offenders. The National Association of Probation Officers is strongly opposed to the proposal. That is important since it represents one of the professions which will have to supervise offenders in the new form of sentence.
The relationship between a probation officer or social worker and an offender—if it is to be useful and effective—requires a build-up of mutual trust, and, as the National Association of Probation Officers has put it, a careful balance between the elements of help and control. If probation officer; and social workers are to influence offenders for good, the enforcement of this provision could become a barrier because it might prejudice the development of a good and useful relationship.

Mr. Nicholas Lyell (Hemel Hempstead): I am grateful for the careful consideration that the hon. Lady has given to this matter. Clause 20(2), which I support, gives an important power to supervisors. They can tell a young offender where they shall live for a specified period or periods. They may have to present themselves to a person or persons—who may be the supervisor or somebody else—at specified hours. The supervisor may tell the young offender that he must participate in certain specified activities. The supervisor might have a great deal of control over the young person. That is not seen to be likely to damage the relationship. Why is it so different if the magistrates, after consultation, require the offender to stay at home with his parents with a supervisor being involved?

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Mr. Kilroy-Silkrose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Has the hon. Lady finished speaking?

Dr. Summerskill: I have not.

Mr. Speaker: We cannot have an interruption of an interruption.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I thought that the hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) was making a speech.

Dr. Summerskill: The hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) has helped with the point that I was making. The relationship between the supervising officer and the offender has to be almost friendly and one of mutual trust. If the offender is supervised and controlled to the extent described by the hon. and learned Member, I do not believe that mutual trust will be built up. The same point was made by the Minister in Committee when we were discussing an amendment relating to the police. It was suggested that the police should have greater control than is provided for in this amendment. The Minister said that involving the police in curfew arrangements would not assist the buildup of trust with young offenders, because the police would be asked to play a role that would not be effective and useful in building up such a relationship.
The supervisor will have to make random checks on the young person to see whether he is at home. How can that build up trust? Any breach of the curfew should be reported to the supervisor by the parents. How will that create mutual trust between the young offender and the supervisor, or the young offender and his parents, or between all three? That will not make for an effective and useful relationship between the probation officer or social worker and the child, who may be as young as 10, because we are talking about a sentence that can be imposed on a child aged from 10 to 16 years. The system is obnoxious, because for it to work effectively the social worker or probation officers would, in practice, be policing it. Their job is, and should be, to advise and assist offenders and not police them.

Mr. Mayhew: As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) has pointed out, the probation order legislation requires a youngster to refrain from doing certain things or going to certain places. What is the difference in principle between that and this new provision?

Dr. Summerskill: We are talking about a youngster being confined to his home—a child of 16 would be harder to confine than a child of 10—between 6 pm and 6 am. The supervisor could make random checks to see whether the young person was at home. That power does not exist at the moment—there is a curfew in connection with bail but that is totally different, and does not affect a child of 10.
Extra resources will be required. If extra work is to be imposed on probation officers and social workers we should know where the man and the woman power and finance are to come from so that the scheme does not fail through shortage of people or money. At the Association of Chief Probation Officers' recent conference, Mr. Michael Day, the chairman, expressed his anxiety that the Government were not providing a grant to the probation service to implement any of the provisions of the Bill. It was estimated that the proposed range of probation orders—community service orders for 16-year-olds, supervised activity orders and others—would cost about £3·5 million to establish.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence: Does he hon. Lady believe that probation officers might be better disposed towards operating the provision if they were likely to earn more money?

Dr. Summerskill: No, because they are not only worried about manpower and money. They are worried about some of the principles involved. The National Association of Probation Officers is strongly opposed to the proposal, because it feels that it will create serious problems between supervising officers and offenders. That is a far more fundamental complaint than the one about money, which could, presumably, be overcome if the Government were prepared to provide more money and recruit more officers. They are worried about the operation and enforceability of the proposal.
The Bill says that it cannot quantify either the amount of money or staff needed for probation and after-care. That is a serious deficiency when we are discussing a new form of sentence. It would be wrong to introduce such a new sentence unless it can be properly enforced. It would undermine the authority of the courts and discredit the supervision order and the effectiveness of the new sentence. That is another argument against proceeding with the proposal.
If there is a breach of the order the supervisor will have to take the juvenile back to the court, regardless of the views, discretion or judgment of the supervisor. Breaches of the order may, presumably, lead to the custody of the offender. We must hope that there will not be too many breaches of the curfew and too many offenders placed in custody, because, according to the Minister, we are trying to keep young people out of custody by giving courts that additional power. It would be unfortunate if we found that breaches of the curfew were so extensive that people were being put into custody.
6 pm
The question arises whether courts will be encouraged to impose supervision orders rather than custodial sentences. It is obviously to be hoped that in every case where there is an alternative to a custodial sentence courts will take it. We cannot be sure that this will happen. On the contrary, the courts could regard the order as an additional form of punishment and use it as a punishment when they would not normally have considered the matter sufficiently serious to merit imposition of an order. However, because the order is provided and Parliament has given the power, it is possible that some courts will use it as an additional punishment simply because it exists. It does not follow that courts will necessarily be encouraged to keep people out of custody.
Will there be a reduction in juvenile crime? Here again it is uncertain that simply by keeping young people indoors at night there will be a reduction in juvenile crime. Juvenile crime can take place during the day. There is an assumption that in the evening a young person could be up to no good. On the other hand, he could be up to a lot of good. He could be taking part in positive and constructive pursuits. I do not see the fact that it is after 6 pm as a reason for shutting him up in his home.

Mr. Lyell: The young person involved in a constructive pursuit is not likely to be before the court. It is the young person who has got into trouble doing something destructive who is likely to be there. It is upon him that the supervision order might be placed.

Dr. Summerskill: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman saying that young people get into trouble only between 6 pm and 6 am and that they should therefore be shut up between those times? Is it assumed that they will not get into trouble at any other time round the clock? Such questions show why the proposal is so farcical.
Is it a punishment or is it a deterrent to crime? If the aim is to try to deter crime, it seems strange that the young person should be shut in his own home from 6 pm to 6 am and allowed free for the rest of the day to commit juvenile crimes. It is possible for even the worst offender to partake of some constructive pursuits. The assumption is that if he is shut in his own home with an inadequate, weak and unintelligent parent, he is far better off watching crime on the television with that parent than if he was outside following some constructive pursuit in a youth centre or taking part in a sporting activity, possibly accompanied by a supervisor or his parents.
The conception that he will be the better for being put away in his home in the evening is difficult to comprehend. I hope that the Minister will say whether the purpose is to punish the young person or to deter him from crime. If it is to deter him from crime, he can certainly use the daylight hours to carry on his criminal activities.
I come now to parental control. The Minister has already remarked, I believe, that parents differ and that parental control is unreliable. The Minister placed much emphasis on the fact that parents must consent where children under 14 years of age are involved. That does not get us out of the difficulty of the 14 to 16-year"olds where parental consent is apparently not required.

Mr. Mayhew: I understand how the hon. Lady has become confused about this matter. It is necessary, in the case of a child under 14, for consent to come from the parent or guardian on behalf of the child. It will always be necessary for the consent of the parent to be obtained if the order states that the child, during the relevant time, shall be at home with his parents. In that instance, it will be consent on behalf of the parent himself.

Dr. Summerskill: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman. The fact remains that, even if the parent does consent, parents are not perfect. Parental control could still be unreliable, as the hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out in replying to an intervention. The parent could simply renege on his responsibilities, having given consent, and take no notice of what the child was doing. He might not care whether the child broke the curfew. There are one-parent families. It will be impossible for a probation officer or a social worker to assess, I would have thought, how a curfew order would affect the parent-child relationship or the sibling relationship in the family. The ideal answer, I presume, would be for the parent to report to the supervisor if the child absconded from curfew. I should have thought that this was extremely bad for the parent-child relationship. If a report was made, the child could be back in court facing the risk of being put into custody.
The more this measure is analysed, the more fraught with problems it seems to be. There is curfew now as a condition of bail. It is only occasionally used. It is often broken. It is broken, I understand, not in pursuit of a crime but in pursuit of a football match, a disco, a wedding or something of that nature. This is an indication of the problems that would face society by trying to keep 10 to 16-year-olds in their homes in the evening.
Another difference between this curfew and the bail curfew is that the responsibility for keeping bail curfew lies only with the deifendent. In this case, a third party is involved. Some may say that this makes for easier enforcement. However, given the problems that I have mentioned, I should have thought it would make it harder. Taking all these factors into account, the Minister has certainly not persuaded me—I do not think that he will have persuaded the House—that the problems which he touched upon will be solved simply by good will, which he presumably hopes to find on all sides.
This measure cannot succeed unless it involves the total commitment of all concerned. Anyone who has had any connection with juvenile offenders is extremely suspicious and doubtful of the possibility of achieving the total commitment of all concerned. There is serious danger that the measure will be unenforceable and even positively damaging. We shall vote against it.

Mr. Lyell: I know that the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) has such a delightfully open mind that she is open to persuasion. If she looks at clause 20 as a whole, she will approve of most of it. I am sure that she supports the concept of intermediate treatment that involves a great many requirements to be attached to supervision orders. This clause emanates from the Magistrates Association. I emphasise that because I was amazed to hear the hon. Lady say that no one involved in the treatment of young offenders supported the proposal.
The idea of such a restriction came from the Magistrates Association in a resolution passed last year. I am proud to be able to say that the idea initially came from a resolution of the Hertfordshire magistrates. I have discussed the idea with experienced juvenile court magistrates in my area and with other juvenile court magistrates in inner London who have special knowledge of the problems of young people in inner cities. The idea has their support.
It is generally agreed that it is not only the supervisor—the probation officer—who has a part to play in the treatment of young offenders, particularly the 10 to 16-year-old offenders. The country takes the view that parents have an important responsibility for the maintenance of discipline among their children. The courts have not only a power but a duty to look carefully at the circumstances of each individual young offender who comes before them. In clause 20, we introduce the concept of the night restriction order, imposed by a court after careful consultation with the parents, whose agreement would be necessary, and with the supervisor, whose advice would be necessary. But before we got to that concept we put in powerful powers to enable probation officers to carry out intermediate treatment. I support those powers and I go along with what the hon. Member for Ormskirk said about the need to provide money to make intermediate treatment effective.
However, that treatment does not have to be soft and gentle. I am in favour of gentleness where it is possible, but we must not have something weak and ineffective. One has had ample opportunities to read about and to witness schemes such as the university of Lancaster scheme and the Medway close-support scheme which get a grip on the young offender. They find out where the young offender has gone wrong and :hake sure that he goes to school and remains at school. When the youngster comes out of school at break, they make sure that he does not buzz off.


When school is over they pick the young offenders up and explain to them why they have gone wrong in the first place or take them to some constructive activity, perhaps a youth club, a leisure centre or a carpentry course. That is an excellent approach to the treatment of young offenders.
The same approach is involved in the night restriction clause. It is an insult to parents to think that inviting their 10 to 12-year-olds to remain at home with them for the evening is something wholly negative and ineffective. It is true that some parents are hopelessly incapable of looking after their youngsters whether they be 10 or 16 years old. As my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State said, a sensible court would not impose a night restriction order in such a case. But there are many other cases where the parents would be only too glad to be involved if the opportunity were brought to their attention. They would have the opportunity to bring their boy or girl under control with the assistance of the probation officer. That is the purpose of the order.
After insisting that the juvenile court examines each case individually, the clause gives the court the power to say, for example, "Here is a parent who can and will cooperate and here is a young person going out on the streets late at night and getting into trouble." That young person will probably start off innocently, perhaps going to a disco, but then he may get into a group and perhaps cause some criminal damage, perhaps more than once. I am not suggesting that the court would necessarily use this power the first time that the youngster causes trouble, but after he has built up a record of unruliness and stupidity and it may be desirable to get him back in the home and to get the parents involved. There are a significant number of cases where such a power would be beneficial. I was glad to hear my hon. and learned Friend say that the power should be regarded as an alternative to custody.
6.15 pm
I owe a debt of gratitude to the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk), who taught me a great deal during the passage of the Bill. I know how ineffective residential care can be and what a high rate of recidivism there can be even from local authority care that is non-criminal. For example, 66 per cent. of those in such places are likely to re-offend and come before the criminal courts again within two years. At borstals and youth custody establishments the figure increases to 70 per cent. or 75 per cent. We were told in Committee that it can cost £10,000 a year to keep a young person in residential care. That figure has been confirmed by those at the university of Lancaster and others with whom I have discussed the matter. Residential care establishments are expensive and frequently ineffective.
The clause seeks, in suitable cases, to get a young person who has got out of hand to go back home and to stay there during certain limited hours. We talk about the hours from 6 pm to 6 am, but probably it will be important that a young person should be home by 8 pm and stay in until bed time, instead of hanging around the streets until 10 pm or 11 pm and getting into trouble. That is the sort of guidance that the courts can insist upon under this sensible proposal.
I have confidence in our courts, particularly our juvenile courts, in the supervisors and probation

officers—in general—and in the parents whose children sometimes get into trouble, but who, if their duty is brought home to them, will play a constructive part. Putting them all together will be beneficial.
My discussions with a number of senior probation officers do not reflect the apparent opposition of the National Association of Probation Officers. I was astonished to hear the notion of non-co-operation with the courts coming from such responsible people. I am sure that those connected with that resolution are not typical of the excellent probation service.
I detected just a tinge of arrogance in the supervisors thinking that no one else could be beneficially entrusted with such great powers. I am deeply grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State, who has been pushed, sometimes importunately, by me, as I have had the confidence of being backed by the Magistrates Association, for pressing on and having extensive consultations on the matter.
The proposal will not be the solution to every juvenile criminal problem. The fact that examples can be given where it would not be the appropriate remedy does not establish that it will not be a useful remedy in a significant, perhaps not huge, number of cases. I am grateful for the fact that it has found its place in the Bill and I hope that it will receive the support of the whole House.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) is the originator of the proposal, which has been much watered down, amended, qualified and honed since it was discussed in Committee. He spoke in support of it in an eminently reasonable and sensible way.
I start by reaffirming what my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Dubs) and I said in Committee. I do not oppose the curfew or night restriction order in principle. I oppose it because I have been persuaded by those who ought to know best—those who will have to supervise it—that it has a number of serious difficulties, inadequacies and drawbacks that will be counterproductive to the objective that the hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead and I share.
The hon. and learned Member ended his speech by complimenting his hon. and learned Friend the Minster of State on the series of consultations which he conducted during the months since we served on the Standing Committee. The Government have consulted widely and extensively—as befits the introduction of a major new departure of this kind which gives additional powers to the courts for dealing with juvenile offenders—a massive range of organisations and individuals who have professional knowledge of the subject that we are discussing. Some of them opposed the scheme. I do not know of any organisation—apart from one—which endorsed it, thinks it a good idea, wants to see it on the statute book, or thinks that it will work. The hon. and learned Gentleman and the Minister quoted only the Magistrates Association. However, as they know, many individual magistrates, magistrates' branches and perhaps now a substantial majority of magistrates oppose this measure not in principle but on the ground that it is impracticable.
Let us consider the organisations. I am talking about the organisations which will have to administer the scheme. All of them oppose it: the Association of Directors of Social Services, the Association of Metropolitan


Authorities, the British Association of Social Workers, the Association of Chief Officers of Probation, NACRO, the National Association of Probation Officers, New Approaches to Juvenile Crime, the Nation Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Nation Council of Voluntary Child Care Organisations, the National Intermediate Treatment Federation, and the National Youth Bureau.
The hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead guffaws. I do not know to which organisation he objects—the National Youth Bureau or the National Intermediate Treatment Federation. He alluded to the latter in an approving way. Whatever doubts his implicit comments cast on the credibility of those organisations, they have responsibility, knowledge and experience of the juveniles whom we are discussing this evening. They are the organisations whose voices should be heard with respect and deference.

Mr. Lyell: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I have intervened many times this evening. I hope that this will be the last time.
The hon. Gentleman read out a list of eminent bodies. I have had the opportunity of talking to some of them. However, does he not agree, from his own wide experience, that when a new idea emerges, particularly one which involves a small element of risk, getting such bodies to go on the line and commit themselves is not always easy? In private discussions one often gets much sympathy and constructive thought from them. I pay tribute to the constructive help that I have had from members of those bodies—or many of them—to which the hon. Gentleman referred. However, the fact that they come out with a resolution in no way proves that the vast majority of their members take a particular view, especially when it concerns a new idea.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I cannot allow the hon. and learned Gentleman to get away with that. Indeed, he would not expect me to do so. We accept that he speaks for his constituents, because that is the system under which we operate. We must therefore accept, because we have no other evidence, that the Association of Directors of Social Services and NACRO—both of which, I assume, have circulated memoranda to every right hon. and hon. Gentleman—speak for their organisations. There is no evidence to the contrary.
I do not object to the hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal in principle. I wish I could believe that it would be an alternative to custody. That was largely the burden of his remarks. If I could believe that the night restriction order were a viable alternative to custody, I should be much more sympathetic towards it. However, I do not believe that will be so. Moreover, I do not think that the Minister believes it either. I imagine that, in practice, this power will be used simply as an additional restriction to what in any event will already be a non-custodial sentence.
We shall see. We shall both table questions—of course, I shall still be in the House and the hon. and learned Gentleman will not after the next general election—to discover whether the number of juveniles going to penal establishments or local authority residential establishments actually declines after the commencement of this legislation and this restriction order. The hon. and learned Gentleman or the Minister may wish to take a small bet. Unfortunately, I never bet, but I am sure that this proposal will not in any way affect the numbers going to custodial establishments.
There are five major objections in practice to curfew orders. First, as my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) said, in speaking to her amendment, they will have to be enforced by probation officers and social workers. By placing those people in the role of policemen, we shall damage the relationship between the juveniles and their supervising officers—a relationship which is crucial to their proper working together. I shall not quote, but the probation officers' brief says that its members are totally opposed to this proposal. It points out that they try to develop a caring relationship and that they do not want to have to act as social policemen.
The hon. and learned Gentleman made great play in his speech, and when intervening in my hon. Friend's speech, of the existence of certain conditions under supervision orders. He is quite right. I am well aware that some of the intensive intermediate treatment schemes—for example, the Medway close support unit, which he cited—operate a form of curfew which is enforced as part of a contractual approach, but the approach is one of co-operation between the unit staff, the parents and the juvenile offender. That approach is quite different from what is suggested tonight, which is a requirement laid down by magistrates as a specific condition of a court order.
The hon. and learned Gentleman may not know the difference, but I suggest that there is a fundamental difference between a mutually co-operative and agreed set of rules and procedures obtained under the intermediate treatment scheme currently being operated in Kent and the new requirement that he suggests. In any event, the schemes that we already have do not require that the child remain at home during the long hours envisaged in these arrangements. At best, they usually require that the child be back in the parental home by 10 o'clock in the evening.
Secondly, as my hon. Friend said, NACRO has argued that the curfew requirements are likely to be violated frequently, that detections will be virtually impossible, and that the scheme will be almost unenforceable. We should therefore be in danger of bringing the law into disrepute with young impressionable people who will make it almost a point of honour to get out at night and be seen by their friends to be breaking the curfew. If we wish to engender respect for the law in young people, as I assume we do, this is not the right way to do it.
Thirdly, the imposition of such a requirement—this has been pointed out, but the Minister did not deal with this argument adequately—is likely to increase tension and to worsen relationships within families, thereby placing children at greater risk in future than in the past. Parents who succeed in enforcing a curfew requirement do not need help. Parents who already have that kind of authority and concern do not need a legal requirement to keep their children home at night or to supervise them in other ways. The parents who reed that kind of support for their parental role, who need the court behind them saying "Your child must remain at home between these hours", are the parents who are inadequately equipped to enforce it in practice.
6.30 pm
The hon. and learned Gentleman cannot win. Both ways will exacerbate the family relationships and make them worse, not better. Parents will be able to connive in the child's breaching of the order. I do not want the parent to "shop" his child when he breaches the order, but unless


that is done the parent will be seen by the child to be conniving in his breach of the law. That is not a good position for parents to be placed in.
Curfews will be extremely oppressive to parents, particularly conscientious ones. If parents are to make a serious attempt to ensure that their children abide by the terms of the curfew, they will be imprisoned in their homes with their children. How else will they fulfil their parental obligations and duties under the law to ensure that the child is at home? That will be an onerous obligation on one-parent families. It means that a single parent, whose child has been subject to a night restriction order, will effectively not be able to go out in the evening without running the risk of the child breaking the conditions of the order.
The probation service, and indeed the social services department, will be required to devote a considerable amount of their manpower and financial resources deploying staff in the evenings for no better purpose than to enforce the curfew, using resources which would be far better and more constructively directed to areas where we know that proper supervision in the community or intermediate treatment will work.
The amendments, passed in another place and sponsored by the Government, are unhelpful. They are objectionable, expensive and likely to do more harm than good. I hope that some hon. Members will join us in opposing them.

Mr. William Pitt (Croydon, North-West): I disagree slightly with the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk). I am opposed to a curfew order on principle. It is a fundamentally wrong way to attack juvenile crime. I also object in principle to the euphemism "night restriction order". Whether we ask for their consent or not, we are putting a curfew on young people against their will by and large and, despite parental consent, against the parents' will. If this amendment is agreed to tonight we shall build up for ourselves a severe problem which may well become intractable.
To examine the position logically we must ask ourselves several questions. First, will a curfew be enforceable? A curfew means that a restriction must be enforced. One can enforce a military curfew by ordering troops out to arrest or shoot on sight. I do not think any hon. Members would want to order the military out to arrest or shoot on sight 10-year-olds. In that sense the word "curfew" is ridiculous. We might also ask ourselves whether, if parents are to become the gaolers of such children, they could ask for rate relief on their premises because I believe that prisons have rate relief.
How shall we handle a breach of the order? The hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) brought out that problem. Will the children go back to the court if they are in breach of the curfew, and when? Will it be after the first, the second or the third breach? If they go back, what will the court do and how will it impose a custodial sentence?
I must remind the House what I said on Report about new clause 39. I said that I was concerned how—especially in large conurbations where the curfew order would be used most—I am thinking particularly of cities such as Greater London, Manchester and Liverpool—a young offender who was breaking the

curfew order could be found other than by making large police trawls of the streets. Now we are told that the supervisors will make random visits to the homes. At a time of Government cuts and economic retrenchment, how will we find staff in the probation and social services of the local authorities who will be able to make such random checks? Will social workers and probation officers, who are already overworked, be even further overworked?
I have concluded that a curfew order will not be enforceable. It will rely solely and completely on the good faith of parents and children, who may, by and large, volunteer to have a curfew order imposed upon them because it is an easy solution, and, a few weeks after the curfew order has been imposed, either the parent or the child will say "Blow this; I am fed up. I do not like the curfew order." The parents will feel a restriction upon them, as, naturally, will the child.
What do we envisage parents will do if a child breaks the curfew order? This is the most appalling aspect of the matter. I am a parent of a mature child who is no longer under my supervision or in my house. If I had had to make a decision whether to report my child at the age of 10, 11 or 12—fortunately, there were no curfew orders at that time and she was sensible enough not to get herself into trouble—how could I? The hon. Member for Ormskirk laughs. My daughter is a sensible woman. However, that is beside the point.
If I were obliged to make that decision, how would I react to telling the probation officer or the social worker that my child had breached the curfew order? I would be reluctant to "shop" my child to the authorities. That is another reason why the curfew is not enforceable. Parents will not "shop" their children unless they go in for that sort of thing. They will not consider it to be their responsibility. If a night restriction order is not enforceable by random visits or by depending on the parents to "shop" the children, the order will not be effective.
Another point which stems from whether parents should be expected to report their children for a breach of a curfew order is that any good relationship between child and parent will be destroyed. Parents will be seen to be complying with the enforced curtailment of their child's liberty. The Government argue that regulations enable any blame to be transferred to the law and hence the law would be helping out parents. However, parents must accept that transference. I might say, although it is a point of little validity, that the transference of blame to the law in the family is an extremely woolly concept. I do not believe that it is possible.
Night restriction orders will have a profound effect on family life. The hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) talked about proper family discipline and its enforcement. Those who have had children know a lot about that. I have no doubt that he does himself. If he does, he will know that proper family discipline comes from mutual trust between parent and child. It does not come from outside enforcement. It does not come from placing the parent in an almost Quisling situation whereby children are threatened that the police will be informed if the curfew order is not obeyed.
The hon. Member for Ormskirk has given us some valuable information. I must pay tribute to him, as did the hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead, for his valuable contributions to the debates through all the stages of the Bill. We have been told that it will cost about £3 million a year to work an ineffectual system and to impose


what in many ways amounts to a voluntary custody order. That is against a background of economic retrenchment, when there are insufficient social workers and probation officers to carry out even their present duties. It is against the background of unwilling parents and of all professional bodies which are connected with the care of young offenders—other than the Magistrates Association—being opposed to the whole concept of a curfew order.
I hope that the House will reject the amendment. We shall certainly vote against it.

Mr. Matthew Parris: I apologise because, unintentionally, I missed the beginning of the debate.
The hon. Member for Croydon, North-West (Mr. Pitt) said that family discipline came through trust. He is absolutely right. When I was a child I could trust in the fact that, if I was rude, I would get a smack in the mouth. To that extent, family discipline certainly does come from trust.
It should not be necessary to repeat what has been said in Committee and in the House, but it is not an argument against this measure to put forward occasions when such a penalty would not be a suitable way of dealing with a young offender. In 95 per cent. of cases which come before the courts this course of action would probably be a most unsuitable way to deal with a young offender. However, there may be occasions when it would be a sensible and helpful punishment.
The hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) said that there would have to be total commitment on all sides. There must be a good deal of commitment—perhaps not total commitment—on the part of the parents and the child, and to that extent I go along with the hon. Lady. It would be sensible to go ahead with such a punishment only if the magistrates felt that that commitment existed.
I shall cite an example of a case in which such a sentence might appeal to a court. A young man may have got into trouble in the evenings because he has fallen into bad company. He may have been going round with a gang of people who are perhaps, worse than him. Let us say that he comes from a reasonably good family and is ashamed of what he has done. His parents will try to stop him doing it again, but all sides acknowledge that the gang acts as a lure and that he may want to join it again. What does the court have in mind when sentencing? It considers the need to sever his relationship with the gang, if possible, and to prevent him from going out with it for as long as possible. By fining him or his parents, the court will not sever his relationship with the gang. By sending him to some institution, it may curtail his relationship with the gang, but that might be the type of custodial sentence that we do not want. The court needs to punish him in a way that will prevent him from associating with such people, at least for a little while. In such a case the magistrates' court might find the proposed sentence attractive.
A very persuasive brief was sent to us by the Association of Directors of Social Services. I do not agree with the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) that such briefs represent the views of every one of the members. The hon. Gentleman said that we speak for our constituents. I speak for my constituents, but I certainly do not assume that I speak as every one of my constituents would wish. That is the case with every organisation. However, we received a persuasive brief from the association. Having read it, I am convinced that there may

be difficulties. It is not certain whether the measure will prove successful, but it is worth trying. The risks consequent on its failure are not great. Considerable advantages would attach to its success. Therefore, I believe that it is a brave, imaginative idea, and I am glad that the Minister has persisted with it.

Mr. Alfred Dubs: The growth in the number of young offenders is frightening, and we must be careful before turning down any suggestion that might help to tackle a difficult and increasing problem.
When this proposition was first put to us, I understood that it was a desirable aim that young people who had been getting into serious trouble and who were of school age should be kept off the streets late at night. It was said that this was not a new idea; that it had existed for some years as a condition of bail.
On that basis, I was prepared to consider the arguments for and against introducing a curfew, specifically because it was argued that it would provide one way of reducing the number of young people in custody. There have been many arguments in the House and in the other place about the measure. I have had increasing misgivings about it. It may go much wider than an alternative to imprisonment and become another form of punishment when imprisonment is not an option. I see it being applied to those above school age. The original amendment put to the Standing Committee applied to those above school age. Even now it applies to young people up to the age of 17, at which stage they .are above the compulsory school age. It may be applied for much longer hours than originally proposed. Indeed, 6 o'clock in the evening is quite early, particularly in the summer.
I can well understand why "curfew" has been changed to "night restriction requirement". The word "curfew" has unpleasant connotations. However, the change in nomenclature will not make the concept more acceptable.
6.45 pm
I have three main concerns about the provision. It is said that the proposal will be applied only with the consent of the parents and the young person. However, that consent will apparently be obtained under duress. I cannot imagine a parent or young person refusing to accept the proposition if the alternative is custody. Consent that is obtained under duress is no consent. To that extent it is slightly hollow to say that parents and children will have to agree. They are almost bound to agree because of the conditions under wh:Lch consent is being sought.
Like other hon. Members, I am concerned about the position of the probation officers and social workers who will supervise the night restriction requirement. The Minister said that if parents noticed that their children were not conforming to the requirement, they would not be under any obligation or pressure to report that fact to the police or to the court. I listened carefully, but I do not think that the Minister made any similar statement about the role of probation officers or social workers. As they operate in an official capacity, I wonder whether they will be obliged to report such breaches. The Minister may suggest that they will not be obliged to do so.
What would happen if such a breach were made known to the authorities? Would the police be obliged to arrest the individual, or would the court be obliged to reconsider the young offender's case? The night restriction requirement is apparently being imposed only as an alternative to custody, but I fear that the consequence of


breaching the order will be custody. The Minister may say that that is not so— that it is possible that the requirement is being imposed not merely as an alternative to custody, but for other reasons. Many of us have doubts on that point and I hope that the Minister will clarify it.
I am afraid that this new requirement will encourage the police to spend more time stopping young people to see whether they are in breach of the requirement. That additional factor may worsen relationships between the police and the young. Inevitably the police will see the provision as the easiest way of stopping young people to check whether they are under the restriction. If for no other reason than that, the House should be very careful before giving its approval to any measure that may worsen the relationship between the police and the young.
I have listened to the arguments before, and I have become increasingly doubtful whether the proposal is sensible. I am persuaded by the arguments from the Opposition Benches that it would be a retrograde step if, on the basis of the details suggested, the House were to approve the measure. Therefore, I hope that the amendment will be approved and this proposal thrown out.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I oppose the proposal because of a point made by the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Parris). He said that he did not think it would do much harm even if it did not do very much good. It is that evaluation of the dangers implicit in the proposal which is the divide between us. One can think of cases in which a court might apply this type of curfew order where it might actually do some good. The important question however is "What is the balance?". That is always an important question in any type of punishment. Those of us who have taken the view that the balance is against the proposal will be proved right if the Government succeed tonight and this proposal goes ahead.
The danger of the proposal is that it might increase the feeling that the police harass young people on the street. We have just removed "sus", and did so precisely for that reason. On this type of issue, the police may be acting properly according to their lights and think that it is right to stop young people to find out whether they are subject to such a supervision order and, in those circumstances, come up against innocent young people who bitterly resent being approached in this way. The upshot may be different from the view that the sponsor has taken from the beginning, that it is a modest item of law reform that might do good and would not do any harm. It might turn out to be like "sus", and do a considerable amount of harm.
I have a technical question. My hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) said that the parent had to be consulted. My understanding of the provision is that the parent has to be consulted only if the supervised person is a child and not a young person. Therefore, if the person is more than 14 years old, the parent does not have to be consulted and an order might be made that the child has to remain at home between 6 pm and 6 am at times and in conditions to which the parent might object strenuously. I cannot think of anything more detrimental to the natural harmony of family life than having a 14 or 15-year-old son at home who is not wanted there and who would much rather be out. It is true that the proposal contained in one of the amendments from the other place says that there must be a report stating that the

feasibility of securing compliance is accepted. No doubt the Government rest on that in saying that the parent would have to be consulted by the supervisor.
That brings me to my third and major objection. The supervisors do not like the proposal. The probation service is opposed to the proposal. How will the Government make it work if the probation service, as the main agency, will not co-operate to make it work? I know only too well how final that can be. I have always believed that a social welfare report ought to be available to counsel before a trial even if the accused is pleading not guilty. The National Association of Probation Officers took a decision in 1972 not to allow that. When I was at the Home Office I protested strongly and tried to insist that it should be allowed because it is in the interest of the accused that his counsel sees the report before he decides what his plea will be. We were never able to reverse that decision because it was thought that since the probation service would not work with that edict, it was not worth trying to introduce it. I suspect strongly that the probation service will not work with this proposal. If the service refuses, it will not matter whether the court makes an order. The only people who will enforce it then are the police, which brings me back to the point that I made at the beginning—if the police have to go about trying to enforce these orders, there will be a serious deterioration in relationships, which are already all too bad in the inner cities between young people and the police.

Mr. Mayhew: I do not know what it is that leads so many people in Britain to react with such extreme caution to any new idea, but whatever it is has had full rein in this debate.
The proposal has never been put forward, by the Magistrates Association, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell) or the Government when they came to adopt the principle of the night restriction order, that this was something that would necessarily, even in most cases, be appropriate when a court is confronted with the need to sentence a young offender. It has always been put forward as a promising alternative to the non-custodial options that are already available to the courts in such a case. So many of the objections voiced tonight, from the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) onwards, have concentrated only upon the circumstances in which it could go wrong. The hon. Lady said how sad it would be if there were many breaches of the supervision order. Of course it would be sad. Whether there are a high proportion of breaches will depend in large measure upon the skill with which magistrates and other courts weigh the possibilities of it being a success. It is in order to help them find the right answer that we require them to consult the intended supervisor. It is in order to help them find the right answer that we require them to obtain the consent of the child or the youngster and, similarly, the consent of his parent. It is not only in the case of a child that a parent, in the type of circumstances that we are considering, would have to give consent, because section 12 of the Children and Young Persons Act would require that the court would not include in such an order any requirement that would involve the co-operation of a person other than the supervisor and the supervised person unless that person consents to such an inclusion. If we are talking about


requiring a child to stay at home, that person would be the parent and so the parent's consent would be required in those circumstances.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: That is an interesting interpretation. Why does not the provision require that the consent is required in all cases?

Mr. Mayhew: The magistrates or the court might not always wish the child to reside in a parent's home. That may not be a suitable place and therefore the provision is not put in that rigid way.
An important consideration is how much confidence we have in the courts. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead said in a speech today that it is a question of confidence; in the courts, in the probation officers, welfare and social workers and in parents. He said that putting all these together would be very beneficial. I agree that if we do not have confidence in any of those, either severally or jointly, the proposal is doomed to failure. If we believe that the courts are blind and deaf to what Parliament has said by way of guidance it will be doomed to failure. I do not believe that the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) can take that line because he has been insistent on having guidelines written into the Bill so that the courts shall see in black and white how they are to exercise their discretion.
The courts will see what the restraints or safeguards on this new jurisdiction are. It will be a matter for their experience and judgment whether they use it. Perhaps the most important of the restraints is that they have to consult whether it would be feasible for an order to be made, and they have to be satisfied that if they made the order it would be feasible for it to be carried out.
A great deal has been said about the probation service not co-operating. I do not believe that the probation service as a whole would fail to co-operate if Parliament so asked but if a supervisor who was a probation officer or a supervisor who was a social worker made it clear that he was dead against it, I imagine that it would be rare that a court, notwithstanding that, would say that it would make the order and require that person to be the supervisor.
7 pm
I feel that this is a case of the hon. Lady and other Opposition Members treading a path on which they fear that every corner will be beset by tigers. I do not think that that is a wise or justifiable approach. The hon. Lady asked whether, if it is to be an alternative to custody, it will mean that, when offenders are brought back for breach of the supervision order, a custodial order will be made. The answer is "No". There is no provision for a custodial sentence for a breach of a supervision order. In those circumstances the court may impose a fine or make an attendance centre order, and it would not result in further custodial sentences.
As for resources, we all want more resources for the probation services. We are not aware of the calculation that apparently is attributed to the Association of Directors of Social Services, but I think it could have been made only on the basis that additional probation officers would be needed for the purpose, and we do not believe that they would be needed in any significant number, if at all.
cannot be sure about anything in this field, but, if for any reform of the law, any addition  that one had to be absolutely

certain that in every case a successful result would ensue, that would be the best recipe that I can envisage for no reform whatever.
We have a long way to go and I do not intend discourtesy to those whose points I have not dealt with. I believe that the provision is a useful addition to the law in what will no doubt be a minority of cases, and it is in that spirit that I hope the House will approve it.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 27 to 31 agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 32, in page 2.1, line 17, at end insert—
(aa)to remain for specified periods between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.—

at a place specified in the order; or
at one of several places so specified;"

Question put,That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 107, Noes 75.

Division No. 317]
[7.1 pm


AYES


Alison, Rt Hon Michael
McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)


Ancram, Michael
Madel, David


Aspinwall, Jack
Major, John


Bendall, Vivian
Marlow, Antony


Benyon, Thomas (A'don)
Mates, Michael


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Mather, Carol


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Maude, Rt Hon Sir Angus


Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Bright, Graham
Mayhew, Patrick


Brooke, Hon Peter
Mellor, David


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Moate, Roger


Chalker, Mrs. Lynda
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Chapman, Sydney
Murphy, Christopher


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)
Neale, Gerrard


Cope, John
Needham, Richard


Cranborne, Viscount
Neubert, Michael


Dorrell, Stephen
Newton, Tony


Dover, Denshore
Osborn, John


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Page, Richard (SW Hens)


Dykes, Hugh
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Elliott, Sir William
Percival, Sir Ian


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Proctor, K. Harvey


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Renton, Tim


Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles
Rhodes James, Robert


Forman, Nigel
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Rossi, Hugh


Goodlad, Alastair
Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.


Greenway, Harry
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')


Grieve, Percy
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)
Silvester, Fred


Griffiths, Peter Portsm'th N)
Sims, Roger


Grist, Ian
Speed, Keith


Gummer, John Selwyn
Speller, Tony


Hamilton, Hon A.
Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Stanley, John


Hampson, Dr Keith
Stevens, Martin


Haselhurst, Alan
Stradling Thomas, J


Hawksley, Warren
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Temple-Morris, Peter


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Thompson, Donald


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Trippier, David


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Viggers, Peter


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Waddington, David


Lang, Ian
Ward, John


Lawrence, Ivan
Warren, Kenneth


Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Wells, Bowen


Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; W'loo)
Wheeler, John


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Winterton, Nicholas


Loveridge, John



Lyell, Nicholas
Tellers for the Ayes:


McCrindle, Robert
Mr. David Hunt and


MacGregor, John
Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones.






NOES


Alton, David
Leighton, Ronald


Anderson, Donald
McCartney, Hugh


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
McNally, Thomas


Atkinson, N.(H'gey,)
McWilliam, John


Benn, Rt Hon Tony
Marks, Kenneth


Bennett, Andrew(St'kp't N)
Milian, Rt Hon Bruce


Bidwell, Sydney
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton ltchen)


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Newens, Stanley


Bottomley, Rt Hon A.(M'b'ro)
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Parry, Robert


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Pavitt, Laurie


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)
Penhaligon, David


Crawshaw, Richard
Pitt, William Henry


Crowther, Stan
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Cryer, Bob
Prescott, John


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Dalyell, Tam
Race, Reg


Davidson, Arthur
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Deakins, Eric
Robertson, George


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Dormand, Jack
Rooker, J. W.


Dubs, Alfred
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Dunnett, Jack
Rowlands, Ted


Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Sandelson, Neville


Evans, loan (Aberdare)
Sever, John


Field, Frank
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Foot, Rt Hon Michael
Skinner, Dennis


Foulkes, George
Spearing, Nigel


Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Steel, Rt Hon David


George, Bruce
Stoddart, David


Graham, Ted
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Tinn, James


Hardy, Peter
Welsh, Michael


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Whitlock, William


Hooley, Frank
Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)


Howells, Geraint



Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Tellers for the Noes:


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Mr. Frank Haynes and


Lamond, James
Mr. George Morton.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 33 to 38 agreed to

Lords amendment:No. 39, in page 21, line 32, at end insert
as to—

(i)the offender's circumstances; and
(i)the feasibility of securing compliance with the requirements,
and is satisfied, having regard to the supervisor's report, that it is feasible to secure compliance with them

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Clause 20 provides that a court should not itself include requirements in a supervision order on a juvenile offender unless it had first consulted the supervisor. Some concern was expressed in the House that that brief provision was inadequate. This amendment therefore makes more detailed provision. It specifies that the court's consultation with the supervisor must be about the offender's circumstances and about the feasibility of securing compliance with the requirements that the court has it in mind to include in the supervision order. The amendment also requires the court to satisfy itself, on the basis of that consultation, that it is in practice feasible to secure compliance with those requirements. That is the package that we have just been discussing in relation to the night restriction order.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I welcome the amendment, which follows an assurance that was given to me by the Minister on Report. If a supervisor is to enforce the requirements of a supervision order effectively, he must not feel that its

enforcement would be either impracticable or unreasonable. By giving a supervisor the opportunity now to comment on the feasibility or desirability of any requirement that the court may be considering, this provision should help to ensure that the partnership between the courts and supervisors is effective and constructive.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 40 and 41 agreed to.

Clause 22

CHARGE AND CONTROL OF OFFENDERS

Lords amendment: No. 42, in page 25, line 40, after "that" insert

"it is appropriate to exercise those powers because of the seriousness of the offence and that".

7. 15 pm

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment was accepted on Third Reading in the other place. It was moved after an amendment on slightly different lines had been withdrawn. In its final form, the amendment introduces an additional guideline for the imposition of a residential care order—the "charge and control" condition—on a juvenile offender. Such a condition can be imposed only when a juvenile is already in care as a result of an offence and commits a further imprisonable offence. Subsection (3) of the new section 20A of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 provides that the court shall not add a charge and control condition to a care order unless it is satisfied that no other method of dealing with the offender is appropriate. This amendment requires the court to be of the opinion that it is appropriate to exercise those powers because of the seriousness of the offence. The Government had, at an earlier stage, made clear their view that it would be best to leave it to the discretion of the courts to decide when custody could be avoided only by using this power to make a charge and control condition. But the form in which the amendment was ultimately proposed on Third Reading was acceptable to the Government. I commend it to the House.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Amendment No. 42 was proposed by Baroness Faithfull and others on behalf of the parliamentary penal affairs group in another place. I welcome it because it provides that, before making a residential care order, the court must be satisfied that it is appropriate for the seriousness of the offence. Like my hon. Friends, I retain the view that the residential care order is of monumental irrelevance to the needs of juvenile offenders today. According to the Government's estimates, the order will mean that several hundreds more children will be sent inappropriately, unnecessarily and ineffectively to residential care at a cost, on the Government's estimate, of about a further £6 million a year. That is when the consensus of the DHSS, the Home Office and those who are involved is overwhelmingly to the effect that we should move away from residential care towards methods of dealing with juvenile offenders in the community.
We have debated the residential car
occasions, in Committee, on the
on Report. My hon. Friends and


is inappropriate as a way of dealing with the needs of juveniles. It is on the statute book only because of the Government's cosmetic desire to appease some elements of their own Tory law and order lobby and perhaps of the Magistrates Association. The Government do not believe that it is a sensible contribution to dealing with juvenile delinquency or young offenders.
However, if this retrograde provision is to remain in the Bill it is important to ensure, as the amendment seeks to do, that residential care orders are not imposed in future for minor offences but are reserved for more serious offences and will be used as a genuine alternative to prison department custody.
I welcome the Government's accepting the amendment. It is one means to mitigate the damage that the residential care order will inflict on the system of dealing with juvenile offenders.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause C

CRITERIA FOR MAKING CARE ORDERS

Lords amendment:No. 43, before clause 23, insert:
C. In section 7 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969—

(a)in subsection (7) (under which a court has power to make a care order where a child is found guilty of homicide or a young person is found guilty of any imprisonable offence) after the word "Subject" there shall be inserted the words "to subsection (7A) of this section and " ; and
(b)the following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—
(7A) A court shall not make a care order under subsection (7) of this section in respect of a child or young person unless it is of opinion—

(a)that a care order is appropriate because of the seriousness of the offence; and
(b)that the child or young person is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes a care order."."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment introduces into the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 criteria for the making of care orders on juvenile offenders who are sentenced in criminal proceedings. It was moved by my noble Friend on Report in the other place. It is not quite in the same terms as the amendment proposed, in Committee by the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group, but its purpose is the same as that amendment.
Section 7 of the 1969 Act already provides that the juvenile must have been found guilty of an imprisonable offence before a care order is made. Under this amendment, a court would not be able to make a care order unless it was of the opinion that such an order was appropriate because of the seriousness of the offence. In addition, it is necessary that the care or control test now used in care proceedings should be satisfied—that is, the court must be of the opinion that the child or young person is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes a care order. The 1969 Act provides that in the expression "care or control", "care" includes protection and guidance and "control" includes discipline.
The amendment thus introduces a twofold test in terms which are consonant with the existing provisions of the 1969 Act and which, with its reference to the seriousness

of the offence, is in accord with the guidelines for custodial sentences which have been introduced into the Bill.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I welcome the amendment. In a similar way to the previous amendment it provides that before a care order is made in criminal proceedings the court must consider that the order is appropriate because of the seriousness of the offence and that the child needs care or control that he would not otherwise receive. The amendment was brought forward by the Government in response to a similar amendment proposed in another place by members of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group, as the Minister said.
As has been said many times, the system of care orders in criminal proceedings is one of the many injustices in dealing with young offenders. An increasing body of research evidence. much of it collected by Professor Norman Tutt and his colleagues at Lancaster university, some of which was referred to earlier by the hon. and learned Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Lyell), demonstrates that most young offenders receive care orders to local authority residential establishments unnecessarily and inappropriately. Department of Health and Social Security research shows that most care orders made in criminal proceedings are for young people convicted of petty property offences with few, if any, previous convictions. About 40 per cent. are imposed on first offenders and 60 per cent. on first and second time offenders.
The amendment will ensure that in future care orders are imposed not for minor offences, but only when there is a genuine need for care and control.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause D

RESTRICTION ON MAKING CARE ORDERS IN RESPECT OF PERSONS NOT LEGALLY REPRESENTED

Lords amendment: No. 44, after the words last inserted, insert:
D. The following section shall be inserted after section 7 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969—
'Legal representation
(1) A court shall not make a care order under section 7(7) of this Act in respect of a child or young person who is not legally represented in that court unless either—

(a)he applied for legal aid and the application was refused on the ground that it did not appear that his means were such that he required assistance; or
(b)having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply.

(2) For the purposes of this section a person is to be treated as legally represented in a court if, but only if, he has the assistance of counsel or a solicitor to represent him in the proceedings in that court at some time after he is found guilty and before a care order is made, and in this section "legal aid" means legal aid for the purposes of proceedings in that court, whether the whole proceedings or the proceedings on or in relation to the making of the care order; but in the case of a person committed to the Crown Court sentence or trial, it is immaterial whether he applied for legal aid in the Crown Court to, or was informed of his right to apply by, that court or the court which committed him.'".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The Government were able to table this amendment on Report in the other place. It is almost identical with that which was tabled in Committee by the noble baroness Lady Faithfull.
The amendment improves the Bill. It ensures that a care order can generally not be made on a juvenile offender who is not legally represented before being sentenced in criminal proceedings. It is framed in the standard form set out in section 21 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The Minister did not say that the amendment was proposed on behalf of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group in another place. I do not know why everyone should be in such a hurry to get through our business tonight.
Without the amendment we would have had the anomaly that no unrepresented young offender could be sent to a detention centre, even for as little as three weeks, whereas a juvenile could be sent to an institution under a care order for a year or even longer without being offered legal representation. The amendment is an important safeguard for the recipients of care orders in criminal proceedings. I welcome it.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause E

RESTRICTION OF LIBERTY OF CHILDREN IN CARE

Lords amendment:No. 45, insert the following new clause—
E.—(1) The following section shall be inserted after section 21 of the Child Care Act 1980—
"Use of accommodation for restricting liberty.
21A.—(1) Subject to regulations under subsection (2)(a)below, a child in the care of a local authority may not be placed, and, if placed, may not be kept, in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty unless it appears—

(a)that—

(i)he has a history of absconding and is likely to abscond from any other description of accommodation; and
(ii)if he absconds it is likely that his physical, mental or moral welfare will be at risk; or
(b)that if he is kept in any other description of accommodation he is likely to injure himself or other persons.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations—

(a)specify—

(i)exceptional cases where subsection (1) above is not to apply to children committed to the care of a local authority under section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969;
(ii)a maximum period beyond which a child may not be kept in such accommodation without the authority of a juvenile court; and
(iii)a maximum period for which a juvenile court may authorise a child to be kept in such accommodation;
(b)empower a juvenile court from time to time to authorise a child to be kept in such accommodation for such further period as the regulations may specify; and
(c)provide that the power conferred by virtue of paragraph (b) above shall be exercisable on the application of the local authority in whose care the child is.
(3) It shall be the duty of a juvenile court before which a child is brought by virtue of this section to determine whether the criteria for keeping a child in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty are satisfied in his case; and if a court determines that the criteria are satisfied, it shall make an order authorising the child to be kept in such accommodation and specifying the maximum period for which he may be so kept.
(4) On any adjournment of a hearing under subsection (3) above a justice of the peace or a juvenile court may make an

interim order permitting the keeping of the child to whom the hearing relates during the period of the adjournment in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty.
(5) An appeal shall lie to the Crown Court from a decision of a juvenile court under this section.
(6) A juvenile court shall not exercise the powers conferred by this section in respect of a child who is not legally represented in that court unless either—

(a)he applied for legal aid and the application was refused on the ground that it did not appear his means were such that he required assistance; or
(b)having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply .".
(2) In the Legal Aid Act 1974—

(a)in section 28(3)(a) and (6), after "1969" there shall be inserted "or under section 21A of the Child Care Act 1980"; and
(b)at the end of section 29(1)(d)there shall be inserted "or (e)where a child is brought before a juvenile court under section 21A of the Child Care Act 1980 and is not (but wishes to be) legally represented before that court."."

Read a Second time.

The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Tony Newton): I beg to move, as an amendment to the Lords amendment, in subsection 21A(4) leave out 'a justice of the peace or'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 46, 250, 251 and 2.

Mr. Newton: The Government amendment and the other Lords amendments, apart from Lords amendment No. 45, are all technical or tidying up amendments.
I hesitate to say that Lords amendment No. 45 is one of the better amendments passed in the other place. That would imply a knowledge of the other 290 that I do not possess. But it is a good amendment. It embodies two sensible reforms and reflects a response to the views expressed by hon. Members and noble Lords and Ladies. That shows the working of Parliament at something approaching its best.
The history is complex, and I shall confine myself to explaining the main purposes of the amendment. The first is to define in law the criteria on the basis of which young people would be admitted to secure accommodation. The criteria are tight. They are an improvement on the previous legal position and, indeed, the position at earlier stages of the Bill.
I make one important qualification. Alongside the criteria set out in the amendment we have included the power for the Secretary of State by regulation to prescribe a qualification to enable children remanded to care to be kept in secure accommodation in certain circumstances.
The second purpose of the amendment is a completely new provision for the judicial review of the placement of children in secure accommodation. It is achieved by giving the Secretary of State the power to make regulations specifying exceptional cases, a maximum period during which young people can be confined in secure accommodation without the formal authority of a juvenile court and a maximum period for which a juvenile court may authorise a young person being kept in secure accommodation. The provision also provides for appeals from decisions of the juvenile court to the Crown court and for legal aid to be granted to young people involved in the process.
I hope that the House will consider the proposals satisfactory. They move us a long way towards more


stringent safeguards on young people being put into secure accommodation and on the way in which the process of their being kept there is sanctioned.
Anxiety was expressed in another place about the fact that on judicial review the Secretary of State's regulation-making power was permissive rather than mandatory. That is no more than for reasons of convention. I give the House a categorical assurance that the Secretary of State intends to use these powers and that he will propose to the House that the regulations should be made as soon as possible.

7. 30 pm

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I am pleased to hear the Minister's categorical assurance, but can he be a little more specific about when he expects to be able to bring the regulations before Parliament?

Mr. Newton: I can be a little more specific, although probably not quite as specific as the hon. Gentleman would like. There are two problems. The first is that we are still in the consultative phase on what the regulations should contain. Secondly, as the hon. Gentleman knows, we have already committed ourselves to a broader review and reform of the community homes regulations as a whole, and that may take a little time.
I hope that we shall be able to disentangle the making of these regulations from the wider issue of the community homes regulations and that that will enable us to proceed with considerable speed. Provided that the consultation process can be concluded reasonably quickly and we are able to disentangle these regulations from the wider issue, I hope that we shall be in a position by the latter part of next spring to bring forward the regulations in which the hon. Gentleman is interested.

Dr. Summerskill: The Opposition warmly welcome these important and significant amendments that were introduced mainly by Opposition Members in the other place. The amendments have done a great deal to lessen the damaging effects of a residential care order on a child. As the Minister acknowledged, it is important that there should be proper safeguards in respect of young children who are enclosed within the child care system. At present, children in care, many of whom have not committed a criminal offence, can be there for indefinite periods at the discretion of the care authority and with no judicial review.
I understand that this legislation is definitely no longer in breach of article 5.4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There was some question that it might have been. It is reassuring to know that as a result of these amendments it is not.
I am sure that the availability of a judicial review and the other safeguards in the amendments will ensure that greater thought and consideration will be given before care orders are implemented and imposed. That is what we have wanted throughout the passage of the Bill.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill), I warmly welcome these amendments to one of the most important parts of the Bill.
The Minister rightly paid testimony to the work that has been done in Parliament on this issue, both in this House and in the other place. It is a great testimony to the effectiveness of parliamentarians of all parties as well as to outside organisations such as NACRO and the Children's Legal Centre, both of which have been

extremely active in lobbying Members of both Houses, briefing them and drafting the amendments. These amendments are in response to those tabled by the Opposition which were drafted by the Children's Legal Centre, and in response to amendments along similar lines proposed by the parliamentary penal affairs group.
Two reports published in the last 18 months have proposed that such statutory criteria should be laid down and that a system of judicial review of the detention of young people in secure accommodation should be introduced. The parliamentary penal affairs groups report "Young Offenders: A Strategy for the Future" published in 1981 and, more recently, the report of the Children's Legal Centre entitled "Locked Up in Care" have been profoundly influential in affecting our arguments and attitudes. I also hope that they have convinced the Government that what has been proposed by the Opposition and the parliamentary penal affairs group is necessary and desirable.
Both reports express concern that secure units are currently being used for younger and less delinquent children that was the case several years ago. They both point out that the recidivist rate of young people in residential establishments is high and, most important, that such establishments seem to make younger and less delinquent children a more likely to reoffend than would have been expected from their offending records.
The Government have also acknowledged that their failure up to now to provide a judicial review of the detention of children in secure accommodation probably placed us in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. Even today, we are still in breach of that convention and we shall continue to be so until the Minister's assurance of the regulations coming before us in late spring is realised.
This amendment was brought forward in response to Opposition amendments based on the Children's Legal Centre recommendations. It is reassuring that the Minister has gone further and given a categorical assurance that the regulations will be introduced in the late spring. He is on notice from now until then to ensure that the consultations are carried out with great speed and efficiency. There is no good reason why the regulations cannot be before us next spring. We are talking about 2,000 children a year being locked up in prison-like conditions without any proper judicial control, review or supervision. That has always been an offence to our criminal justice system and to our local authority system of care and welfare of young people.
We are now taking an important step to put that right. The Minister can be assured that we shall be watching him closely to ensure that he follows this through to the bitter end.

Mr. Newton: With the leave of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I should make it quite clear to the hon. Gentleman that my categorical assurance related to the making of regulations. If he reads what I said about the date in Hansard,he will find that it was slightly less categorical, but we shall do what we can to meet the tentative target that I have set.
To avoid any misunderstanding, I should point out that these amendments have no relationship with residential care orders. They are concerned only with the placement of children in secure: accommodation. I am happy to join the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) in his


tribute to the many people who have played a part in bringing us to where we are today. Not least, I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for the work that he has done.
In fairness to my officials, I must resist the suggestion that the DHSS has been dragged along, kicking and screaming, by this process.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: They are an admirable bunch.

Mr. Newton: I agree with that.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: It has been the Ministers.

Mr. Newton: I do not think Ministers have been the problem, because I have not been dragged kicking and screaming—

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The hon. Gentleman is all right.

Mr. Newton: We can all agree that we have been mutually helpful to one another. I merely place on record the fact that the first suggestion of a judicial review was contained in a DHSS report on children in care produced in February 1981.
At any rate, we can all be pleased with what will be passed into law, and I am grateful to everyone who has played a part.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 46 agreed to.

New Clause F

POWER OF CROWN COURT TO GRANT BAIL PENDING
APPEAL

Lords amendment: No. 47, before clause 27 insert:
F.—(1) In section 81 of the Supreme Court Act 1981—
(a) in subsection (1) (which lists cases in which the Crown Court may grant bail) at the end of paragraph (e) there shall be added—
or
(f) to whom the Crown Court has granted a certificate under section 1(2) or 11(1A) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 or under subsection (1B) below ;";

(b) the following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection—
(1A) The power conferred by subsection (1)(f)does not extend to a case to which section 12 or 15 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (appeal against verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity or against finding of disability) applies.
(1B) A certificate under this subsection is a certificate that a case is fit for appeal on a ground which involves a question of law alone.
(1C) The power conferred by subsection (1)(f)W is to be exercised—

>(a)where the appeal is under section 1 or 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, by the judge who tried the case; and
(b)where it is under section 10 of that Act, by the judge who passed the sentence.
(1D) The power may only be exercised within twenty eight days from the date of the conviction appealed against, or in the case of appeal against sentence, from the date on which sentence was passed or, in the case of an order made or treated as made on conviction, from the date of the making of the order.
(1E) The power may not be exercised if the appellant has made an application to the Court of Appeal for bail in respect of the offence or offences towhich the appeal relates.

(1F) It shall be a condition of bail granted in the exercise of the power that, unless a notice of appeal has previously been lodged in accordance with subsection (1) of section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968—

(a)such a notice shall be so lodged within the period specified in subsection (2) of that section; and
(b)not later than 14 days from the end of that period, the appellant shall lodge with the Crown Court a certificate from the registrar of criminal appeals that a notice of appeal was given within that perod.
(1G) If the Crown Court grants bail to a person in the exercise of the power, it may direct him to appear—

(a)if a notice of appeal is lodged within the period specified in section 18(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 at such time and place as the Court of Appeal may require; and
(b)if no such notice is lodged within that period, at such time and place as the Crown Court may require.".

(2) In the Criminal Appeal Act 1968—

(a)in section 11—

(i)in subsection (1), for the word "An" there shall be substituted the words "Subject to subsection (1A) below, an"; and
(ii)the following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection

"(1A) If the judge who passed the sentence grants a certificate that the case is fit for appeal under section 9 or 10 of this Act, an appeal lies under this section without the leave of the Court of Appeal." ;

(b)the following section shall be substitued for section 19—

"Bail

19.—(1) The Court of Appeal may, if they think fit—

(a)grant an appellant bail pending the determination of his appeal; or
(b)revoke bail granted to an appellant by the Crown Court under paragraph (f) of section 81(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981; or
(c)vary the conditions of bail granted to an appellant in the exercise of the power conferred by that paragraph.

(2) The powers conferred by subsection (1) above may be exercised—

(a)on the application of an appellant; or
(b)if it appears to the registrar of criminal appeals of the Court of Appeal (hereafter referred to as "the registrar") that any of them ought to be exercised, on a reference to the court by him." ;
(c)the following paragraph shall be substituted for section 31(2)(e)—
(e)to exercise the powers conferred by section 19 of this Act;".

(3) The following subsection shall be inserted after section 30(7) of the Legal Aid Act 1974—
(7A) Where a certificate that a case is fit for appeal has been issued under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 or under section 81(1B) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, legal aid which may be ordered to be given by a legal aid order under section 28(7) above shall include legal aid for the purposes of an application for the grat of bail by the Crown Court.".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 268, 278 and 4.

Mr. Mayhew: The new clause derives from one originally moved by Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. It springs from a proposal from the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group. The intention of the sponsors of the


original amendment was that if a defendant intends to appeal, and the judge considers it a proper case, he should be able to grant bail pending the appeal immediately after completion of the hearing in the Crown court without further formality. To achieve that simple result, however, this rather daunting clause is necessary.
In order to ensure that the Court of Appeal is not faced with a flood of unmeritorious appeals, the grant of bail is made dependent on the grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal by the judge who presided at the trial or who passed sentence. The intending appellant may then apply for bail immediately. To prevent any delay, it will not be necessary for a notice of appeal to have been lodged at that stage, but to ensure that the offender carries out his stated intention to submit an appeal, the amendments provide that it shall be a condition of any bail granted that a notice of appeal shall be lodged within the period of 28 days prescribed in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 for the lodging of such appeals. The overall effect will be to speed up the process for granting Crown court bail in those cases where the judge thinks it appropriate.
Under existing law a judge of the Crown court already has power to grant a certificate of fitness for appeal where the appeal is against conviction on a ground involving a question of fact or of mixed law and fact. The amendments give a judge power to certify the fitness for appeal of appeals against conviction involving a question of law alone. I should stress that such a certificate will be required only where the appellant desires to apply to the Crown court for bail pending appeal and will not affect the existing right of such offenders to appeal direct to the Court of Appeal without having to obtain the court's leave. A judge of the Crown court would also be given power to grant a certificate of fitness in relation to appeals against sentence. That places all applicants for bail pending appeal on the same footing. Legal aid is made available for the purposes of an application to the Crown court for the grant of bail.
There are provisions to ensure that there is no confusion over the responsibility of the two courts. I need not detail them. The amendments to schedule 15 and the long title are purely consequential.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: I welcome these amendments. Although they were proposed by Lord Hutchinson on behalf of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group, and opposed by the Government, it was one of the rare occasions when we managed to win a Division. In spite of that, I commend the Government for not having attempted to reverse the decision.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause G

ACTIVATION OF SUSPENDED SENTENCE

Lords amendment: No. 48, after clause 27 insert:

" G. In section 23(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, the words "which have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed" shall be omitted."

7. 45 pm

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we shall take the Minister's consequential amendment.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendment relates to section 23 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, which specifies the powers of a court in dealing with an offender who has committed an imprisonable offence during the operational period of a suspended sentence. At present section 23 requires the court to make an order that the suspended sentence shall take effect unless it is of the opinion that: it would be unjust to do so in view of all the circumstances that have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed, including the facts of the subsequent offence.
The purpose of the amendment is simply to enable the courts to take account also of matters that arose before the suspended sentence was passed, but of which the court imposing the original sentence may not have been aware—such as, for example, medical history. The Government are satisfied, after careful consideration and on the basis of consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, that the amendment is, on balance, desirable and will not undermine the deterrent impact of the suspended sentence.
The amendment to schedule 15 which we are discussing with this amendment is purely consequential. Amendment No. 48 was accepted by the Government on Third Reading of the Bill in another place and this is, therefore, the first opportunity to male this tidying-up amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Consequential amendment made: In schedule 15, page 116, line 23, leave out 'Section 23' and insert

In section 23, in subsection (1), the words "which have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed", arid subsections'.—[Mr. Mayhew.]

Clause 28

EARLY RELEASE OF PRISONERS

Lords amendment: No. 49, in page 31 line 2, at end insert

"and
(c) an offence specified in Part III of that Schedule."

Mr. Mayhew: 1 beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lorc s in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 180 to 180C.

Mr. Mayhew: This amendment deals with early release under clause 28. It deals with drug trafficking offences, added to the schedule that lists the offences that are excluded from the power granted to the Home Secretary, with parliamentary approval, to effect early release in certain, very tightly limited, circumstances.
This group of amendments falls into two categories. The amendment to clause 28 and amendments to schedule 1 together have the effect of excluding from eligibility for early release under the provisions of clause 27, prisoners who are serving sentences for offences of trafficking in drugs.
In making provision in the clause for the exclusion of offences of violence, which we have already done in this House, the Government have always recognised—and there has been general recognition—that some problems of definition were bound to arise. The list of offences at present found in schedule 1 was deliberately confined to those offences where violence on the part of the offender is an inherent element of the offence. Nobody can doubt, however, that those who traffic in hard drugs are clearly a deep menace to society. It was argued forcefully in
another place that such offenders should be treated in the same way for the purposes of this clause as those sentenced to imprisonment for offences involving violence.
The second set of amendments is purely technical. The schedule at present refers to the Hijacking Act 1971 and the Protection of Aircraft Act 1973. These measures have now, however, been consolidated in the Aviation Security Act which received Royal Assent this summer. The remaining amendments adjust the references in the schedule accordingly.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29

POWER TO ALTER MINIMUM PERIOD FOR ELIGIBILITY FOR RELEASE ON LICENCE

Lords amendment: No. 50, in page 32, line 43, leave out "and".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 51.

Mr. Mayhew: Clause 29 amends section 60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 to give the Secretary of State a power to reduce, by order, the minimum period of imprisonment which must be served before a prisoner is eligible for parole. Section 60 of the 1967 Act extends to Scotland, and it is intended that the amendment made to it by clause 29 should also extend to Scotland. An appropriate amendment to the extent clause will be tabled later. Section 100 of the 1967 Act, which is amended by clause 29 to provide that orders made under the amended section 60 are subject to affirmative resolution procedure, does not, however, currently extend to Scotland and the amendment amends the extent section in the 1967 Act by adding section 100 to the list of sections which apply to Scotland. The second amendment is purely drafting.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 51 agreed to.

Clause 31

ABOLITION OF ENHANCED PENALTIES ON SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION OF SUMMARY OFFENCES UNDER ACTS OF PARLIAMENT

Lords amendment: No. 52, in page 33, line 17, leave out "of Parliament".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 53 to 55.

Mr. Mayhew: The first amendment in this group is a drafting amendment. It removes from clause 31 the rather cumbersome phrase "Act of Parliament" when the word "Act" alone is sufficient.
Amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55 are also straightforward. Together with similar amendments to clauses 32, 34, 36 and 38, they ensure that fixed and maximum fines for summary offences are caught by the provisions of this part of the Bill which apply to the uprating of fine levels.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55 agreed to.

Clause 32

ABOLITION OF ENHANCED PENALTIES UNDER SUBORDINATE INSTRUMENTS

Lords amendment: No. 56, in page 34, line 1, leave out
"of Parliament".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 57 to 60.

Mr. Mayhew: These are purely drafting or technical amendments and I need not explain their content.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 57 to 60 agreed to.

Clause 33

THE STANDARD SCALE OF FINES FOR SUMMARY OFFENCES

Lords amendment No. 61 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 62, in page 34, line 37, leave out "at" and insert

"or maximum fine by reference to"

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 63.

Mr. Mayhew: As with the similar amendments to clauses 31 and 32, already agreed to, these amendments ensure that part III of the Bill affects fixed as well as maximum fines.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 63 to 98 agreed to.

New Clause H

EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

Lords amendment: No. 99, after clause 36, insert:

"H. In section 2(3) of the Emergency Powers Act 1920 for "of one hundred pounds" there shall be substituted "not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, as defined in section [Construction of references to "the standard scale"] of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, or not exceeding a lesser amount"."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 189 and 207.

Mr. Mayhew: This is not a new provision, but for technical reasons it is necessary to bring into a new clause the provisions relating to the increase in penalties under the Emergency Powers Act which are located in schedules 3 and 7 to the Bill. These are deleted by amendments Nos. 189 and 207.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause I

ORDERS RELATING TO SPREAD OF PESTS

Lords amendment: No. 100, after the words last inserted, insert:

"I. The following subsections shall be substituted for sections 3(4) of the Plant Health Act 1967 (control of spread of pests in Great Britain)—

"(4) An order made by a competent authority under this section may provide that a person guilty of an offence against the order shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of an amount not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, as defined in section [Construction of references to "the standard scale"] of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, or not exceeding a lesser amount.

(4A) An order so made for preventing the spread in Great Britain of the Colorado beetle (Leptinotarsa decemlineata (Say)) may provide that a person guilty of an offence against the order relating to the keeping of living specimens of the beetle (in any stage of existence), or to the distribution in any manner of such specimens, shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for not more than three months, as well as, or as an alternative to, a fine under subsection (4) above."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment increases to — 1,000 the penalty under section 3(4) of the Plant Health Act 1967 for contravening an order made for preventing the spread in Great Britain of the Colorado beetle.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause J

BYELAWS RELATING TO THE BURNING OF STRAW OR STUBBLE

Lords amendment: No. 101, after the words last inserted, insert:

"J. Any byelaws relating to the burning of straw or stubble made by a local authority under section 235 of the Local Government Act 1972 (byelaws for good rule and government and suppression of nuisances) may provide that persons contravening the byelaws shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £1,000 and, in the case of a continuing offence, a further fine not exceeding £5 for each day during which the offence continues after the conviction thereof; and any such byelaw in force at the coming into force of this section which specifies £200 or any smaller sum as the maximum fine which may be imposed on summary conviction of an offence under any such byelaw shall have effect as if it specified £1,000 instead (but with no change by virtue of this section in the maximum daily fine, if any, for which it provides)."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendments Nos. 102 and 279.

Mr. Mayhew: It was argued and accepted in the other place that the maximum fine for offences relating to straw and stubble burning should be £1,000 rather than £500 and that the new maximum should be applied directly to existing byelaws, thereby saving local authorities the trouble of having to remake the relevant instruments. This revised new clause and associated amendments give effect to those decisions.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 102 agreed to.

New Clause K

BYELAWS FOR BRITISH AIRPORTS AUTHORITY AERODROMES

Lords amendment: No. 103, after clause 37, insert:

"K. The following subsections shall be substituted for section 9(3) of the Airports Authority Act 1975 (by virtue of which the maximum fine that byelaws made by the British Airports Authority in respect of aerodromes owned or managed by it may specify for a contravention of the byelaws is £100)—

"(3) Any person contravening any byelaws made under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding such amount as, subject tovsubsection (3A) below, may be specified by the byelaws in relation to the contravention.

(3A) The maximum fines that byelaws may specify by virtue of subsection (3) above are fines of an amount at level 4 on the standard scale, as defined in section [Construction of references to "the standard scale" ] of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, or of a lower amount."."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 104.

Mr. Mayhew: Together these two new clauses give effect to an undertaking that I gave in Committee. Their effect is to increase from £100 to £500 the maximum summary penalty generally available for offences created by civil airports' byelaws, thereby enabling the airports authorities to provide, when they remake their byelaws, for a higher penalty for "taxi touting".

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 104 to 111 agreed to.

Clause 40

POWER TO ALTER SUMS

Lords amendment: No. 112, in page 40, line 12, at end insert—

"(fa) paragraph 11(2) of Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955* and to the Air Force Act 1955† (compensation orders); 
(fb) paragraph 14(1) of that Schedule and paragraph 14(1) of Schedule 4B to the Naval Discipline Act 1957‡ (recognisance from parents and guardians);"

*1955 c. 18.
†19:55 c. 19.
‡1957 c. 53.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House cloth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 113.

Mr. Mayhew: Clause 40 lists the provisions which are affected by the power to alter maximum fines and certain other sums by order. Amendment No. 112 merely adds to the list those provisions which enable standing civilian courts to impose financial penalties on a juvenile. Amendment 113 similarly adds to the list the table of maximum periods of imprisonment in default now applicable to Crown courts by virtue of clause 52, the maximum fine available to standing civilian courts under the Armed Forces Act 1976, the relevant provisions of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 which provide maxima higher than £1,000 for offences relating to the licensing of sex establishments, and the similar provision in the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982 relating to the licensing of cinemas.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 113 agreed to.

Clause 41

FINES FOR CERTAIN OFFENCES UNDER MERCHANT
SHIPPING ACTS AND PREVENTION OF OIL POLLUTION
ACT 1971

Lords amendment: No. 114, in page 40, line 33, after
"1971" insert—

"(a)"

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Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we are taking Lords amendments Nos. 115 and 116.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendments are concerned with penalties under the Merchant Shipping Acts. Amendments Nos. 114 and 115 are drafting amendments. Amendment No. 116, although it looks daunting, is simple in its effect. Two of the powers to prescribe penalties in subordinate legislation under the Merchant Shipping Acts do not clearly permit different maxima to be applied to offences according to their relative gravity.
A recent interpretation of the provisions of sections 20 and 21, which respectively are concerned with the control of oil pollution and regulations on health and safety on ships, is that all offences must be triable either way with two years' imprisonment on indictment. Many of the offences will not be of the more serious kind. For example, they may consist simply of failing to maintain correct records. We therefore need to ensure that the flexibility conveyed in powers to prescribe maxima in subordinate instruments is available.
Amendment No. 116 makes it clear that summary trial only may be provided for where appropriate and that the maxima for the summary offences may be fixed according to their relative gravity within the overall limit of level 5 on the standard scale.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 115 and 116 agreed to.

New Clause M

FINES FOR OFFENCES AGAINST REGULATIONS RELATING
TO WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY APPARATUS ON FOREIGN SHIPS
AND AIRCRAFT

Lords amendment: No. 117, after clause 41 insert:

"M. (1) In section 6 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949—
(a) in subsection (2), for the words from "such", in the second place where it occurs, to "regulations", in the fourth place where it occurs, there shall be substituted the words "a maximum fine for each offence of an amount not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, as defined in section [Construction of references to "the standard scale"] of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, or of a lesser amount"; and

(b) the following subsection shall be added after subsection (3)—

"(4) For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section—

(a)section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (the standard scale of fines for summary offences); and
(b)an order under section 143 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 which alters the sums specified in section 33(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982,

shall extend to Northern Ireland."

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the punishment for an offence committed before this section comes into operation."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment increases from —100 to level 5 on the standard scale—which currently stands at —1,000—the maximum fine available for summary offences against regulations made under section 6(2) of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949. The regulations enable control to be exercised over the use of the apparatus on foreign ships and aircraft within the United Kingdom's territorial jurisdiction.
The present maximum has remained at —100 since 1949 and would be increased to only —200 by clause 36 of the Bill. A more appropriate reflection of the potential gravity of the offences concerned would be —1,000.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 44

POWER TO ALTER CERTAIN FINES AND OTHER SUMS

Lords amendment: No. 118, in page 43, line 29, leave out "of this Act".

The Solicitor-General for Scotland (Mr. Peter Fraser): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss Lords amendment No. 119.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The amendments add to the list of sums that can be altered, to take account of changes in the value of money, the exceptionally high summary fines that are being provided for offences under section 7(4)(a) of the Cinematogrph (Amendment) Act 1982 and paragraph 19(3) of schedule 2 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 119 agreed to.

Clause 45

REVISION OF PENALTIES FOR SUMMARY OFFENCES AND
OF CERTAIN OTHER SUMS

Lords amendment: No. 120, in page 44, line 9, leave out "(2)," and insert (1A) to"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we are taking Lords amendments Nos. 121, 122, 130, 150, 275, 276 and 287.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The primary purpose of the amendments, and in particular the new clause, is to clarify the effect of the provisions of both the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 and the current Bill on the penalties for offences in respect of which there is no express provision regarding the mode of trial. Broadly speaking, those offences with no specific mode of trial which, prior to the Criminal Law Act 1977, carried maximum penalties which did not exceed a fine of £ 400 or three months' imprisonment, are made triable only summarily. The remainder are made triable either


summarily or on indictment. Those statutory offences which are at present triable only on indictment or in the High Court will continue to be only so triable.
The new clause makes amendments to section 289B and 289D of the 1975 Act which are consequential upon the new clause dealing with mode of trial. It also corrects certain defects and omissions. For the convenience of practitioners, the new clause sets out the amended section 289B in full.
The other amendments to sections 289B and 289D are, in the main, designed to clarify the effect of those sections on certain types of fine. I refer to fixed, as opposed to maximum, fines in respect of each period of a specified length during which a continuing offence is committed, and fines in respect of specified quantities or numbers of things.
The amendments to clause 45 and schedule 50 are consequential on the provisions of the new clause.

Mr. Bruce Milan: Clause 45 is incomprehensible. The Government are suggesting a remarkable series of amendments, including amendment No. 150, which inserts a new clause into the Bill. That consists of several other new clauses to be inserted into the Criminal Procedures (Scotland) Act 1975.
I would not say that I come to the Bill fresh, but I come to it new and I do not understand why such substantial changes should appear as Lords amendments. The Opposition take a dim view of important changes in criminal procedure legislation in Scotland being spatchcocked into what is otherwise an English Bill. That is an unfortunate way to legislate, particularly when the amendments are incomprehensible.
What will be the effect of amendment No. 150 in terms of the number of offences triable summarily compared with the number tried on indictment? Will either category be increased or will it make no difference? If it will make no substantial difference, why is it necessary?

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I understand the right hon. Gentleman's concern. The Bill seeks to bring into law an arrangement by which fines are uprated to take account of inflation without introducing a multiplicity of amendments to statutes.
The assumption has been that the provision for fines in the 1975 Act and in the Bill involves offences falling neatly into three distinct categories—those triable only summarily, those triable either summarily or on indictment, and those triable only on indictment.
The provisions and fines in the 1975 Act in part were designed to rationalise and inflation-proof fines for offences triable only either summarily or on indictment and offences triable only on indictment. The 1975 Act used a broad-brush approach which increased where necessary the fines for such offences to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum on a summary conviction and an unlimited fine on conviction on indictment. This Bill seeks to rationalise and inflation-proof fines for offences which are triable only summarily. To that end it contains broad-brush provisions for fines for such offences. However, it is now apparent that there are a large number of offences in Scottish legislation for which there is no express provision for the mode of trial. That is the basis on which all the assumptions in the Bill are made.
I understand the right hon. Gentleman's concern that the discovery should come at a relatively late stage in the

Bill's progress. I'-lope that he will accept that we are trying to accommodate a particular set of circumstances when no mode of trial exists in Scottish statutes.
The amendments provide a better delimitation of apparatus to uprate fines in terms of charges which can be tried only on indictment or summarily. There is no significant change to the overall arrangement.

Mr. Milan:: I understand that there is no significant change in the legislation, but there are a number of offences that can be tried one way or another. Do the new provisions carry some indication of the division between one category and another? What is likely to happen in practice? Will there be more trials taken summarily because of the provision, fewer, or just about the same number?

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: Practically there will be no significant alteration, but if I am wrong I shall let the right hon. Gentleman know.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 121 and 122 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 123, in page 45, line 25, leave out from "fine" to end of line 26 and insert

"or a maximum fine which is"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 124, 132 to 138, 143, 145, 146 and 148.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The amendments are designed to ensure that the provisions of the proposed new sections 289E to 289G of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 achieve the correct result in cases where the fines can be imposed on conviction of an offence triable only summarily that has been non-textually amended. That will ensure that in cases of the type in question the fine provisions in the Bill achieve a textual amendment specifying the fine and not merely an amendment to the provisions that alter that fine.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 124 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 125, in page 45, line 36, after "the" insert "fine or"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This is purely a drafting amendment. It amends section 289F(1) so that it refers consistently throughout to fines or maximum fines.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 126, in page 46, line 1, leave out "in any Act passed" and insert "passed or made"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Subsection (1)(iv) of the proposed new section 289F is designed to exclude from the scope of the general uprating of fines provided for in section 289F fines which have been altered between the passing of the Criminal Law Act 1977 and the passing o f this Bill. The reason for the exclusion is that any such alteration should have been designed to put the fines in question on to the appropriate point of the five-point scale. It will be wrong further to increase such fines.


As drafted, however, subsection (1)(iv) excludes from the general uprating only fines which have been altered since 1977 by an enactment contained in an Act. The amendment extends that exclusion to cover fines which have been altered since 1977 by enactments contained in subordinate legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 127, in page 46, line 2, leave out from first "the" to end of line 3 and insert

"commencement of this section."

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 128 and 129.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The Scottish fines provisions were drafted on the assumption that they would be brought into force as soon as the Bill received the Royal Assent. The intention, however, is to bring the fines provisions into force in about April 1983. It is, therefore, necessary to amend the fines provisions accordingly.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 128 to 130 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 131, in page 46, line 15, at beginning insert

"Subject to subsection (7A) below,"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 139, 144 and 147.

8. 15 pm

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: Those amendments ensure that in any case where the fine formula is X per quantity or Y whichever is the greater, both legs are caught for the purpose of section 289F—the uprating of summary fines levels—and 289G—conversion to levels on the standard scale. Equivalent amendments have already been made for the English fine provisions.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 132 to 148, agreed to.

Lords Amendment: No. 149, in page 48, line 46, at end insert—

"(8) Where an enactment to which subsection (5) above applies confers a power such as is mentioned in subsection (4)(a)(ii) above, the power shall be construed as a power to make a person liable to a fine or, as the case may be, a maximum fine of the amount corresponding to the level on the standard scale to which the enactment refers by virtue of subsection (4) above or of a lesser amount."

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment. This confers upon the makers of subordinate legislation the discretion to provide in that subordinate legislation fixed or maximum fines of an amount less than that in the relevant enabling power even when such discretion is not currently conferred by the enabling legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 150 agreed to.

Clause 46

SCHEDULES 7A TO 7D TO THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT 1975 AND SCHEDULES 6 AND 7 TO THIS ACT

Lords amendment: No. 151, in page 49, line 40, leave out "Subsection (3) above does" and insert

"The amendments provided for in Schedule 8 to this Act, other than paragraph 4 thereof, do"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 152 and 153.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland:: These amendments are designed to make it clear that the district court can impose fines of up to £500 for common law offences in respect of which proceedings have been instituted after schedule 8 comes into force, even if the offences were committed before that schedule comes into force. That is desired because the increase affected by schedule 8 in the district courts' sentencing power for common law offences is in the nature of a jurisdiction change rather than an increase in criminal penalties.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 152, 153 and 154 agreed to.

New Clause P

COURTS-MARTIAL AND STANDING CIVILIAN COURTS.

Lords amendment: No. 155, before clause 47 insert:

"P. Schedule [Courts-martial etc.] shall have effect in relation to offenders who come before courts-martial and Standing Civilian Courts."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 215, 263 and 293.

Mr. Mayhew: The new clause and the associated amendments deal with changes to the Armed Forces Acts which are necessary in consequence of the changes made in the Bill. The purpose of the amendments is to bring the Armed Forces legislation into harmony with the provisions made in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause Q

APPLICATIONS TO CROWN COURT FOR BAIL BY PERSONS REMANDED IN CUSTODY

Lords amendment: No. 156, after clause 47 insert:
Q.—(1) In section 81 of the Supreme Court Act 1981—
(a) in subsection (1) (which lists cases in which the Crown Court may grant bail) at the end of paragraph (f) there shall be added "or
(g) who has been remanded in custody by a magistrates' court on adjourning a case under—

(i)section 5 (adjournment of inquiry into offence);
(ii)section 10 (adjournment of trial);
(iii)section 18 (initial procedure on information against adult for offence triable either way); or
(iv)section 30 (remand for medical examination), of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980;";

(b) the following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection
—

"(1H) Where the Crown Court grants a person bail under subsection (1)(g) it may direct him to appear at a time and place which the magistrates' court could have directed and the recognizance of any surety shall be conditioned accordingly.

(1J) The Crown Court may only grant bail to a person under subsection (1)(g) if the magistrates' court which remanded him in custody has certified under section 5(6A) of the Bail Act 1976 that it heard full argument on his application for bail before it refused the application.".

(2) In subsection (6)(a) of section 5 of the Bail Act 1976 (supplementary provisions about decisions on bail) after the word "Court", in the first place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words "or if it issues a certificate under subsection (6A) below".

(3) The following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection—

"(6A) Where in criminal proceedings—

(a) a magistrates' court remands a person in custody under any of the following provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980—

(i)section 5 (adjournment of inquiry into offence);
(ii)section 10 (adjournment of trial);
(iii)section 18 (initial procedure on information against adult for offence triable either way); or
(iv)section 30 (remand for medical examination),

after hearing full argument on an application for bail from him; and

(b) either—

(i)it has not previously heard such argument on an application for bail from him in those proceedings; or
(ii)it has previously heard full argument from him on such an application but it is satisfied that there has been a change in his circumstances or that new considerations have been placed before it,

it shall be the duty of the court to issue a certificate in the prescribed form that they heard full argument on his application for bail before they refused the application.

(6B) Where the court issues a certificate under subsection (6A) above in a case to which paragraph (b)(ii) of that subsection applies, it shall state in the certificate the nature of the change of circumstances or the new considerations which caused it to hear a further fully argued bail application.

>(6C)Where a court issues a certificate under subsection (6A) above it shall cause the person to whom it refuses bail to be given a copy of the certificate.".

(4) In section 30 of the Legal Aid Act 1974 (scope of legal aid) the following subsections shall be inserted after subsection (1)—

"(1A) Legal aid which may be ordered to be given to any person for the purposes of any proceedings by a legal aid order under section 28(2) above, whether or not in the circumstances mentioned in section 29(1)(c) above, shall include, in the event —

(a)of his being remanded in custody in those proceedings; and
(b)of the court issuing a certificate under section 5(6A) of the Bail Act 1976 (refusal of fully argued bail application),

legal aid for the purpose of proceedings in connection with an application for bail to the Crown Court.

(1B) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) above, legal aid in connection with an application for bail to the Crown Court shall not include representation by counsel except in a case where by virtue of subsection (2) (a) below legal aid ordered to be given for the purposes of the proceedings before the magistrates' court included representation by counsel."."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to consider Lords amendment No. 253.

Mr. Mayhew: This new clause fulfils an undertaking that the Government gave at the time of the Bill's passage through this House. It provides that defendants who are refused bail by a magistrates' court after the hearing of a full application will have a further avenue of application to the Crown court. It also provides that legal aid will be available for the purposes of such applications. Legal aid will be provided by an automatic extension to existing legal aid orders so that there will be no need for the defendant to make a separate application for it.
Where the magistrates' court refuses bail to the defendant after hearing a full application for bail, it will be required to issue a certificate to that effect and the Crown court's power to grant bail will be limited to cases where such a certificate has been issued. The House will note that I have emphasised that the avenue of application will be available only after a full hearing. The effect of the case of the Queen against Nottingham justices was that a magistrates court decision on one full application for bail should bind the court, which would not have to hear further applications unless it could be shown that there had been a change in the circumstances of the defendant since the date of the first application. It is not intended that a court's decision that there has been no change in circumstances should be capable of appeal to the Crown court. The essential purpose of the new clause, therefore, is to allow the defendant to secure a review of the magistrates' court's substantive decision that, given the full range of circumstances existing at the time of his application, bail should be refused. The Government are satisfied that the new clause will assist defendants to pursue their applications for bail at a rather more convenient forum than the High Court at present represents.

Mr. Kilroy-Sillk: For many years, the system of judicial review of magistrates courts' decisions to refuse bail has been allowed to remain in a highly unsatisfactory state given the face that about 44 per cent. of the 58,00() individuals who ate remanded in custody every year are eventually found not guilty or given a non-custodial sentence. Many people are inappropriately remanded in custody and refused bail. The provision for a legally-aided right of application to the Crown court will have several advantages over the present procedure for applying to a High Court judge in chambers. It is obviously far more accessible and speedier. Because of the advantages of legal representation, the defendant will presumably have his case presented by a lawyer who will be aware of the most effective form of presenting his case and is therefore more likely to obtain bail for the defendant.
This amendment introduces an important change, for which reformers have been pressing for some years. The Minister has fulfilled a commitment that he gave to me on Report when I tabled a similar amendment on behalf of the parliament all-party penal affairs group. I welcome the amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause R

LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN CASE OF COMMITTAL ON WRITTEN STATEMENTS

Lords amendment: No. 158, after the words last inserted, insert:

"R. In section 6(2)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 for the words "is not represented by counsel or a solicitor" there shall be substituted the words "has no solicitor acting for him in the case (whether present in court or not)"."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The new clause makes a minor but worthwhile change to the law regarding committals for trial by magistrates courts. Before the Criminal Justice Act 1967 came into force, it was necessary for magistrates courts to hear the prosecution in each committal in order to ensure that there was a prima facie case against the defendant. However, the 1967 Act introduced a procedure by which a court, sitting as examining justices, may, if satisfied that all the evidence before the court consists of written statements, commit a defendant for trial without consideration of the evidence. The procedure can be used only where the defendant consents and is represented by counsel or a solicitor. The purpose of the latter condition was to ensure that a defendant was properly advised before consenting to a committal taking place without consideration of the evidence.
The difficulty has arisen that the condition has been interpreted to mean that the defendant's legal representative must be present in court. There are occasions when it will be important for the legal representative to attend court, but there are many cases in which no useful purpose would be served. Accordingly, this new clause clarifies the meaning of what is now section 6(2) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 by making it clear that there is no requirement for a legal representative to attend court on a committal under that section. It keeps the requirement that a defendant should have a solicitor acting for him in the case, however, so we can be sure that defendants are properly advised before consenting to this form of committal. It will, of course remain open to a solicitor to attend when there is a need for him to do so—for instance, when a defendant in custody wants to apply for bail.
There will be a worthwhile saving in terms of legal aid expenditure. This is estimated to be in the region of £1 million a year without in any way prejudicing the interests of defendants. The amendment, which has the support of the Law Society, makes an improvement in the procedures for committals under section 6(2) of the 1980 Act. I commend it to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause S

SOCIAL INQUIRY REPORTS ON PERSONS WHO HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY SERVED PRISON SENTENCES

Lords amendment: No. 159, after the words last inserted, insert:
S. The following section shall be inserted after section 20 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973—
Social inquiry reports for purposes of s. 20
20A.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, the court shall in every case obtain a social inquiry report for the purpose of determining under section 20(1) above whether there is any appropriate method of dealing with an offender other than imprisonment.

(2) Subsection (1) above does not apply if, in the circumstances of the case, the court is of the opinion that it is unnecessary to obtain a social inquiry report.
(3) Where a magistrates' court passes a sentence of imprisonment on a person of or over twenty one years of age on whom such a sentence has not previously been passed by a court in any part of the United Kingdom without obtaining a social inquiry report, it shall state in open court the reason for its opinion that it was unnecessary to obtain such a report.
(4) A magistrates' court shall cause a reason stated under subsection (3) above to be specified in the warrant of commitment and to be entered in the register.
(5) No sentence shall be invalidated by the failure of a court to comply with subsection (1) above, but any other court on appeal from that court shall obtain a social inquiry report if none was obtained by the court below, unless it is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case it is unnecessary to do so.
(6) In determining whether it should deal with the appellant otherwise than by passing a sentence of imprisonment on him the court hearing the appeal shall consider any social inquiry report obtained by it or by the court below.
(7) In this section "social inquiry report" means a report about a person and his circumstances made by a probation officer.".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment meets an undertaking given by the Government in the other place that we would bring forward a provision to require a court, unless there are reasons to the contrary, to obtain and consider a social inquiry report before imposing a first sentence of imprisonment on an adult offender. It is modelled on the similar provisions of clause 2 relating to young offenders and brings section 20 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 into line with them. I ask the House to accept the amendment.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: The implications of the imposition of a first custodial sentence are important because of the potential loss not just of a job, but of family connections, a home and so on. Serious consideration should be given by the court to all the circumstances before such an important step is taken. It is crucial that a social inquiry report be asked for so that the full circumstances surrounding the offender and the offence can be brought to the attention of the court before it passes such a sentence.
The Government are fulfilling a commitment given in another place following an amendment moved by Baroness David on behalf of the parliamentary all-party panal affairs group. I welcome the amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause T

DEFERMENT OF SENTENCE

Lords Amendment: No. 160, after the words last
inserted, insert:

"T. Section 1 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (which gives a court sentencing an offender the power to defer passing sentence on him) shall have effect subject to the following amendments—

(a) in subsection (1), for the words from "to have" to "sentence" there shall be substituted the words "or any other court to which it falls to deal with him to have regard, in dealing with him";

(b) the words ", subject to subsection (8A) below," shall be inserted after the word "and" in subsection (2);

(c) the words "deal with" shall be substituted—

(i)for the words "pass sentence on" in subsection (4);


(ii)for the words "pass sentence on" in subsection (4A); and
(iii)for the word "sentence" in the second place where it occurs in subsection (5); and

(d) the following subsections shall be substituted for subsection (8)—

"(8) The power of a court under this section to deal with an offender in a case where the passing of sentence has been deferred thereunder—

(a) includes power to deal with him in any way in which the court which deferred passing sentence could have dealt with him; and

(b)without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, in the case of a magistrates' court, includes the power conferred by section 37 or 38 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 to commit him to the Crown Court for sentence.

(8A) Where, in a case where the passing of sentence on an offender in respect of one or more offences has been deferred under this section, a magistrates' court deals with him by committing him to the Crown Court under section 37 or 38 of the Act of 1980, the power of the Crown Court to deal with him includes the same power to defer passing sentence on him as if he had just been convicted of the offence or offences on indictment before the court ." ."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendment No. 283.

Mr. Mayhew: The new clause was introduced by the Government in another place in fulfilment of an undertaking which I gave on Report in response to an amendment which had the support of the parliamentary all-party penal affairs group.
The new clause removes the present restriction in section 1(8) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 on the power of magistrates to commit an offender to the Crown court for sentence following a period of deferment. This provision was inserted into the Act by means of schedule 12 to the Criminal Law Act 1977 following a decision by the Court of Appeal in the case of R v Gilby. It has been argued that the restriction inhibits magistrates courts from ordering a period of deferment in cases where the eventual outcome might be a non-custodial sentence, but where, if the offender did not respond to deferment, the right course might be to commit to the Crown court for sentence, thus leading to a potentially unnecessary use of custody by the magistrates at the first hearing. The effect of this new clause is to amend the statutory provision for the deferment power to give magistrates the power to commit to the Crown court for sentence in these circumstances. Amendment No. 283 simply repeals the now redundant provision in schedule 12 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. I commend the amendments to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 161 agreed to.

New Clause U

RIGHT OF APPEAL OF PROBATIONERS ETC

Lords amendment: No. 162, after clause 49, insert:
 U.—(1) The following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (1) of section 50 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (meaning of "sentence")—
(1A) Section 13 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (under which a conviction of an offence for which a probation order or an order for conditional or absolute discharge is made is deemed not be a conviction except for certain purposes) shall not prevent an appeal under this Act, whether against conviction or otherwise.
.
(2) The following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (1) of section 108 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (right of appeal to the Crown Court)—
(1A) Section 13 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (under which a conviction of an offence for which a probation order or an order for conditional or absolute discharge is made is deemed not to be a conviction except for certain purposes) shall not prevent an appeal under this section, whether against conviction or otherwise.".
(3) In the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973—
(a) the following subsection shall be inserted after subsection. (1) of section 11 (substitution of conditional discharge for probation) —
(1A) No application may be made under subsection (1) above while an appeal against the probation order is pending."; and
(b) in Schedule 1 (discharge and amendment of probation orders)—

(i)the following sub-paragraph shall be inserted after paragraphs 1( 1) and 3(1)—
"(1A) No application may be made under sub-paragraph (1) above while an appeal against the probation order is pending."
(ii)the following sub-paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph. 2(1)—
"(1A) No order may be made under subparagraph (1) above while an appeal against tie probation order is pending." ;
(iii)in paragraph 4, for the word "Where" there shall be substituted the words "Subject to paragraph 4A below, where"; and
(iv)the following paragraph shall be inserted after that paragraph —
"4A. No application may be made under paragraph 4 above while an appeal against the probation order is pending."."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House cloth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 244 and 285.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendments seek to provide for a full right of appeal against sentence where a probation order or an order for conditional or absolute discharge has been made either alone or in conjunction with an ancillary order such as a compensation order.
The present position is that, in a case where a probation order or order for conditional or absolute discharge is made, the offender has a right of appeal against conviction but not against sentence. That is the effect of section 13 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.
The rationale behind these provisions is that a right of appeal against sentence seems inappropriate since a probation order can be made only with the offender's consent and an order for conditional or absolute discharge represents the minimum that can be imposed consistent with a finding of guilt. However, an unintended side effect of the legislation has been to exclude any right of appeal against any ancillary order, such as a compensation order, made in conjunction with the probation order or order for conditional or absolute discharge. It was never the intention of the provisions to exclude appeals against ancillary orders in those circumstances. They are appealable when imposed in conjunction with a more serious sentence and, as they can be quite punitive, it seems incongruous for the right to be withdrawn when the principal punishment is less severe. Furthermore, the present position hat; created difficulties in the Court o Appeal, as at least one recent case has evidenced. The court was obliged to conclude that it had no jurisdiction,


to vary or overturn an order for costs that accompanied a conditional discharge, although it clearly would have wished to do so.
The amendments correct that anomaly and go further by providing a right of appeal against a probation order or an order for conditional or absolute discharge, whether or not combined with an ancillary order. I need not trouble the House with the consequential amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51

COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS

Lords amendment: No. 163, in page 51, line 18, at end insert
with respect—
(a) to the powers of courts in England and Wales in relation to community service orders; and
(b) to arrangements for persons in England and Wales to perform work under such orders.
(2) Schedule 12A to this Act shall have effect for the purpose of the enforcement in one part of the United Kingdom of community service orders made in another part.

8. 30 pm

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Paul Dean): With this we may take Lords amendment No. 233.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendments clarify the provisions of the Bill on the extent of community service orders. The existing schedule 12 is to be spit into two schedules and the amendments pave the way for the relevant provision in clause 61, a new comprehensive structure for which is provided in a later amendment.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 52

MAXIMUM PERIODS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEFAULTING ON FINES ETC

Lords amendment: No. 164, in page 51, leave out lines 21 to 26 and insert—
(a) the following subsections shall be substituted for subsections (2) to (4)——
(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, if the Crown Court imposes a fine on any person or forfeits his recognizance, the court shall make an order fixing a term of imprisonment or of detention under section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (detention of persons aged 17 to 20 for default) which he is to undergo if any sum which he is liable to pay is not duly paid or recovered.
(3) No person shall on the occasion when a fine is imposed on him or his recognizance is forfeited by the Crown Court be committed to prison or detained in pursuance of an order under subsection (2) above unless
(a) in the case of an offence punishable with imprisonment, he appears to the court to have sufficient means to pay the sum forthwith;
(b) it appears to the court that he is unlikely to remain long enough at a place of abode in the United Kingdom to enable payment of the sum to be enforced by other methods; or
(c)on the occasion when the order is made the court sentences him to immediate imprisonment, custody for life, youth custody or detention in a detention centre for that or another offence, or sentences him

as aforesaid for an offence in addition to forfeiting his recognizance, or he is already serving a sentence of custody for life or a term—

(i)of imprisonment;
(ii)of youth custody;
(iii)of detention in a detention centre; or
(iv)of detention under section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.
(3A) Subject to subsections (3B) and (3C) below, the periods set out in the second column of the following Table shall be the maximum periods of imprisonment or detention under subsection (2) above applicable respectively to the amounts set out opposite thereto.
TABLE

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 165 to 168, 245, 272, 277, 283A and 286.

Mr. Mayhew: Amendments Nos. 164 to 167 and the associated amendments to the schedules are all tidying up amendments which flow from our acceptance in Committee in this House of the provision in clause 52 that restricts the powers of the Crown court in the imposition of a custodial term in default of the payment of a fine or a forfeited recognisance.
Amendments Nos. 168 and 277 bring the provisions for defaulters on a fine imposed by a court martial into line with the provisions for defaulters on fines imposed by magistrates courts and the Crown court.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 165 to 170 agreed to.

New Clause V

ABOLITION OF RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO MAKE UNSWORN STATEMENT

Lords amendment: No. 171, after clause 54 insert:
V-(l) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, in any criminal proceedings the accused shall not be entitled to make a statement without being sworn, and accordingly, if he gives evidence, he shall do so on oath and be liable to cross-examination; but this section shall not affect the right of the accused, if not represented by counsel or a solicitor, to address the court or jury otherwise than on oath on any matter on which, if he were so represented, counsel or a solicitor could address the court or jury on his behalf.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) above shall prevent the accused making a statement without being sworn—
(a) if it is one which he is required by law to make personally; or
(b)if he makes it by way of mitigation before the court passes sentence upon him.
(3) Nothing in this section applies—
(a) to a trial; or
(b) to proceedings before a magistrates' court acting as examining justices,
which began before the commencement of this section.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, we may take the motion of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) to disagree with the amendment, and Lords amendments Nos. 260, 261 and 5.

Mr. Mayhew: The new clause and the associated amendments relate to the proposal that the right of a defendant to make an unsworn statement from the dock should be abolished. An amendment to abolish the


unsworn statement from the dock, substantially subsection (1) of the new clause, was moved in another place by Lord Wigoder.
Subsections (2) and (3) and the other amendments were moved by my noble Friend Lord Elton on behalf of the Government. Subsection (2) aims to ensure that a defendant who has not been sworn is not precluded by this provision from making a statement that he is required, by law, to make, or one, after verdict and before sentence, by way of mitigation.
Subsection (3) is needed so that the provision does not affect trials or committals for trial begun before the provision comes into effect. The other amendments are consequential and provide for the repeal of two enactments that assume the continued existence of the right to make an unsworn statement and add to the Bill's long title to reflect the inclusion of this provision.
I hope that it will be helpful to the House in discussing what I regard as an extremely interesting subject if I give a brief account of this history of the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock and the strength of concern about this continuation which moved the Government to urge that Lord Wigoder's amendment be accepted.
Before 1898, the defendant in a criminal trial was not allowed to give evidence, and the unsworn statement provided the only mechanism by which he could say anything by way of answer to the charge against him. Then, in 1898, we had the Criminal Evidence Act, and for the first time it allowed the defendant in a criminal case to give evidence on his own behalf. However, to avoid any suggestion that the new legislation would in some way put pressure on a defendant to give evidence, Parliament thought it right to ensure that an unsworn statement and the right to make an unsworn statement should be preserved. So it was. That was the genesis of its continuance from 1898 to this day.
However, it has become axiomatic, of course, that the defendant has a choice whether to give evidence. That is his right, and the law provides that if he chooses not to give evidence, but simply to say "In our criminal law the burden of proof lies on the Crown to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. I do not have to prove my innocence", he is entitled to do so, and it is not open to the prosecution to make any adverse comment to the jury upon the fact that he has done so and that he has failed to give any evidence.
Therefore, the preservation of the unsworn statement is unnecessary to make the right not to give evidence an effective one. By continuing to preserve it, we expose juries to what I believe is a substantial risk of confusion, quite unnecessarily. They are often told to make what they will of facts and allegations which are set out in a statement delivered from the dock without being sworn, although they do not form part of the sworn evidence in the case. They have to make what they can, not only of the evidence that is given in an unsworn statement from the dock and to give it what weight they think fit, but also of a direction on the matter that normally would be along these lines from the judge:
Where a defendant makes an unsworn statement from the dock, it need not be read out to the jury, but it is established that the judge should remind them of it and tell them that although it is not sworn evidence which can be the subject of cross-examination, nevertheless they can attach to it such weight as they think fit and should take it into consideration in deciding whether the prosecution has proved its case.

Such a statement is certainly more than mere comment, and in so far as it is stating fact, it is clearly something more and different from the comments in counsels' speeches. The direction might well continue:
What is said in such a statement is not to be altogether brushed aside, but its potential effect is persuasive rather than evidential. It cannot prove facts not otherwise proved by the evidence, but it might show the evidence in a different light.
The jury should be invited to consider the statement in relation to the evidence as a whole.
That represents a valiant attempt by judges to give what assistance can be given to a jury about how to regard and consider evidence which is not given on oath in the court, but is given from the dock and is not subject to cross-examination. However, with the best will in the world. I believe that most people sitting on a jury would be inclined to consider it on the opaque side.
A further consideration is that the procedure is capable of abuse. That is far from unknown in practice these days. Defendants may use an unsworn statement to blacken the characters of what may be innocent prosecution witnesses, safe in the knowledge that any criminal record they might have cannot be called into question and that they cannot even be cross-examined as to the truth of the allegations.

Mr. Donald Anderson: Can the hon. and learned Gentleman cite any researched evidence, other than anecdotal evidence from a judge, which suggests that that is so?

Mr. Mayhew: Those who practise in the criminal courts have many experiences of that having happened, although I doubt whether any research findings exist. I do not know. However, even those who contend that we should keep the right would not deny that it is not only capable of abuse, but, on occasions, is abused.

Mr. Clinton Davis: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman deal with a point that goes to the heart of the matter? If an arrested person with a record goes into the witness box and alleges that he has been "verballed", and, unbeknown to everybody, the allegation is true, in nine cases out of 10, or even more, he is done for by virtue of the revelation of his character. Does not the hon. and learned Gentleman consider that such circumstances present a strong case for providing some protection of this kind, limited though it is, to deal with the evidence of unscrupulous police officers?

Mr. Mayhew: I had intended to deal with such a case and shall do so now. It is the case that if, in the course of giving evidence on one's own behalf, allegations are made which are adverse to a prosecution witness character, it is open to the prosecution, with the leave of the judge—which is an important qualification—to cal evidence to cross-examine the defendant about his antecedents and to, as it were, let the jury know that he is a person of bad character.
The rationale for that is that in some cases fairness and justice requires that somebody who is making allegations of a serious nature, impugning the character of a prosecution witness, ought to have the nature of his own character put before the jury so that the jury can the better weigh the allegations that are being made against the prosecution witness. That is how the law looks at it. However, the judge's discretion in the matter is an important qualification. It is not a dead letter. It is a reality and it by no means always follows that, in a case where


an allegation is being made by an accused person to the effect that his alleged confession is not his, his character will be put in.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Mr. Kilroy-Silk rose—

Mr. Mayhew: I have not finished my point. I am quite good at sitting down when the hon. Gentleman wishes to interrupt, but may I complete my point?
The principles by which the courts exercise the discretion to decide whether or not to allow evidence of an accused person's previous convictions to be adduced are customarily set out in the following terms. The judge may feel that even though the position is established in law—namely, that the defendant has impugned the character of a prosecution witness—the putting of questions as to the character of the accused person may be fraught with results which immeasurably outweigh the results of questions put by the defence and which make a fair trial of the accused person almost impossible.
On the other hand, in the ordinary and normal case he may feel that if the credit of the prosecutor or his witnesses has been attacked, it is only fair that the jury should have before it material upon which it can form a judgment about whether the accused is more worthy of belief than those whom he attacked.
8.45 pm
It is well settled that the Court of Appeal will not interfere in the exercise of the discretion of the trial judge unless he has gone wrong in principle or unless there was no material to enable him properly to exercise such discretion. Therefore, it is by no means a dead letter. In many cases the prosecution counsel would not even consider an application to put it—[Interruption.] There are many things that I know nothing about that I have to talk about in the House, but I do know a little about this subject. In many cases it would not occur to people to make that application, and, if it were made, a judge would not allow it. That is my answer. It is to overstate considerably the case for retaining the right to make an unsworn statement to say that if someone has been "verballed" and he wishes to tell the jury about the case, yet he has previous convictions, he is lost without the ability to make an unsworn statement.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Is not the real answer to suggest that the elimination of the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock would be more palatable if at the same time it were accompanied by the introduction of a tape recording of the interrogation of suspects?

Mr. Mayhew: I have much sympathy with that argument. In a debate in the House following the publication of the Philips report the Government implied that they favoured the principle of tape recording. In my county of Kent, the chief constable carried out an experiment— I believe it was in the Dartford area— which proved to be entirely feasible. So I have sympathy with the suggestion.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: If that is so, why does not the Minister carry out both of the changes together? What is the rush to get this provision through by itself?

Mr. Mayhew: The hon. and learned Gentleman will find that those matters are not stationary—

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: They are moving.

Mr. Mayhew: However, although legislation is not required to provide for the admissibility of evidence on a tape recorder— that is frequently admitted today— legislation is needed in this instance.

Mr. John Ryman: I suspect that there are no statistics about this, but will the Minister agree that experience shows that judges are most reluctant to allow an application by the Crown to put in the character of a defendant if the conduct of the defendant is necessary for the defence to put its case. Is not it rare for character to be allowed in the circumstances which have been described?

Mr. Mayhew: I do agree. That accords with my understanding of the practice. A few years ago it used to be said that the only circumstances in which the character would not be put in was if it were absolutely necessary for the conduct of the defence to make allegations which involved impugning the character of the prosecution witness. That is not now regarded as an accurate or full statement of the law, because there are wider circumstances in which a judge will exercise his discretion and not allow an application by the prosecution.

Mr. Lawrence: I am astonished to hear what has been said by Opposition Members and by my hon. and learned Friend. I speak mainly from my knowledge of the Old Bailey and London as opposed to the provinces. Since the Selvey case, it is rare for a man's character to be excluded once he has challenged the integrity or the honesty of a police officer. Although I support what my hon. and learned Friend seeks to do, I should prefer him not to support his case by resting it upon what I consider to be a totally unfounded argument.

Mr. Mayhew: I hear what my hon. and learned Friend says, but he will have heard what has been said from quarters more persuasive tonight than the Dispatch Box. Therefore, it follows that there is at least a disparity of practice in the country.
I want to move to some of the arguments that have been adduced in support of the contention that the House should disagree with the Lords in the amendment to abolish the unsworn statement. I am much comforted to have my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General beside me because this is an issue on which the senior Law Officer might be able to assist the House. In another place, the noble Lord Hutchinson of Lullington said that the abolition of the unsworn statement would have unfortunate consequences in the magistrates courts. The unsworn statement, as is suggested, can be used to enable the defendant to make a statement while avoiding superfluous examination. This begs the question of which cross-examination is regarded as superfluous and which as necessary. It was said in the other place that there are umpteen cases in a magistrates court every month in which the clerk says to the defendant, "You can go into the witness box to give your side of the case or you can make a statement from the dock." The argument is that often an accused person will not want to go into the witness box and will say from the dock what he wants to say. It is argued that this is very convenient because it saves time. But that is not the whole story. It is quite improper to say to someone that he can have that choice and not go on to say that if he goes into the witness box he will be cross-examined and will not be cross-examined if he stays in the dock.
Once that warning or explanation is given, it is apparent to all accused that their evidence will carry very much more weight if they go into the witness box than it will if they protect themselves from cross-examination by staying in the dock. It is not possible to sustain that line of argument without the implication that magistrates pay no attention to what is said from the dock. Therefore, I do not think that the time saving point in the magistrates court carries the argument for disagreeing any further. If a defence is so short that it is hardly worth going into the witness box, it will not yield material for very protracted cross-examination and it is the duty of any court to ensure that cross-examination is limited to what is relevant.
The unrepresented defendant is able to address the court on any matter to which his lawyer, if he had one, could speak, and any defendant will be able similarly to make a statement by way of mitigation. If the amendment is passed, those courses are still open to him. Given these savings, I find it difficult to envisage circumstances in which the removal of the unsworn statement will constrain the procedure in trials in magistrates courts, except that if the defendant chooses to give evidence he will have to do so on oath like any other witness. That is exactly what the clause seeks to achieve.
But it has also been argued that it is an essential protection for the accused whose line of defence involves an attack on a prosecution witness but who fears that he may thereby become liable to cross-examination on previous convictions. I have said what I wanted to say about that, but I should like to point out how it is open to abuse by an unscrupulous defendant. It is said on the one hand that this is an infringement of the right to silence, as it is commonly called, but during last year's debate on the report of the Royal Commission on criminal procedure we said that we accepted its recommendation that the right to silence should not be modified. That remains our position and any connection between the abolition of the unsworn statement and an attack on the right to silence is imaginary.
I turn to what the sponsors of the amendment appear to regard as its main justification— whether a clause abolishing the unsworn statement should have found its way into the Bill in the first place. There are many measures that it would have been desirable to have in a Criminal Justice Bill. We had to make decisions but the Lords have added this amendment and we therefore have a duty to deal with it on its merits. When one examines the opportunities that are afforded to blacken the name of witnesses who have come to court to do their duty, to give their best account and to tell the truth as it appears to them, it is a matter of great injustice that, from the safety of the dock, with no liability to cross-examination, they can have their bona fides and character blackened. Where police officers believe that such a strategem has been followed, it can lead to temptation to improve upon the truth in another case, in order, as it were, to even up the scales. That is a human temptation. I do not say that it is yielded to very often, but I can visualise circumstances in which it might be.
As long ago as 1972 the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended unanimously the abolition of the unsworn statement. There is recent very high judicial authority for the proposition that the right to make an unsworn statement has nothing to do with the right of silence; it has to do with the right to lie to the court with impunity.
I regard the subject as being extremely important, and I look forward to hearing what the House has to say about it. I commend the new clause to the House.

Mr. Arthur Davidson: As the hon. and learned Gentleman has rightly said., the right of the accused to make an unsworn statement from the dock has existed by statute since 1898 and been enshrined in the common law probably since the time of Queen Anne. It is wrong, and of doubtful constitutional propriety, that a right daung back so long—a right involving the liberty of the subject and a fair trial—should be abolished as a result of an amendment, inserted at a comparatively late stage of a Bill in the House of Lords, without any trailer or marker being put down throughout the extensive Second Reading and interminable Committee stage of the Bill in this House. The amendment was introduced not by the Government but by a Liberal peer, Lord Wigoder—for whom I have the greatest respect—and accepted by the Government after the shortest of debates, after no more than four or five peers had made short speeches.
The right, as I have said, is a common law right. It was given to the accused originally because he had no right to make a sworn statement and no right to be represented by counsel. It was a right that was specifically preserved by Parliament in the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 and not, as has been suggested , a right that was inserted by accident. It is wrong that it should be abolished in this almost throwaway cursory manner.
I accept that there is a strong body of legal and judicial opinion in favour of abolition, and there has been for a considerable time, but there is no unanimity among lawyers—certainly not among defence lawyers—in favour of abolition. Some may be in favour of abolition, but there is a strong body of opinion that it is a valuable right afforded to the accused. There is no unanimity ever among Labour lawyers, some of whom are in favour of abolition, but there is a strong body of opinion among defence lawyers that the right is valuable and should be retained.
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Why do they feel that that right should be retained? Take the case of the defendant who may be genuinely innocent and who genuinely disputes the evidence that has been given by the police about a statement that he is alleged to have made while being interrogated in police custody. The defendant may genuinely believe that he has been "verballed". That happens. It does not happen as often as is alleged in court, but it happens. The danger is that if the defendant attacks the police evidence and their account of that interrogation, on any assessment he is in severe danger of his previous convictions being brought out in court and of irretrievable damage being done to the outcome of the trial. Of that there can be no doubt.
If the Government intended to abolish the unsworn statement, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Kilroy-Silk) said in his intervention, they should have done it as part of the process of implementing other procedural and evidential changes, many of which were recommended by the Royal Commission on criminal procedure, which also recommended this change. However, it recommended the change in conjunction with changes affecting the right of the accused not to have his previous convictions produced against him if he attacks police evidence. There is nothing to prevent the Government from doing that.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: It would be possible for the Minister to give an assurance tonight, having already accepted that the two should go together—he said that himself—that he will not activate this part of the Act unless and until the tape recording of interrogations is introduced. He said that this proposal required legislation. He has the legislative opportunity, but he does not need to implement the legislation. He could give the assurance tonight that he will not implement it until tape recording is also available.

Mr. Davidson: My hon. Friend has made a good point.
I mentioned what the Royal Commission recommended. In case it is thought that I am mistaken, I shall read briefly from its report. Speaking in favour of abolition of the unsworn statement, it says:
Some accused, however, decide to make an unsworn statement because they fear cross-examination on their criminal record, if they mount an attack on the prosecution witnesses, for example, in attempting to show that a confession has been improperly obtained. If the unsworn statement were to be abolished, we consider that this point would need review.
I ask the Minister to give an assurance, even at this late stage, that he will not implement the abolition of the unsworn statement without equally dealing with the points about the danger of previous convictions being brought up against the accused.

Mr. Clinton Davis: In view of what the Minister has said, would it not be easy for him to activate such procedure by a Home Office directive to police forces?

Mr. Davidson: Indeed it would. No doubt he will deal with that.
At the very least, the provision to ensure that tape recordings are used properly to supervise the proceedings in the interview room should be quickly introduced. The Minister should give us an assurance on that matter.
The unsworn statement also has a value for the inarticulate, not very bright and frequently confused accused person, who is instinctively frightened of going into the witness box and of being cross-examined, not necessarily because he has something to hide, but because of the new and horrific experience of being asked questions by a skilful and what to him appears ferocious advocate. He fears that he will cut a poor dash and make a bad impression on the jury. The unsworn statement is a useful half-way house between total silence, with the danger of adverse conclusions being drawn by the jury, and submitting to a cross-examination that the accused feels he will handle badly.
The Minister said that one strong reason for abolishing the unsworn statement is that juries find it difficult to know what weight to give it. It is not evidence on oath and is not subject to cross-examination, and the judge will tell them that it is therefore less cogent than a sworn statement. The Minister read out the direction that Archbold recommends judges to use. I do not know whether juries find it confusing, but I suggest that they find it no more confusing than the other complicated and technical directions that judges have to give about the weight of other evidence—for instance, the value to be put on a statement of one accused implicating another. Judges can direct juries on the probative value of the unsworn statement, and they frequently do so in terms that reveal their disapproval. It is suggested that unsworn statements may result in acquittal of unworthy people, but I do not know on what evidence.

Mr. Ryman: Is there not a danger that cunning criminals will make unsworn statements from the dock deliberately to mislead juries, because they know that there is confusion in a juror's mind about what is evidence from the witness box and what is not?

Mr. Davidson: There is that danger, but the cunning, sophisticated, professional criminal can, and frequently does, take advantage of many other evidential rules.
The number of people who appear before Crown and magistrates courts is very great, and only about 1 per cent. of the total are professional criminals. To suggest that a valuable safeguard for the bulk of the accused, who do not fall into that category, should be jeopardised because of the tactics and villainy of a very small minority is a dangerous argument and damaging to civil liberties.
As I have said, professional criminals form a very small part of the vast number of people who come before the courts. About 2·3 million people have appeared before the Crown and magistrates courts. About 70,000 of that total appear before the Crown courts. To suggest that the majority are professional villains and, therefore, that this valuable safeguard should be tampered with, is an untenable argument. We do not have to tune our legal system and criminal procedures to cater for the villainy of a very small minority. We certainly do not have to do so without building in other safeguards for the accused who does not come under that category and who may be innocent.
The amendment accepted by the Government preserves the right to make unsworn statements from the dock for people who are not represented by professional counsel. However, once the right to make an unsworn statement has vanished, other than when he is unrepresented, a professional criminal might have counsel to put his case, sack counsel and exercise his right as an unrepresented defendant to make an unsworn statement from the dock. The suggestion that the rationale of this proposal is somehow to curtail the professional criminal from abusing the system is not very strong.

Mr. Mayhew: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that in that event the court would be obliged to point out to the jury that counsel could only have been sacked to permit a statement from the dock to be given? In addition, there would be no counsel's speech to the jury at the end of the case. That would be a different situation from that which obtains at present.

Mr. Davidson: I do not know whether that necessarily follows. A professional criminal may well think that it is a risk worth taking. He may feel that he has a better chance by sacking counsel and making an unsworn statement than by having counsel to represent him.

Mr. Anderson: Would it not be improper for the court to make any such suggestion, as there are a variety of possible explanations for the sacking of counsel at that stage? Surely it would be wrong for the court to suggest that one possibility.

Mr. Davidson: My hon. Friend is right. It is not unknown for counsel to be dismissed, and it would be improper for the judge to suggest to the jury the motives for that sacking. He may be entirely wrong. It could be extremely prejudicial.
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The Minister has rather pooh-poohed the suggestion by Lord Hutchinson in the debate in another place that every defendant in a magistrates court, who now has the right to make a short statement without cross-examination about why the money would not go into the meter or why his car was not causing an obstruction, might have to submit himself to a lengthier statement and a lengthy cross-examination. That would take up the valuable time of the court. I do not intend to expand on that argument. No doubt other hon. Members will.
One clearly damaging effect of the amendment is that, inevitably, once the right to make an unsworn statement has been taken away, more people will choose to go into the witness box and be cross-examined rather than feel that they have said nothing by exercising their right to silence. The accused will feel that it is the most important thing happening to him. He is the most important person in the court. He feels that he has a right to say something, and he will be extremely dissatisfied and unhappy if he has to maintain the right to silence. Once the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock has been taken away, more and more people will feel disposed not to give evidence under oath—not because they are guilty or because they have something to hide, but because they do not feel that they can acquit themselves well. They will be driven to give evidence under oath very much against their natural inclinations. Counsel may be inhibited in cross-examining the police about the accuracy of their statements if the accused does not say something in explanation.
I do not know what all the fuss is about, or why the Government suddenly feel that they have to take this step. I am not at all sure of the value to the accused of making an unsworn statement. It is unlikely that an acquittal results solely from the accused doing that. There is no evidence to support the view that an unsworn statement makes a difference to the verdict.
On the subject of abuse, the Minister knows only too well that rules of professional conduct lay down that the statement should not be drafted by counsel. It must be in the words of the accused, and frequently he says something that the jury finds suspicious. That may be the case, but it is said by him at his own request and by a man who may be innocent.
One of the dangers of doing away with the right to make an unsworn statement is that it can be interpreted as the slippery slope to abolishing the right to silence. The Minister referred to the recommendation of the 1972 Criminal Law Revision Committee which recommended the abolition of the unsworn statement. I think that I am right in saying that the committee also recommended the abolition of the right to silence. That is something that most of us would fight hard to retain.
What is the urgent need to bring in this amendment? What is the urgent need to legislate on this ancient and well-tried matter of criminal procedure concerning the right of the subject? Why legislate in this covert manner, why legislate on it in isolation, and why do so in a Bill that is meant to deal with other and very different matters of penal reform? The Minister said that the Government had had to amend the long title to accommodate this measure.
I suggested to the Government in a friendly way, why not, if they have it in mind to get rid of the unsworn statement, because it is damaging to the legal process, introduce a measure openly in a Bill based on the Royal
Commission's recommendations? I understand that there is to be a White Paper and a debate in the next Session. The Government should bring in this measure in a Bill dealing with a variety of procedural and evidential matters. Any matter affecting the liberty of the subject and the right to a fair trial ought to have a proper, considered and open debate in the House. That is what the Opposition are asking for and that is why I am asking my right hon. and hon. Friends to support my right hon. Friend's motion.

Mr. Lawrence: I support the amendment and the Government's position. Whatever else this is about, it is not about the abolition of the right to silence, because the man who is charged with a criminal offence can still be silent. It is not even about a right that is used frequently in the courts, although in recent years there has been more use of the unsworn statement from the dock than I can remember at any time in the past 20 years. It is a right which was not used very often, for one important reason.
This right has the enormous disadvantage that a jury of reasonably intelligent people will ask themselves what is wrong with a man's case if he will not come into the witness box and allow his story to be tested by cross-examination. That is not an aspect that would escape the attention of a jury because a judge would be likely, in the course of his direction, to make it clear—or to make it confused, but at any rate to underline the point—that the distinction between the evidence that is given from the witness box and the statement that is made from the dock is that in the latter case the defendant has not allowed his case to be tested. That is why counsel for the defence thinks long and hard about allowing his defendant to make a statement from the dock before that action is taken.
We are talking about a right which maximises the chances of a guilty man being acquitted. The reason why a guilty man does not give evidence on oath is that he does not wish to be cross-examined. All who practise in the courts appreciate that the best safeguard for truth, if that is what we are after, is cross-examination. A guilty defendant who fears cross-examination has a greater chance of being acquitted if he is not cross-examined. The amendment removes a method by which guilty people are acquitted.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: A man is not guilty if the verdict is not guilty. I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks that such a man is guilty, but how does he know? Many miscarriages of justice, with which members of the Bar do not concern themselves because they do not go back to court, involve cross-examination of the accused. A person can be convicted, but someone else might turn up and say that he committed the offence. The system is used in such cases and yet a man might be convicted. I am sure that that man's counsel would think that he was aptly convicted.

Mr. Lawrence: Because of human imperfections, injustices are likely whatever the system. I am talking about the greater likelihood of the injustice of a guilty man being acquitted because he cannot be tested on his story by being cross-examined. Thai is the principal reason why the right as it exists is used. All hon. Members who practise in the courts know that that is so.
The second reason why a man may seek to make a statement from the dock—and it may be connected with the first reason—is that it entitles him to make an unjustified attack upon the integrity of police officers.


Such a man knows that his character will not be put to the test and that the jury will not know the full truth about him. An unscrupulous and unjustified attack may be made upon an innocent co-accused by the man in the dock whose statement cannot be tested and who seeks to place the blame on him.
A third reason involves the direction which a judge must give to a jury. A judge has to say, in effect, "Members of the jury, what you have heard is not evidence, but on the other hand you must not put it out of your mind. It has not been tested, but it may throw light and provide background. You must place on it such reliance as you think fit." Hon. Members who think that a jury can make head or tail of that are sorely mistaken. Who benefits? The guilty man benefits from the confusion.
I have given three reasons why, regardless of the anachronism, the right is clearly used to benefit guilty men.

9. 30 pm

Mr. Clinton Davis: Mr. Clinton Davisrose—

Mr. Lawrence: I will give way in a moment.
I am as anxious—I think my record in the House shows this—as any Opposition Member to protect the liberty of an innocent person in a court of law. I am as anxious as any hon. Member to see the rapid introduction of the tape-recorded interview. I do not think, however, that the liberty of the individual who is innocent is threatened by the dismantling of this right. It is a subjective matter based on one's own experience, one's own knowledge and one's own feeling. I have never been convinced—that is not to say I have not been wrong—of the innocence of any man who has not wanted to go into the witness box or who has not wanted to remain silent but has preferred to make a statement from the dock. It may be that he was innocent, but I have never been convinced of the innocence of any such man, although I have been convinced of the innocence of some who have gone into the witness box and allowed themselves to be cross-examined.
What is going wrong with our system of justice is that, alone among the nations of the Western world, we have an acquittal rate among those who plead not guilty of about 50 per cent. Hon. Members should think for a moment what that means. Either we have a system where innocent people are being dragged through the courts, charged with serious offences and brought through the expense, the agony and inconvenience of criminal trials, or a lot of guilty people are walking free, which is a gross injustice to law-abiding citizens. Opposition Members prefer to believe that the whole system is corrupt, that it is weighted on one side against the innocent man and that there are countless miscarriages of justice. I prefer to believe—it is my subjective judgment—that we have a system that acquits more guilty people than any other system. That is not good for law and order.

Mr. Clinton Davis: The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a large number of assertions backed up by very little fact. How does he know that juries are confused? What statistical evidence is he able to adduce before the House that juries are so confused? Does he attribute the 50 per cent. acquittals entirely to defendants making unsworn statements from the dock? Is that not absurd?

Mr. Lawrence: It is as absurd as the suggestion that the hon. Gentleman has made. Of course I make no such assertion. I am merely explaining the general position and saying that we had better do something about it. Otherwise, an enormously high proportion of guilty people are set free into our society to offend again. That is something we need worry about when there is an increase in the amount of serious and violent crime. It is a burden on all hon. Members to do what we reasonably can to diminish that crime.
I do not claim that acceptance of this proposal will bring about a rapid decrease in the amount of crime. I believe that we have to tighten up where we can reasonably do so. A system that allows the guilty man to have a 50–50 chance of acquittal if he pleads not guilty is one that does not serve society and which encourages crime. A man may commit a dozen crimes before he is even detected. He is then brought before a court on a plea of not guilty and has a 50–50 chance of acquittal. When eventually he is convicted, he may get a pat on the head and twopence out of the poor box. Is that any disincentive to crime?
I do not wish to exaggerate the strength of the points being made in support of the amendment, but I have no doubt that the right to make an unchallenged statement from the dock is used more by the guilty than by the innocent and that it results in more acquittals than it ought to do. That is not just my feeling; it is the feeling of judges who have spent many years listening to criminal cases and of many police officers who have spent years striving for the reduction of crime.

Mr. Bob Cryer: The hon. and learned Gentleman has made great play with a number of assumptions, but will he bear in mind the fact that the Attorney-General precluded the possibility of research being undertaken into juries' decisions and attitudes to find out about the sort of thing that the hon. and learned Gentleman is alleging? No doubt he voted for that decision and the consequence is that the assumptions that he is making cannot be tested or investigated.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) will not be tempted too far down that road. The debate is about unsworn statements.

Mr. Lawrence: I will quickly answer the important point made by the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer). The reason why there has been a reluctance to allow that sort of research to be conducted has nothing to do with the innuendo in the hon. Gentleman's question and everything to do with the inadvisability of allowing people to tamper with jurors and to get at them in a way that may affect their judgment or make other jurors fear that they may be approached. It is a different argument.
It is thought by many practitioners, judges and police officers and by those concerned with justice that this amendment will reduce the chances of guilty men being set free to commit more crimes. Therefore, it is incumbent on all hon. Members to support the proposals. The conquest of crime is vital to us all and is part of the reason why we have been sent here.

Mr. Clinton Davis: The hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) spoke earlier about jurors being confused, but the arguments that he has adduced, talking about 50 per cent. of acquittals and so on, seem to have confused him.
We are discussing a limited and qualified right. I suspect—we have to enter the field of conjecture, for the reasons outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer)—that the right has little effect on the acquittal rate. Jurors are not ill-informed people. They are reasonably sophisticated and, anyway, they have the benefit of directions from a judge.
I join my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Accrington (Mr. Davidson) in asserting that the House has embarked on an unusual procedure for changing the law. It is not a well-considered proposal and it is not backed by statistical research. Indeed, it is not backed by any research. It is a retrograde step to introduce it at this stage, particularly as it is not accompanied by the sort of protection that the hon. and learned Member for Burton conceded ought to be afforded to defendants against their being verballed.
The Minister of State was less convincing than he occasionally is. I was particularly alarmed to hear the sort of direction that he would give if he were on the bench in the case of a defendant who elected to make a statement from the dock after sacking his counsel. I have always favoured the hon. and learned Gentleman's going back as soon as possible to the practice that he embellished, but I am now a little fearful, because he may be elevated to the bench and if he gives such directions as a judge he will be in all sorts of trouble.
It is wrong to suggest that the proposal is the conventional and agreed wisdom of all members of the bench, the Bar and the solicitors' profession. It is nothing of the sort. The proposal divides the profession and there are sincerely held views on both sides of the argument.
The proposal has crept in curiously and surreptitiously. If the Government think that it is so important, why did they not put it in the Bill originally? If it is so significant surely they would have included it in the original Bill. Why do it this way?
We are discussing the abrogation of a not unimportant right. It does not go to the heart of our criminal system, but it is not an anachronism and all the other things that the Minister and the hon. and learned Member for Burton have suggested.
I wish to outline some of the merits of retaining the present system. I was not convinced by the Minister's argument, because I believe that there are some cases where virtually the only way for some people to adduce evidence in seeking to rebut verbals or allegations of planted evidence is to make a statement from the dock.
The Minister said that a judge is always there to afford protection. He is right to an extent, but that is not the whole answer, because there is a big question mark over this matter. There is no consistency of practice by judges and one does not know how a judge is likely to react.
In any event, there is a severe limitation to the benefit accruing to defendants from following this course because of the warning that judges are obliged to provide to juries. A statement from the dock is not regarded as having anything like the same value as evidence given from the witness given from the witness box. I simply do not accept the argument about confusion of the jury. I have practised a good deal as an advocate in magistrates courts over many years and, although I do not appear so often nowadays, I do not believe that magistrates are confused. Indeed, that argument has not been adduced in the debate.
The people most likely to avail themselves of the right to make a statement from the dock are those with

convictions, those who allege that evidence has been planted or that they have been verballed and those who allege that the police or prosecution witness have behaved unscrupulously. because such persons have a record they are in fact most vulnerable to unscrupulous behaviour by the police or by discreditable prosecution witnesses.
This is not intended as an attack on the police as a whole, because the vast majority of them do not behave in this way, but the evidence is overwhelming that some police officers, particularly in the recent past, have behaved unscrupulously. That has been found out, more often than not, after a trial rather than during the course of a trial. There are: too many examples of aberrant conduct by a minority of police officers. In my opinion, such police officers will be given extra incentive, by virtue of the denial of this right, to behave in this manner.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Accrington drew attention to people who are frightened by the whole procedure. There are such people. I know that from my own experience. There are many people who are afraid of going to see counsel and even of going into a solicitor's office. For them it is a nightmare. How much more of a nightmare is it for them to have to go into the witness box and be exposed to cross-examination?
9.45 pm
The hon. and learned Member for Burton says that this is the way to find out the truth. I am a great believer in our adversarial system, but I do not believe that it is the last word. Many injustices can be caused by its very practice. A rough cross-examination of a person who is inarticulate and ill-equipped to deal with the situation can redound to the disadvantage of the prosecution. One knows that that can happen. Even a too rough summing up by the judge can have that effect. The fact is, however, that in some instances, it can make people extremely confused, particularly if they are frightened, and they do not fall into the character or capacity of skilled professional criminals. So, in my opinion, my hon. and learned Friend made a point of substance.
As I said before, this proposal would not be nearly so harmful if it were ,accompanied by some countervailing protections, which the Minister himself conceded. Such protections are overdue. I invite the Minister to answer this question: if he says that no legislation is required to introduce protections such as tape recorders at police stations, why is he not prepared now, in this debate, if this is the road that he wants to take, to say that the Home Office will give a direction to police forces that tape recorders will be introduced simultaneously with the denial of this privilege? What is wrong with that? He has already conceded the principle. That would establish the Government's good faith in this regard, and it is overdue. Here is the opportunity to do it.
The Minister dealt most unfairly with the criticisms of the practical disadvantages of eliminating this right, which were made by Lord Hutchinson of Lullington. I invite the Minister to recognise that practical disadvantages could flow from this, particularly in magistrates courts. However, that matter is not at the heart of our case.
In conclusion, I want to ask the Minister one practical point. Subsection (3) of the new clause says:
Nothing in this section applies—
(a) to a trial; or
(b) to proceedings before a magistrates' court acting as examining justices, which began before the commencement of this section.


What does the word "proceedings" mean in that context? Is it the committal proceedings themselves, or does it also apply to the proceedings before the date fixed for committal, which of course can be long and drawn out? I assume that it is the first, but perhaps the Minister will answer that question.
In my opinion, the Minister has not made out a good case, but I should be prepared to agree with him if he made the concession for which I have asked and which I think is reasonable. If he did that, there would be no need to divide the House this evening. I hope, therefore, that he will respond affirmatively to the proposition that I have advanced.

Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke: We last discussed this important matter in a debate on one of the innumerable reports on the reform of criminal procedure. Whether it was the Philips report or another I cannot recall, because reports fall upon us like leaves on Vallombrosa. On that occasion I was emboldened to make a speech in general support of the proposed reforms, particularly in support of this reform that we are discussing tonight. As far as I remember, although I warmed to my theme and developed it at some length saying that it was time that this anachronism was swept away, there was no opposition from any quarter of the House.
The report's authority is strong. I agree that it is a difficult matter and I am impressed by what the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Davis) had to say on that question. I have no doubt that my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) will also impress me with arguments in favour of retaining this old right when he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. It is a right that existed and was necessary long before any person accused of a serious crime was allowed to go into the witness box.
On balance, I am still as sure that the right should go. That is not because I have any particular regard for the position of the police in this matter. As my hon. and learned Friend the Minister may know, I have adopted the view for some time that I will not support any reform that in any way infringes the rights of the accused in favour of the prosecution so long as the police adopt an obstructive attitude towards audio and video recordings of interviews. I have abstained on many occasions from voting for what are otherwise necessary reforms because we all have a duty—I do not believe that I am pushing at a shut door because I think that the Front Bench agree—with much greater energy than has been adopted in the past to induce the police authorities to take their duties in this regard seriously.
If it were only a question of the balance between the police and the accused, I would perhaps not be supporting the Government quite as strongly as I am. However, it is much more than that. It is a question of the gross unfairness to co-defendants which, to my mind, clearly pushes down in favour of the abolition of this right. I have been engaged in many trials in which I have heard some accused person with a long record abuse his right to make a statement from the dock in order to attack a co-accused and try to offload the blame upon him, a person who may

have no record at all. It is grossly unfair on such a co-accused when that happens. Neither he nor his counsel can cross-examine and his co-defendant can get away with murder.

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Anderson rose—

Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke: I know that the hon. Gentleman will say that it is the duty of the judge to warn the jury that such a statement is not evidence against a co-accused; and, of course, he is right about that. Such a statement is not evidence.

Mr. Anderson: Normally the hon. and learned Member for Darwen (Sir C. Fletcher-Cooke) is farsighted, but he has not targeted correctly this time. I believe that there is authority to the effect that, if an attack is made on a co-accused, or the prosecution, during an unsworn statement from the dock that opens up the opportunity to reveal the character of the person making the attack.

Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke: No, that is not the case. Character cannot be put in in that way. I have the support of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve), who has a great deal of experience from sitting as a recorder. In those circumstances it seems an enormous injustice to other persons, who must be presumed innocent until the jury declare them guilty. That is what we are discussing. It is not right that such persons should be subjected to and liable to that sort of attack when they cannot answer back. For that reason alone all those persons who are interested in the innocence of persons in the dock should be disposed to remove that anachronism.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: As the only non-legal practitioner who has spoken so far, I have no preconceived ideas on this subject. I have paid a great deal of attention, to what has been said here and in another place. I have not heard one convincing argument in favour of the abolition of the unsworn statement.
The Minister and several of his legal colleagues have made great play of abuses of the unsworn statement that apparently occur in the courts. No doubt there are such abuses. There are abuses in various ways in all walks of life. The fact that it is abused does not necessarily mean that the whole concept of making an unsworn statement from the dock is brought into disrepute. The only evidence that we have been given tonight of abuse of the system is anecdotal and impressionistic. There has been no evidence collated from research, and none of the extravagant claims that were made by the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) are susceptible to objective evidence. Despite being pressed by several of my hon. Friends, he was not able to produce evidence to back his more extravagant claims.

Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke: The hon. Gentleman used the word "anecdotal", which implies that it is hearsay and that it has been heard from someone else. That is the definition of the word "anecdotal". I gave direct evidence of a direct experience when I was there.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: That is still impressionistic. It is not statistically valid or viable evidence. Conservative Members surely know the difference between those types of evidence. A defendant's ability to make an unsworn statement from the dock in minor motoring cases saves a considerable amount of court time. There has been no


controversy about that. There has been no suggestion by any hon. Member that that is not an important and positive attribute of that right.
All hon. and learned Members have mentioned their fear that many defendants make unsworn statements from the dock because they have been "verballed" by the police and are afraid that if they make that allegation under cross-examination their previous convictions will be adduced in evidence against them.
If the man is innocent, and if he has been "verballed"—we know that that happens in a few cases—it is absolutely crucial and important that the right that he currently possesses to go into the dock and say so, and let the jury determine whether he is telling the truth, should be retained.
Certainly, if the Minister and those of his friends who are supporting him—

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,

That, at this day's sitting, the consideration of the Criminal Justice Bill, the Civic Government (Scotland) Bill [Lords] and the Insurance Companies Bill [Lords] may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour. — [Mr. Boscawen.]

Criminal Justice Bill

Question again proposed, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Kilroy-Silk: If the Minister and those who support him feel that that right, which has been long established and never substantially brought into question, should be eliminated, the least they can do is to accept, as did the

Royal Commission on criminal procedure and my hon. and learned Friends, that it should go in tandem with the introduction of the tape recording of the interrogation of suspects. If it is necessary to abolish this long-standing right, I cannot see why we cannot, at the same time, introduce the crucial safeguard of ensuring that suspects' confessions and interrogations have been recorded.
The Minister has already accepted the principle and he has agreed that we need a legislative opportunity to abolish the unsworn statement. However, he could hold it in reserve and implement it only when and if he is in a position to provide the resources to enable the introduction of tape recording. That would make the amendment more acceptable. There is no reason to rush into this tonight. There is no major campaign or demand in the country to end a great injustice, anomaly or abuse. It is a provision that has been thrown in by the other place almost by the back door. It is unnecessary to introduce it in this manner and with such haste. If such a measure is to be introduced, it should be introduced properly and in conjunction with other provisions.
This is not an isolated attack on the rights of defendants in court. It is another example in the long line of cases in which this Government and previous Governments have whittled away the rights of defendants, whether by abolishing the majority verdict, by vetting jurors or by the new campaign, initiated by the police, to discredit the jury system altogether. It is another example of a clearly thought out and sustained campaign by certain people and institutions who would like to see the scales stacked heavily against the offender and on the side of the police.
For that reason, if for no other, we should be careful before rushing headlong tonight into agreeing to a retrograde amendment.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: I hope that the House will not agree to the amendment, because I believe that the operation of the new rule will be oppressive to the simple and innocent people who may appear before the criminal courts. I am fully aware of the immense array of legal talent, expertise and authority among those who support the amendment. Such expertise could be intimidating and it may seem impertinent of me—a junior member of the Bar—to challenge the wisdom, if not the legal authority, of that view. I am sorry that I am on the other side of the argument from so many of my hon. Friends. It may also be that my view is derived more from instinct than from my legal training or legal knowledge, despite the fact that I have been a criminal advocate for 22 years.
It is curious that the amendment was moved in the other place by a Liberal Peer. The Liberals are a party who consider themselves to be the special guardians of the liberty of the individual. The amendment was supported by a former Lord Chancellor and a former Attorney-General in the Labour Government. It was also supported by an eminent Law Lord and it was accepted, finally, by the Government. We can thus be certain that this is not a party matter.
We should examine the case on its merits. When I consider the formidable authority of the legal hierarchy which is on the side of the amendment, in some ways I feel reassured. What do they know of the thoughts and feelings of the ordinary citizen—I mean the innocent ordinary citizen—who comes before a criminal court for the first time? Let us bear in mind the fact that millions of our fellow subjects come before magistrates' courts, which receive comparatively little publicity. Only thousands come before Crown courts for jury trials.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) and other advocates of the amendment seem to think that we are dealing only with jury trials. We are not. We are dealing with the ordinary defendants most of whom come before magistrates' courts. I am very concerned about the fact that so many of the advocates of the amendment should be arguing that this right, which has existed for almost 100 years, is of benefit to the guilty man. They do not seem to realise that by depriving the defendant of this right we are in fact taking a benefit away from the innocent.
After all, most such people, especially those who are before the courts for the first time, are intimidated by the atmosphere of the court. The court is strange to them. They are naturally suspicious of lawyers and of magistrates—of all the legal apparatus. Here is something to which they were entitled. They may be confused, perplexed and not understanding. How many of those who have spoken in favour of the amendment have had experience in magistrates' courts of seeing such ordinary, humble people appearing before a magistrate and having a clerk rise and read out to them the appropriate wording as to their rights to give evidence on oath or from the dock? How many of those people realise—I am reassured by the fact that so many of the supporters of the amendment are distinguished, eminent, legal figures who rarelyappear before magistrates' courts—that more than half the time the defendants concerned, especially if they are innocent, are confused and simply do not know what to do when presented with this choice.

Mr. Percy Grieve: They are advised by people such as my hon. Friend.

Mr. Stanbrook: My hon. and learned Friend says that they may be advised by counsel, but they may not have counsel. They may not be represented and if, as I suspect is the case, most of them are somewhat wary and suspicious of the legal profession, they may not have wanted counsel originally when they were before the court.
If someone is asked whether he wishes to give evidence on oath from the witness box, in which case he will be cross-examined on what he has said, or to remain in the dock and say something from there, in which case he will not be cross-examined, to the ordinary innocent mind the latter alternative is often the most attractive.

Sir Charles Fletcher-Cooke: My hon. Friend has painted a pathetic picture, which brings tears to the eyes, of some lonely, innocent, inarticulate person in a magistrates' court. I hope that he realises that the amendment does not apply in any way to such a person. If such a person is all alone in the court, without counsel or solicitor, he may still make an unsworn statement from the dock. The provision applies only to those who are represented by counsel or solicitor.

Mr. Stanbrook: I may be wrong, but my impression is that we are taking away the right of the defendant to make any sort of statement as to the facts. As I understand it, the wording certainly allows him, when he is not represented by counsel, to say anything that his counsel could have said, but counsel cannot give evidence as to the facts. Who am I to assert that my hon. and learned Friend is wrong? However, my impression of the clause is that it would not be possible to make a statement as to the facts in a magistrates' court. If that is the case—I believe that the point has been made already in the other place—we are depriving many people of a right which they enjoy at the moment and of which unsophisticated people often take advantage. They feel intimidated and simply do not want to go through the palaver of going into the witness box, taking the oath—

Mr. Grieve: They do not want to be cross-examined.

Mr. Stanbrook: —and then being cross-examined by someone—it might be a policeman, a solicitor or a barrister—who is perhaps a little fearsome, as has been said. I do not believe that in depriving such people of a privilege that ordinary people in Britain have had for nearly a century we are advancing the cause of justice in our criminal courts.
It has been argued in favour of the amendment that it is necessary because of the abuse of the privilege by unscrupulous criminals, but we are not talking about abuse by unscrupulous criminals; we are talking of the rights of individual citizens. We are taking a right away. We cannot possibly justify a diminution of the right of the individual citizen in the criminal courts on the basis that some criminals abuse that right.
I accept and support most of the Opposition arguments against the amendment except that which suggests that the right should be maintained because police witnesses are sometimes dishonest. I do not think it is right to adduce that sort of argument. The case can stand well without any such imputation against police witnesses.
Before we make any changes to the rights of individual citizens in our criminal courts, we must ask ourselves


whether by so doing we shall diminish any existing rights of innocent citizens under our law to be tried justly and fairly. I cannot possibly accept the argument that just because some people abuse the right—and the abuse comes most often when accused persons are represented by counsel before a jury—we must take away the privilege. In other words, I fear that the effect upon ordinary defendants coming before our criminal courts will be an impression that judges and lawyers are ganging up against them, and that the net effect will be a further weakening of that faith that the ordinary citizen should have in our legal system.

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Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that we ought to consider seriously the fact that about 50 per cent. of court trials result in acquittals. I do not agree with him that that means that many guilty men go free. We know that in at least one-third of that 50 per cent. the case is stopped before it gets to the jury. Therefore, in those cases the jury was not misled by dishonest criminals. Something is wrong with the criminal investigation system when it leads to such disparity. We should move rapidly towards a public prosecutor system such as the one in Scotland, which would be a major advance in criminal law reform and would get rid of such cases. That is also pertinent to the consideration of this issue.
Despite the amount of froth that it has engendered in the press and elsewhere, the fact is that this is a fairly small issue. No statistics have been presented, but I do not believe that there are many cases before the criminal courts where unsworn statements are used. They are used more frequently at the Old Bailey than they used to be. Some criminals think that there is a wheeze about using that system, which is making it more attractive. However, a small proportion of court cases result in its use.
Therefore, I would not feel deeply aggrieved if the amendment were passed. However, I agree with my hon. Friends that it is wrong if we allow the amendment to be interjected by the other place during a discussion there and then brought to the House of Commons, without a full discussion of all the implications.
It had been agreed that one of the main reasons why unsworn statements are advised by counsel in cases when they represent the accused is that they enable a man to question the police evidence without putting in his character. If we are going to take that right away from him, it should follow that we consider the question of putting in character. Whatever the Minister says about how the judges are so scrupulous in not allowing that except in appropriate cases, it is not my experience. It is some years since I practised, but we did not get far in arguing with the judge that he should not allow the character to be put in. If the police had been cross-examined on the basis that their evidence was false, almost inevitably that led to the character being put in. If we are going to take away this device, we should consider the matter of putting in character. That is why that device should be properly considered as a balancing item.
I would prefer it if we looked at the system of the criminal trial. We believe in the adversarial system and not in the Napoleonic code system of searching for the truth rather than defining whether there is a case against the accused. That means that we must have the present rules in criminal trial, which may not get nearer to the truth than

at present. There is a case for considering the right to silence in that respect. Within that overall view I would be prepared to look at the unsworn statements and the right of the accused not to go into the box, or at least not to have comments made by the judge if he does not do so. Before that, however, there would have to be a better supervision of the initial inquiries that led to his appearance at the trial. That means overhauling the whole criminal investigation system.
That could be done if we had a public prosecutor. In Scotland, where there is a procurator fiscal, the police are not responsible for prosecution. They do their job under the general direction of the procurator fiscal. They report to him and he keeps a grip on them. He is an independent lawyer who is not in the business of simply seeking to get a prosecution on its feet at all costs. He decides objectively whether there should be a prosecution. Far fewer bad cases are brought before the courts in Scotland. I suspect that the acquittal rate is also much lower.
In Denmark, where the public prosecutor is entitled to question the accused before a case goes to trial, the number of cases that are fought is small—only 5 per cent. —and few of those result in acquittal. It does not involve the enormous resources and expense of the English system of long trials that frequently lead to acquittal.
We should not tackle the problem by a little reform here or there. That might lead to injustice. We need an overall assessment. A more radical approach to the criminal trial needs to be taken. The lawyers would shout. People are deeply attached to everything that has been done since 1295. But we are now in a different world. We should adopt a fresh approach. But I am not prepared to support piecemeal legislation that does not necessarily take account of the overall balance.
Prosecution lawyers and those who sit as judges or temporary judges are in favour of the proposal; defending lawyers are against it. The reason for that is not hard to understand. We should look seriously at the English criminal trial, but not in this way.

Mr. Grieve: I shall not attempt to follow the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) in his disquisition on the possible disadvantages of our present system of criminal procedure.
It is high time that the anachronism of the unsworn speech from the dock was swept away. It is a coelacanth of our criminal procedure. For centuries the accused was not allowed to give evidence in his own defence because it was thought that he would probably commit perjury and put his immortal soul in danger. At last, in 1898, he was given the right to give evidence in his own defence. It was a necessary reform, although it came all too late. The accused was entitled to go into the witness box and give evidence in his own defence and was subject to cross-examination. The legislature of that time did not, perhaps, give its mind to the fact that the residual right to make a statement from the dock was left. In consequence, it remained as a refuge for those who did not wish to subject themselves to cross-examination.
It is an anachronism that weighs criminal procedure in the courts unfairly on the side of the accused. In my career at the Bar I have had experience of that. There have been occasions when I thought it right to advise my client that it would be desirable—because if he gave evidence he would be cross-examined and his case demolished—to


make a statement from the dock. It cannot be cross-examined or impugned, but it enables the accused who makes such a statement to make all sorts of aspersions, animadversions and attacks on prosecution witnesses. It means that his own character cannot be put in issue.
For years now the Bench and the Bar have thought that this was an anachronism that ought to be swept away. The other place has done a service to the administration of the criminal law by suggesting that in this Criminal Justice Bill we should take the opportunity of so doing.
I understand the feelings of colleagues who hesitate before making any change that would seem to whittle away the opportunities that a man has for defending himself. But what opportunity for defence which is worthy of the name is whittled away by saying that any defence that a man may make on his own behalf should be subject to cross-examination? This is an anachronism that has endured for nearly 100 years. It has endured far too long. It is time that it was swept away. It is time that those who wish to speak on their own behalf in the criminal courts should be subjected to cross-examination.
For those reasons, which I put extremely shortly, I suggest that the amendments should be supported.

Mr. Anderson: The arguments are finely balanced. I cannot work up any enthusiasm for the view that this is an assault on a matter of deep constitutional principle or a matter that deeply concerns the right of the individual. Such an assault would exist if, for example, the proposal was to abolish the right to silence.
I am more convinced by the arguments of procedure, of selectively choosing from the Philips committee, of not putting this issue in a wider context, and by the suggestion that it has been brought in by a side wind, that it has not been properly considered or based on any researched material that could properly convince the House.
Arguments have been advanced that this is a historical accident, anachronism and anomalous hangover that has not been properly considered.

Mr. Grieve: How on earth can the hon. Gentleman think that research will help a question of this kind?

Mr. Anderson: On this, as on a number of other matters that come before the House, there could be research on the way in which it has been used. For example, the House has benefited from research on juries. Such research can affect what happens in the consideration of important legal matters in this place.
It is not, as the hon. and learned Member for Solihull (Mr. Grieve) appeared to suggest, some anomalous hangover from the 1898 Act. If he reads the debates at that time, he will see that the principle was debated during the passage of that Act. It is certainly true that there are real problems in directing a jury on the weight to be attached to an unsworn statement from the dock, but judges must give other difficult directions to juries—for example, the accomplice warning. I do not think that that has proved too difficult for juries in the past.
10.30 pm
It is correct, as has been suggested, that the unsworn statement can lead to abuse. But there are precautions, such as the fact that counsel, under the Bar code, cannot draft that statement, and that evidence can be given in rebuttal of anything that is said in an unsworn statement that catches the prosecution by surprise. I do not know whether, if there is an attack on the character of either the prosecution witness or a co-accused, that opens the possibility of having the character of the person making the unsworn statement

that catches the prosecution by surprise. I do not know whether, if there is an attack on the character of either the prosecution witness or a co-accused, that open the possibility of having the character of the person making the unsworn statement put before the jury. I have sought to delve in legal books to find authority for that. I believe that there was a case on this subject during the summer. I stand corrected if that is not so. It is a matter that the House could correct if it were not possible for the character to be put in issue if such an attack were made under cover of an unsworn statement.
I do not believe that the amendment is the thin end of the wedge against the right of silence. I was intrigued by what the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) said about the 50 per cent. acquittal rate, as if there were something peculiar about that figure. If 50 per cent. is an improper proportion, it would be interesting to know what the hon. and learned Member would think was a proper percentage of acquittals and how he would adjust the rules to produce such a proper acquittal rate.

Mr. Lawrence: We just seem to acquit a very much higher proportion than anybody else.

Mr. Anderson: If 50 per cent. is not the proper rate, what does the hon. and learned Gentleman consider to be the proper rate? On what basis is that proper rate calculated and how would he set about ensuring that that rate is achieved? It would clearly be impossible to do so.
A more weighty objection to the amendment is the point put so eloquently by hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Davis). Because of their antecedents, many defendants are vulnerable, their vulnerability is known to the police and it is difficult for them to tell the jury of any offensive conduct from the police during the questioning to which they had been subjected. There could then be real injustice.
Another possibility, which has not yet been discussed, but which could affect a defendant of good character, is the possibility that he may have made a statement under caution in which he implicated several of his co-accused. He may be most reluctant to go into the witness box and be cross-examined because it would put him in difficult position with his co-accused. Yet, he may, as an innocent person, have a proper explanation for the charge that is being brought against him. However, for extraneous reasons—the danger of his being cross-examined about the role of his co-accused—he may be reluctant to go into the witness box. This is a factor that can arise in criminal cases, and which is of some importance.
The proposed abolition of this right must tilt the balance, to some extent, against a defendant. There is no clear evidence of abuse and there is no research material available. The Minister has said, in relation to the provision of tape recordings, that the position is not "stationary"—it may not be stationary, but it is hardly mobile. If there is a link between the introduction of tape recordings and the abolition of the right to make an unsworn statement, why does not the Minister undertake to introduce the two in tandem so that, if the balance is tilted against the defendant in respect of the amendment, he can tilt the balance towards the defendant by a Home Office direction in respect of the other matter?
The Government have been selective by acceding to the amendment. They can redress the balance administratively. If they wish to be seen to be acting in a just manner, they should give that undertaking to the House.

Mr. Ryman: I shall make only three short points, because the arguments have been fully rehearsed. Not for the first time during the Bill's passage I am almost entirely in disagreement with many of the speeches made by my hon. Friends.
I disagree with the contention that some great constitutional principle is at stake. It is not. At stake is whether an existing right of a defendant should be preserved or abolished. I disagree with any suggestion to the effect that a vast amount of academic research on the subject is required. It is not.
It is common knowledge that the practice of making unsworn statements from the dock is widely abused in criminal trials throughout the country. It is common knowledge among those with any experience and knowledge of the subject that frequently this results in juries being deceived. It is nonsense to say that the abolition of the right would in some way prejudice a fair trial. Nobody wants that.
The crux of the matter is as to whether this Bill is the most appropriate machinery for dealing with an undoubted anachronism. The sooner that is abolished the better. I have been more impressed by my hon. Friends' speeches criticising the Government about the manner in which the legislation has been introduced. I have a great respect for the Peers who introduced the amendment in another place. I prefer their views and those of the Criminal Law Revision Committee to those of various hon. Members who have made speeches tonight. I say that with respect to them. Members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee and the Peers who made speeches in another place have more experience and knowledge of the matters under discussion than many hon. Members on both sides of the House who have made speeches. Therefore, I shall support the Government, although I find the manner in which they introduced the proposal distasteful.
The argument in favour of abolition is not outweighed by the manner in which it was introduced. It would have been better to have introduced comprehensive legislation to reform criminal procedures in various ways. My Front Bench advanced a false argument when it was said that it is necessary to couple the provision with the recommendations of the Philips Royal Commission. That covered a far wider subject. We want an abolition of abuses which enable guilty people to be acquitted and to deceive juries. This is a modest but a worthwhile reform which should be supported.

Mr. Cryer: I shall speak briefly. I am encouraged to intervene by the pontificating tonight largely by members of the legal profession. I am always suspicious about leaving the law to lawyers who say that they have proof that juries have been deceived. Mostly, they are the selfsame lawyers who maintained that the jury system had existed for hundreds of years and that there was no possibility of carrying out research to discover if any juries, in any unnamed trial and without identification, had been deceived. Those lawyers who now claim confidently and pompously that juries have been deceived are not prepared to allow any research to see if their assumptions are correct. One or two, hearing talk of research, curl their lips because they know so well about these matters. Why should they not know? They live at the top of the tree. Their earnings make most ordinary people curl up in wonderment.
What about the ordinary people? Have they been given much of a chance to comment on this change? Of course they have not. It has been introduced by a back-door method. There has been no consultation. No papers have been issued to explain that the Government have had fresh amendments introduced by the House of Lords—by lawyers in the other place, of course—which is subject to no give-and-take through the electoral system. Its members are responsible to no one except themselves. Lawyers have decided that some reform is necessary and the Government have gone along with it, as they did over jury research. The Minister said that jury research was desirable. It went to the other place. Then the Minister urged all the Conservative Members who had voted for research to vote against it in a remarkable turn-around within the space of a few days.
It is not good enough. People claim that this is not a constitutional change. Things might appear differently to the pensioner or the housewife who feel themselves innocent of the accusation that they have stolen goods from a supermarket. Their reputation for honesty is suddenly in jeopardy. As has already been indicated, the change affects magistrates' courts as well as jury courts. What happens in magistrates' courts is important. Indeed, the vast bulk of criminal cases is dealt with in those courts.
An accused person whose reputation is at stake might feel that the removal of the right of an option is reasonably important. It is a reduction of choice. A person appearing before a court for the first time is confused and horrified by the accusation. I am referring to people who feel that they are completely innocent. I am not talking about the clever criminal who, in any case, will not be attending the court by himself. He will be employing one of the well-paid lawyers represented in their plenitude in this debate.
The ordinary housewife or pensioner may be nervous or apprehensive even about speaking in court let alone being subjected to cross-examination. They may wish to take the opportunity to make an unsworn statement from the dock to which they have at least become accustomed for a few minutes during the torture to which they have been subjected—I use "torture" in a metaphorical sense—to overcome the fear that their story, which they honestly believe to be true, will be torn to shreds by a clever lawyer appearing for the prosecution. Everyone knows that what I say about mental strain, the apprehension and the tension of an appearance in court is true. There is need seriously to consider the consequences before going ahead with the proposed change.

Mr. Lawrence: So that we may better appreciate whether the arguments of the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) are based on experience, will he tell us how many times he has been in a magistrates' court or the Crown court and listened to a trial?

10. 45 pm

Mr. Cryer: I have observed trials on about 30 or 40 occasions in magistrates' courts. The hon. and learned Gentleman probably does not realise that when I was a teacher I took regularly groups of students from a further education college to the magistrates' court, because I thought that it was important that they should know something about how the courts function. I regard the magistrates' courts as an important form of summary jurisdiction about which people should know something.
I am worried about going ahead rapidly with this change. I do not believe that a case has been made out


showing clearly the advantage of such a change. It seems to be an administrative advantage for the Government's convenience, and not for the maintenance of legal principles that have existed for over 100 years. It is a piecemeal attempt to alter matters in a highly unsatisfactory manner. There has been no opportunity for interested organisations to make representations. I support the objections that have been made.
I am sorry that, yet again, this measure is being taken on a Thursday night on what is probably for both sides a modest Whip.

Mr. Alan Clark: A two-line Whip?

Mr. Cryer: Not in my case. Since the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) is making his comments from a sedentary position, which is usually the case and probably the result of his public school education, I must point out to him that one of the hon. Members who started the change down the corridor was a Social Democrat Member. However, neither the Social Democrats nor the Liberals could bother to attend to take part in discussions which, on both sides of the House, are regarded as reasonably important. We should have had more time to consider the proposal. The Government should withdraw it and allow time for proper consultations.

The Attorney-General (Sir Michael Havers): I have been slightly puzzled by the attacks that have been made upon the Government for being so resistant to any attempt to initiate any form of jury research. My recollection of the Bill was that we were doing our best to reach a satisfactory agreement about that. Perhaps the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) has forgotten who was the Member of the other place who fought tooth and nail against any form of research on juries. It was the noble Lord Hutchinson. He was the one man fighting all the other lawyers in the other place who supported the amendment abolishing speeches from the dock.
I do not for a moment claim that lawyers know best, but, equally, lawyers do not claim to be experts upon every subject as I fear some hon. Members apparently do.
I have been baffled by the number of people who disagree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) when he says that the provision allows criminals to escape. How does one know that such accused are guilty? How can one say that an accused is guilty after he has been acquitted? My other hon. and learned Friend the Member for Darwen (Sir C. Fletcher-Cooke) was accused of being anecdotal when he spoke of actual experiences when he was present in court. But, no. "Verbals" are to be accepted as true. "Verbals" are a fact of life, but where is the evidence that makes the "verbals" any more likely to be accurate than the suggestion that more criminals have been acquitted than would otherwise have been the case? It is all very one-sided. We have to accept that "verbals" are the order of the day, but statements that can only be based on surmise have to be dismissed.
I wonder whether some hon. Members have any sense of reality when they speak of defendants being so scared or inarticulate that they must be given a useful halfway house between not saying anything and being forced to go into the witness box. What about all the Crown witnesses

who have never been in a court? Even a barrister who has had to give evidence will admit that he never realised that it was so unpleasant.
I cannot accept the idea that only the defendant will be inarticulate or will crumple under cross-examination. Let hon. Members think about a girl in a rape case. She has to give evidence before a jury and, in a notorious case, a packed public gallery. She may be subjected to the most frightening and searching cross-examination, perhaps by a QC for a defendant on legal aid. Time and again, I have seen cross-examinations in a rough manner lasting for hours. If the judge allows it, the whole of the girl's past sexual life will be exposed to the world—and all to be published the next day. Yet it is suggested that the defendant must not be exposed to all that; he must have the useful halfway house.
It may be suggested that the girl is a liar or a loose, lustful woman who sought the man's companionship and, eventually, sex with him, but she is not allowed to see him challenged if he chooses to sit in his halfway house. He is allowed to stand in the dock and say "She is a loose woman. She led me on. She got drunk in the pub and put her hand on my trousers when we got into the car." He does not get cross-examined.
A sense of fairness supports those who wish the amendment to be carried, but I have an even stronger reason to support it. It was outlined by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Darwen and it is not statistical or anecdotal. I have seen it happen too many times.
Two defendants fall out. One goes into the witness box and is cross-examined. He may not involve his codefendant, but the second man sits in the dock and puts all the blame on the first. The judge tells the jurors that they must judge the case on the evidence and must put out of their minds what defendant B said about defendant A, but that is a form of mental gymnastics of which 12 jurors are not capable. They say "The judge says we must put it out of our minds, but you heard what that defendant said. Might it be true?" However careful the judge may be, the seed has been planted.
Nothing can be more grossly unfair to the defendant who goes into the witness box. He has no opportunity to deal with the allegations. He may have the most convincing evidence to rebut them. He may even be able to show that he was not at the place where the other defendant alleges he was. All of those risks are run. I therefore believe that the support given to this proposal in the other place—by, incidentally, Lord Elwyn-Jones, who was an Attorney-General and a Lord Chancellor—is something that cannot lightly be disregarded.

Mr. Anderson: That danger would still exist, even if this right were abolished, because if the defendant chose the right of silence, his counsel could make those same damaging allegations against the co-defendant, without letting in his character?

The Attorney-General: With the greatest respect to the hon. Gentleman, counsel can draw inferences and comment only on the evidence. It is the evidence that would be given by the man hiding in the dark. Of course, he can cross-examine, but it is the evidence. He will say: "I shall now tell you, members of the jury, what happened. It was not me who was to blame; it was that fellow. He is the one standing beside me, because what he did was",


and then he gives the spiel, and he can take two hours over it. None of that can be challenged. That is a gross unfairness which, more than anything else, justifies the change that we are being asked to make tonight.
I am delighted that no hon. Member has sought to advance the proposition that was advanced in the other place—and again in the newspapers today—that the ability to make unsworn statements should be retained to enable political statements to be made, or those which, if made outside the court, would render the maker liable to an action for slander. I do not know how those propositions were ever seriously put forward. I am relieved that those who have spoken in this debate have had more sense than to repeat them in this House. They are nonsense, and they should never have been made in the first place.
I do not believe that I can help the House by speaking longer—

Mr. Clinton Davis: The Attorney-General has not dealt with the pertinent point raised by his hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State about the countervailing situation which should be provided to deal with the protection of accused persons, for example, by the introduction of tape recorders at police stations. His hon. and learned Friend said that he saw no objection in principle to that. The proposition that I put to the House was that that should accompany the proposition that the Minister is now seeking to make. What is wrong with that? Could not a directive be issued by the Home Office to implement that procedure which the Minister of State agreed should be followed?

The Attorney-General: The only justification for that, if I may say so, would be on the ground, which has not received general acceptance in the House today, of the "verballing", and that, if there is to be a "verballing", the accused runs the risk, if he goes into the witness box, of having his past record disclosed, because a "verballing" requires him to say that a police officer is a liar. Of course, it does not require that. The cross-examination—some of us have had to tread warily on that course in the past—has been one which allows one to challenge—and make clear the fact that one is challenging—and enables one's client to go into the witness box later and say what he wants, without it crossing the mind of the prosecuting counsel that he should make an application to the judge.
If he was idiot enough to do that, I cannot think of any judge who in his discretion would allow that course to be followed. So it can be only on that limited basis that the hon. Gentleman's attempt to connect this with the tape recording can be justified. I understand that a statement is to be made shortly about tape recording. I do not say that it means that there will be tape recording instantly in every police station in the country. One has only to think about the mechanics and the procedures involved to realise that that could not happen straightaway.

11 pm

Mr. Cryer: Before the right hon. and learned Gentleman laughs away the right to make a statement, while I do not give it great weight it is true that, for example, Ron Smith, the father of the murdered nurse, Helen Smith, made a statement from the dock in which he expressed a point of view. That may be regarded as an abuse, but when he made that statement Ron Smith was part of a campaign to have an inquest into the death of his
daughter which was subsequently confirmed by a court. The opportunity to make a statement should not be entirely disregarded.

The Attorney-General: I am not familiar with the circumstances in which Mr. Smith was in court. For this to be appropriate it must have been as a defendant. I doubt if many people would support the proposition that a court can be used to make a political or other statement wholly unconnected with the purpose for which the man is in court. I certainly would not subscribe to that.
The hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Davis) asked a question with which I forgot to deal. The proceedings that he asked about become active when the defendant is first before the court which is sitting as examining justices.

Mr. Stanbrook: Before my right hon. and learned Friend sits down, will he deal with the point on which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Darwen (Sir C. Fletcher-Cooke) and I disagreed? Is it not the case that the rule does catch unsworn statements made in magistrates' courts as to matters of fact?

The Attorney-General: The provision which has been preserved by the subsection is to ensure that where a man has no legal representation the propositions of law, or of inference—whatever it might be—that he wishes to make must be allowed. If it were a statement of fact that counsel could not make, that would not be appropriate.

Question put, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment: —

The House divided: Ayes 97, Noes, 38.

Division No. 318]
[11.1 pm


AYES


Ancram, Michael
Lang, Ian


Aspinwall, Jack
Lawrence, Ivan


Bendall, Vivian
Lester, Jim (Beeston)


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Blackburn, John
Loveridge, John


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Lyell, Nicholas


Bottomley, Peter (Krovich W)
MacGregor, John


Bright, Graham
McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Major, John


Chalker, Mrs. Lynda
Marlow, Antony


Chapman, Sydney
Mates, Michael


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)
Mather, Carol


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Cope, John
Mayhew, Patrick


Cranborne, Viscount
Mellor, David


Dorrell, Stephen
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Dover, Denshore
Moate, Roger


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)


Dykes, Hugh
Murphy, Christopher


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Neale, Gerrard


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Needham, Richard


Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles
Neubert, Michael


Fraser, Peter (South .Angus)
Newton, Tony


Goodlad, Alastair
Osborn, John


Greenway, Harry 
Page, Richard (SW Harts)


Grieve, Percy
Percival, Sir Ian


Griffiths, E.(B'y St. Edm'ds)
Proctor, K. Harvey

Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)
Renton, Tim


Grist, Ian
Rhodes James, Robert


Gummer, John Selwyn
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Hampson, Dr Keith
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Hawksley, Warren
Rossi, Hugh


Hicks, Robert
Rumbold, Mrs A. C. R.


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Ryman, John


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Silvester, Fred


Kershaw, Sir Anthony
Sims, Roger






Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)
Warren, Kenneth


Speed, Keith
Watson, John


Speller, Tony
Wells, Bowen


Stevens, Martin
wells, John (Maidstone)


Stradling Thomas, J.
Wheeler, John


Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)
Winterton, Nicholas


Thomas, Rt Hon Peter
Wolfson, Mark


Thompson, Donald



Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)
Tellers for the Ayes:


Trippier, David
Mr. Archie Hamilton and


Voggers, Peter
Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones


Waddington, David





NOES


Anderson, Donald
McCartney, Hugh


Benn, Rt Hon Tony
Marks, Kenneth


Bennett, Andrew (St'kp't N)
Parry, Robert


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Pavitt, Laurie


Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'y S)
Prescott, John


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Robinson, G. (Coventry NW)


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (B'stol S)
Rooker, J. W.


Cryer, Bob
Rowlands, Ted


Davidson, Arthur
Sever, John


Deakins, Eric
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Skinner, Dennis


Dormand, Jack
Spearing, Nigel


Dubs, Alfred
Stanbrook, Ivor


Dunnett, Jack
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Foot, Rt Hon Michael
Tinn, James


George, Bruce
Welsh, Michael


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Woolmer, Kenneth


Huckfield, Les



Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Tellers for the Noes:


Kilory-Silk, Robert
Mr. George Morton and


Lyon, Alexander (York)
Mr. Frank Haynes.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New Clause W

RECALL OF WITNESSES

Lords amendment: No. 172, after clause 54, insert:
W.—(1) After section 148 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 there shall be inserted the following new section—
Recall of Witnessess.
148A. In any trial, on the motion of either party, the presiding judge may permit a witness who has been examined to be recalled.".
(2) After section 349 of the said Act of 1975 there shall be inserted the following new section—
Recall of Witnessess.
349A. In any trial, on the motion of either party, the presiding judge may permit a witness who has been examined to be recalled.".

The Solicitor-General for Scotland (Mr. Peter Fraser): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This is a short procedural amendment which applies only to Scotland. It is intended to correct an error in the Criminal Justice Act 1980 which inadvertently removed from the Criminal Procedure Act 1975 the provisions which are now being re-enacted.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 55

CONSTRUCTION OF REFERENCES TO STATUTORY MAXIMUM"

Lords amendment: No. 174, in page 53, line 8, leave out "or Northern Ireland"

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendment No. 175.

Mr. Mayhew: This is a technical amendment with a relationship to Northern Ireland.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 175 and 176 agreed to.

Clause 60

COMMENCEMENT

Lords amendment: No. 177, in page 53, line 38, leave out "This Act, except this section," and insert—
(1) The following provisions of this Act shall come into force on the day this Act is passed, namely—
section [Restriction of liberty of children in care];
section 28;
section 29;
section [Her Majesty's Chief Inspectors of Prisons];
section 55;
section [Construction of references to "the standard scale"]:
section 56;
section 57, so far as it relates to paragraph 17 of Schedule 13;
section 58, so far as it relates to the Imprisonment (Temporary Provisions) Act 1980; 
section 59, so far as it relates to paragraph 14 of Schedule 16; 
this section; and section 61. 
(2) Subject to subsection (1) above, this Act

Read a Second time.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, as an amendment to the Lords amendment, to leave out
'section [Restriction of liberty of children in care]' .
The effect of amendment No. 177 is to bring certain provisions in the Bill into force on Royal Assent. We felt it appropriate to propose bringing into force on Royal Assent those provisions which are simply enabling powers. The reason for the amendment to delete the reference to the new clause dealing with the restriction of liberty of children in care is that when the relevant new clause was introduced in another place it was an enabling provision. As a result of subsequent amendments made to it, it is no longer simply that.

Amendment to the Lords amendment agreed to.

Lords amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 178 to 182 agreed to.

Schedule 3


MAXIMUM FINES TO BE INCREASED BY MORE THAN THE GENERAL INCREASE


Lords amendment: No. 183, in page 59, line 13, at end insert—


"Offences under section 45 (plying for hire without a licence).
Section 45 … … … … … …
£ … … … … … … … …
£500."

11. 15 pm

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we are taking Lords amendments Nos. 184, 186, 188 and 193 to 197.

"HOUSING ACT 1980 (c. 51)Offence under paragraph 7 of Schedule 24 (using or permitting the use of premises without means of escape in case of fire in contravention of an undertaking).
Section 147 and Schedule 24 … …
£50 and £35 per day following conviction.
£1;000".


Read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we are to take the Minister of State's amendment to the Lords amendment.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, as an amendment to the Lords amendment, to leave out
and £5 per day following conviction'.
Amendment No. 203 provides for a special increase in the offence under the Housing Act 1980 of using or permitting the use of premises without means of escape in case of fire, in contravention of an undertaking. It is one of a number of similar amendments to the schedule moved by Baroness Gardner and accepted by the Government. The amendment that I propose merely brings the drafting of the amendment into line with that for the other provisions in the schedule.

Amendment to the Lords amendment agreed to.

Lords amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 204 agreed to.

"PROTECTION OF ANIMALS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1912 (c.14)Section 7 (selling poisoned grain or placing on any land any matter rendered poisonous).
For "ten pounds" substitute "level 4 on the standard scale".
£ 25 … … … … … … …
£500."

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment, which was moved in another place by Lord Melchett, with the agreement of the Government, increases the penalty for offences relating to the sale of poisoned grain under section 7 of the Protection of

"PUBLIC HEALTH (SCOTLAND) ACT1945 (c.15)Section 1(5) (contravention of  regulations as to treatment and spread of certain diseases).
For "one hundred pounds" sub-stitute "level 5 on the standard scale"
£ 100 and £ 50 per day during which the offence continues.
£1,000 and £ 50 per day during which the offence continues."

Mr. Mayhew: Amendment No. 183 and other amendments to schedule 3 in the group all provide for special increases in penalties.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 184 to 202, agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 203, in page 62, line 29, at end insert—

Schedule 7

SCHEDULE TO BE INSERTED AS SCHEDULE 7D TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT 1975

Lords amendment: No. 205, in page 66, leave out lines 28 to 32.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment deletes from schedule 7 the obsolete reference to section 3 of the Cinematograph Act 1909

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 206, in page 66, line 32 at end insert—

Animals (Scotland) Act 1912 from a fine not exceeding £25 to a fine not exceeding £500.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 207 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 208, in page 67, line 18, at end insert—

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment effects an increase in the penalty for offences under section 1(5) of the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1945 similar to that which is effected by schedule 3 in the penalty for the corresponding offences in England and Wales under the Public Health Act 1936.

Question put and agreed to.

"AGRICULTURE AND HORTICULTURE ACT 1964 (c. 28)





.Section 20(1) (obstruction, etc. of authorised officer).
For "twenty pounds" substitute "level 3 on the standard scale".
£20
£200.


.Section 20(2) (offences under Part III).
For the words from "one hundred pounds" to "two hundred and fifty pounds)" substitute "level 5 on the standard scale".
(a) for a first offence, £100 or 3 or both;
(b) for a second or subsequent offence, £250 or 3 months or both.
£1,000 or 3 months or both."

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Lords amendment: No. 209, in page 68, leave out lines 7 to 22.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment seeks to delete paragraphs 15 to 18 of schedule 7, which provide for increases in the penalties for certain offences under the Deer (Scotland) Act 1959. The penalties for those offences have been dealt with in the Deer (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1982.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 210, in page 68, line 32, at end insert—

The amendment increases for Scotland the penalties for certain offences under the Agriculture and Horticulture Act 1964. Similar increases for England and Wales are effected by schedule 3.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 211, in page 71, line 2, column 4, leave out "f200" and insert "—500"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 212 to 214.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: These amendments increase the penalty for offences under sections 98(2) and 132(2) of the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 to a fine not exceeding £ 500.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 212 to 215 agreed to.

Schedule 9

AMENDMENTS OF MAGISTRATES' COURTS ACT 1980 RELATING TO REMANDS IN CUSTODY

Lords amendment: No 216, in page 76, line 21, at end insert
(whether present in court or not)

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The purpose of this amendment is to put it beyond doubt that a defendant's solicitor need not be present in court when the magistrates remand a defendant in his absence.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 10

AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULE 3 TO IMMIGRATION ACT 1971

Lords amendment: No. 217, in page 77, line 32, at end insert—
1. In paragraph 2—
(a)in sub-paragraph (1), after the word "directs", in the first place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words "or a direction is given under sub-paragraph (1A) below," ;
(b)the following sub-paragraph shall be inserted after that sub-paragraph—
(1A) Where—
(a)a recommendation for deportation made by a court on conviction of a person is in force in respect of him; and
(b)he appeals against his conviction or against that recommendation,
the powers that the court determining the appeal may exercise include power to direct him to be released without setting aside the recommendation." and
(c)the following sub-paragraphs shall be substituted for subparagraph (5) —
(5) A person to whom this sub-paragraph applies shall be subject to such restrictions as to residence and as to reporting to the police as may from time to time be notified to him in writing by the Secretary of State.
(6) The persons to whom sub-paragraph (5) above applies are—
(a)a person liable to be detained under sub-paragraph (1) above, while by virtue of a direction of the Secretary of State he is not so detained; and
(b)a person liable to be detained under sub-paragraph (2) or (3) above, while he is not so detained.".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 218.

Mr. Mayhew: Amendment No. 217 is concerned with cases where a court recommends for deportation a person

who has been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment. Under that Act a person in that category has to be detained pending the making of a deportation order unless either the court or the Secretary of State directs his release. Previously, release had to be unconditional but clause 63 and schedule 10 to the Bill, which were introduced on Report in this House, enable a court to impose restrictions, so allowing persons to be released who may not otherwise have been released by the courts.
The amendment extends the process a little further by giving a court of appeal power to direct the release—unconditionally or otherwise—of a person recommended for deportation. It appears that at present some appeal courts do not have this power. It also gives the Secretary of State the same power as the courts to impose conditions in a case where he directs the release of a person recommended by a court for deportation. This amendment will help, albeit in a small way, to reduce the number of people in prison.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 218 agreed to.

Schedule 11

PROBATION AND AFTER-CARE

Lords amendment: No. 219, in page 80, line 8, at end insert—
IA. In section 2(3) of that Act (probation orders) for the words "and 4" there shall be substituted the words ", 4A and 4B".
1B. The following sections shall be inserted after section 4 of that Act—
Requirements in probation orders
4A. — (1) Without prejudice to the generality of section 2(3) above, the power conferred by that subsection includes power, subject to the provisions of this section, to require the probationer—
(a) to present himself to a person or persons specified in the order at a place or places so specified;
(b) to participate or refrain from participating in activities specified in the order—
(i) on a day or days so specified; or
(ii)during the probation period or such portion of it as may be so specified.
(2) A court shall not include in a probation order a requirement such as is mentioned in subsection (1) above unless it has first consulted a probation officer as to —
(a)the offender's circumstances; and
(b)the feasibility of securing compliance with the requirements, and is satisfied, having regard to the probation officer's report that it is feasible to secure compliance with them.
(3) A court shall not include a requirement such as is mentioned in subsection (1)(a)above or a requirement to participate in activities if it would involve the co-operation of a person other than the probationer and the probation officer responsible for his supervision, unless that other person consents to its inclusion.
(4) A requirement such as is mentioned in subsection (1)(a)above shall operate to require the probationer—
(a)in accordance with instructions given by the probation officer responsible for his supervision, to present himself at a place for not more than 60 days; and
(b)while there, to comply with instructions given by, or under the authority of, the person in charge of the place.
(5) A place specified in the order shall have been approved by the probation committee for the area in which the premises are situated as providing facilities suitable for persons subject to probation orders.
(6) A requirement to participate in activities shall operate to require the probationer.
(a) in accordance with instructions given by the probation officer responsible for his supervision, to participate in the activities for not more than 60 days; and


(b)while participating, to comply with instructions given by, or under the authority of, the person in charge of the activities.
(7) Instructions given by a probation officer under subsection (4) or (6) above shall, as far as practicable, be such as to avoid any interference with the times, if any, at which the probationer normally works or attends a school or other educational establishment.
Probation orders requiring attendance at day center
4B.—(1) Without prejudice to the generality of sections 2(3) and 4A above, the power conferred by section 2(3) above includes power, subject to the provisions of this section, to require the probationer during the probation period to attend at a day centre specified in the order.
(2) A court shall not include such a requirement in a probation order unless—
(a) it has consulted a probation officer; and
(b) it is satisfied—

(i)that arrangements can be made for the probationer's attendance at a centre; and
(ii) that the person in charge of the centre consents to the inclusion of the requirement,
(3) A requirement under subsection (1) above shall operate to require the probationer—
(a) in accordance with instructions given by the probation officer responsible for his supervision, to attend on not more than 60 days at the centre specified in the order; and
(b) while attending there to comply with instructions given by, or under the authority of, the person in charge of the centre.
(4) Instructions given by a probation officer under subsection (3) above shall, so far as is practicable, be such as to avoid any interference with the times, if any, at which the probationer normally works or attends a school or other educational establishment.
(5) References in this section to attendance at a day centre include references to attendance elsewhere than at the centre for the purpose of participating in activities in accordance with instructions given by, or under the authority of, the person in charge of the centre.
(6) In this section "day centre" means premises at which non-residential facilities are provided for use in connection with the rehabilitation of offenders and which—
(a) are provided by a probation committee; or
(b) have been approved by the probation committee for the area in which the premises are situated as providing facilities suitable for persons subject to probation orders.".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): With this we may take Lords amendments No. 221 and 274.

Mr. Mayhew: This amendment gives courts power to include a range of requirements in probation orders—a power that was believed to exist until the recent judgment of the House of Lords in Cullen v Rogers. That judgment raised issues of great importance as to the nature and extent of requirements that might be imposed under section 2(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. In particular, it was said that no requirement made under that section could be properly imposed if it involved a substantial element of custodial punishment or if it subjected a probationer to the unfettered discretionary control of the supervising probation officer.
The amendment will overcome the disadvantageous consequences of the decision in Cullen v Rogers and permit in particular a probation order to carry with it a condition that the offender shall attend a day centre.
The amendments are all relatively self-explanatory.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 220 and 221 agreed to.

Schedule 12

COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS

Lords amendment:No. 221A, in page 83, line 18, after "officer" insert
or by a social worker of a local authority social services department".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendment No. 222.

Mr. Mayhew: At present a court may not make a community service order unless it considers a report by a probation officer about the offender and his circumstances, among other features, and, if it is considered necessary, hearing a probation officer. The additional words provide that the report may also be made by a local authority social worker, and the court may also hear a social worker.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 222 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 223, in page 86, line 39, leave out from beginning to "it" in line 48.

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 224 to 227.

Mr. Mayhew: The amendments make arrangement for the transfer of community service orders from England and Wales or England or Wales to Northern Ireland.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 224 to 227 agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 228, in page 91, leave out lines 16 to 41 and insert—
(a) the said section 1 shall have effect as if, in subsection (2) thereof—
(i) paragraph (b)were omitted;
(ii) for paragraph (d) there were substituted the following paragraph—
(d) it appears to the court that provision can be made by the Probation Board for Northern Ireland for him to perform work under such an order;";
(b)the order shall specify that the unpaid work required to be performed by the order shall be performed under the provision made by the Probation Board for Northern Ireland and referred to in section 1(2)(d)of this Act as substituted by paragraph (a)above.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 229 to 232.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: These are purely technical amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 229 to 233 agreed to.

Schedule 13

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

Lords amendment:No. 234, in page 98, line 46, at end insert—
(2) The following subsection shall be added at the end of that section—
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) section 33 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (the standard scale of fines for summary offences); and
(b) an order under section 143 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 which alters the sums specified in section 33(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, shall extend to Northern Ireland.".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment is consequential upon earlier provisions of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 235, in page 98, line 46, at end insert—
Customs and Excise Act 1952 (c. 44)
. For section 283(5) of the Customs and Excise Act 1952 there shall be substituted the following subsection—
(5) The proviso to subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to Scotland; and in the application of the said subsection (2) to Scotland the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed on summary conviction in the sheriff court shall be 6 months, and the penalty for an offence which is triable only summarily by virtue of paragraph(b)of that subsection shall be that to which a person was liable on summary conviction of the offence immediately before 29th July 1977 (the date of the passing of the Criminal Law Act 1977) subject to any increase by virtue of Part IV of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.".

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 249 and 284.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The amendments are designed to solve problems that exist in relation to the mode of trial and penalties for offence under the Customs and Excise legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 236, in page 99, line 29, after "custody"" insert
, and after the word "centre" where first occurring there shall be inserted the words "or a young offenders' institution"

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Section 49(1) of the Prison Act 1952, which has application throughout the United Kingdom, makes provision for the arrest of persons unlawfully at large from sentences of imprisonment or detention in a detention centre imposed in Scotland. The provision has, however, never been amended to include persons unlawfully at large from sentences of detention in a young offenders' institution, and this amendment seeks to make good that omission.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 237 agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 238, in page 100, line 14, leave out paragraph 12 and insert—
12. The following subsections shall be substituted for subsections (4) to (7) of section 26 of that Act (transfer to serve sentence)—

'(4) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a person transferred under this section to any part of the United Kingdom or to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man there to serve his sentence or the remainder of his sentence shall be treated for purposes of detention. release, supervision, recall and otherwise as if that sentence (and any other sentence to which he may be subject) had been an equivalent sentence passed by a court in the place to which he is transferred.
(4A) A person who has been sentenced to a sentence of a length which could not have been passed on an offender of his age in the place to which he has been transferred, shall be treated for the purposes mentioned in subsection (4) of this section as the Secretary of State may direct.'
12A. The words 'youth custody centre' shall be substituted for the words 'Borstal institution' in section 29(1) (removal of prisoners etc. for judicial purpose) and section 30(3) (prisoners unlawfully at large) of that Act.
12B. In subsection (2) of section 32 of that Act (supervision and recall)—
(a) in paragraph (1) for the word 'section' there shall be substituted the words 'sections 206,';
(b) at the end there shall be added the following paragraphs—
'(f)section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982;
(k)section 73(4), (5) and (6) of the Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1968.'.
12C. The words 'or of any authorised officer' shall be added at the end of section 33 of that Act (orders relating to transfers of prisoners and others to be under hand of the Secretary of State or of an Under-Secretary or Assistant Under-Secretary of State).").

11. 30 pm

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move. That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendments Nos. 238A, 239, 264 to 266, 271, 282, 289 and 290.

Mr. Mayhew: This amendment makes provision for the transfer of young offenders in custody between the various British jurisdictions consequential to part I of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 238A to 241 agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 242, in page 102, line 38, at end insert—
20A. The following words shall be added at the end of section 15(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (variation and discharge of supervision orders)—
or power to insert in the supervision order a requirement in pursuant of section 12(3C)(aa)of this Act in respect of any day which falls outside the period of 3 months beginning with the date when the order was originally made."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment makes provisions consequential on the provisions in the Bill for the night restriction order.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment; Nos. 243 to 251 agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 252, in page 107, line 35, at end insert—
41A. In section 77(2) of that Act (power to fix a term of imprisonment and postpone issue of warrant of distress) after the word "imprisonment" there shall be inserted the words "or detention under section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (detention of persons aged 17 to 20 for default)".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendment No. 254.

Mr. Mayhew: These are minor and consequential amendments to the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 253 and 254 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 255, in page 108, line 37, at end insert—
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (c. 49)
50. The following subsection shall be inserted after subsection (2) of section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (which relates to penalties for contempt and kindred offences in proceedings in England and Wales)—
(2A) In the exercise of jurisdiction to commit for contempt of court or any kindred offence the court shall not deal with the offender by making an order under section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (an attendance centre order) if it appears to the court, after considering any available evidence, that he is under 17 years of age.".

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Lords amendment No. 292.

Mr. Mayhew: This amendment imposes on the Crown court the same prohibition that already applies to magistrates' courts over making an attendance centre order on a juvenile who is in contempt. This is a consequential amendment necessitated by other provisions in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 14

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS SCOTLAND

Lords amendment: No. 256, in page 108, line 40, at end insert—
Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865 (c. 56)
. In section 4 of the Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865 (apprehension and punishment of offenders) for the words from ", and on being convicted" onwards, substitute the words "; and every person committing an offence against the provisions of this Act shall be liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 1 on the standard scale.".

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment derives from an undertaking given to the Committee on the Civic Government (Scotland) Bill. It removes the penalty of imprisonment for offences under the Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865, replaces the existing maximum fine of £10 with a new maximum of £25 and deletes the provision which allows a person to be convicted on uncorroborated evidence.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 257, in page 109, leave out lines 6 to 11 and insert—
(b) at end of that section insert the following subsection—
(4) Subsection (2) above shall extend to Scotland, but save as aforesaid this section shall not extend to Scotland.".
3. At the beginning of section 702 of that Act (offences punishable as misdemeanours) insert the words "Subject to section 703 of this Act,".
3A. For paragraph (a)of section 703 of that Act (summary proceedings in Scotland) substitute the following paragraphs—
(a)subject to section 43(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (which among other things makes certain offences triable either summarily or on indictment), any offence under this Act which was triable only summarily

immediately before 1st January 1980 (the date of commencement of the said section 43) shall continue to be so triable and shall be deemed to have been so triable at all times since that date;
(aa)subject to any special provisions of this Act—
(i) an offence under this Act described as a misdemeanour shall be triable either summarily or on indictment and, subject to any other penalty prescribed in respect of any particular offence, shall be punishable on summary conviction with a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or both, and on conviction on indictment with a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or both;
(ii) subject to sub-paragraph (i) above, an offence under this Act made punishable with imprisonment for any term not exceeding 6 months or with a fine or a maximum fine which does not exceed level 5 on the standard scale shall be triable only summarily;
(iii) an offence under this Act not falling within paragraph (a) above or the preceding provisions of this paragraph shall be triable either summarily or on indictment:
Provided that in relation to the period before the commencement of section 45 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 subparagraph (ii) above shall have effect as if for "level 5 on the standard scale" there were substituted "£1000";".

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment is designed to bring the mode of trial in Scotland for offences under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 into line with that in England and Wales, and in so doing avoid the anomalies which might otherwise arise in penalty levels for such offences in the different jurisdictions as a result of the provisions in the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment:No. 258, in page 112, line 43, at end insert—
Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)
.In section 6 of the Immigration Act 1971 (recommendations by court for deportation)—
(a) in paragraph(b)of subsection (3), for the words "first offenders" substitute the words "persons who have not previously been sentenced to imprisonment";
(b) in subsection (5), the words "except in Scotland," and paragraph(b) and the word "and" preceding it are repealed.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Lords amendment No. 269.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: The amendments effect two minor changes to the Immigration Act 1971 which are consequential on the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. They should have been made when that measure was passing through the House but unfortunately they were overlooked.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 259, in page 113, line 1, at end insert—
 . In section 193A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (fines on conviction on indictment to be without limit)—
(a) at the beginning, insert "(1)";
(b) for the words "section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980" substitute the words "section 457A(4) of this Act";
(c) after the word "fine" where first occurring insert the words "of or";


(d)for the word "section" in the second and third places where it occurs substitute the word "subsection";
(e)at the end, insert the following new subsection—
(2) Where any Act confers a power by subordinate instrument to make a person liable on conviction on indictment of any offence mentioned in subsection (1) above to a fine or a maximum fine of a specified amount, or which shall not exceed a specified amount, the fine which may be provided in the exercise of that power shall by virtue of this subsection be a fine of an unlimited amount.".

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Section 193A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 is designed to give the courts completely unfettered discretion as to the amount of the fine that should be imposed in cases where a person is convicted on indictment. It is designed to remove any limitation on the fine that can be imposed on conviction on indictment of any offence. The amendment simply corrects two technical defects in the existing section.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 15

REPEALS

Lords amendments Nos. 260 and 261 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 262, in page 115, line 23, column 3, at end insert—



"In section 55(3), the words "Subsection (2) of section twenty-two, and"."

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment disapplies section 22(2) of the Prison Act 1952 to Scotland. This provision is not required to be extended to Scotland because the Secretary of State for Scotland has a power similar to that conferred by section 22(2) under section 10(2) of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 263 to 269 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 270, in page 116, column 3, leave out lines 11 to 14 and insert—



"In section 2, in subsection (6), the words from "under", in the first place where it occurs, to "Act", and subsection (8)."

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That the House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The purpose of the amendment is to make the wording and meaning of section 2(6) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 even simpler.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 271 to 293 agreed to.

Schedule 16

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Lords amendment: No 294, in page 123, line 34, leave out from "thereafter" to end of line 36 and insert
have effect as if it were a requirement imposed under section 4B of that Act specifying as the clay centre which the probationer is required to attend the day centre at the premises of the day training centre

Mr. Mayhew:: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment would enable a requirement to attend a day training centre, made under the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, to continue in force after section 4 of that Act is repealed on the implementation of the provisions of the Bill. Without this amendment, requirements under that provision would cease to have effect, and that would be a bad thing.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No 295, in page 123, line 40, at end insert—
Fines
17. Any provision of Schedule 14 to this Act which alters the penalty for any offence shall not affect the penalty for an offence committed before that provision comes into force.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment provides that schedule 14 shall not affect the penalty which may be imposed in respect of an offence committed before it comes into force.

Question put and agreed to.

Title

Lords amendment: No 1, in line 1, leave out "the powers of courts with regard to"

Mr. Mayhew: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
This amendment to the long title was made towards the end of the passage of the Bill in another place to reflect more clearly the first purpose of the Bill as set out in the long title in the light of the changes that had been made to it.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment No. 2 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No 3, in line 6, after "courts); insert
to amend the law of Scotland relating to the mode of trial of certain offences and :he recall of witnesses

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment simply amends the long title of the Bill to cover a new clause on mode of trial for Scotland, and a new charge on recall of witnesses.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos 4 and 5 agreed to.

Civic Government (Scotland) Bill [Lords]

Lords amendment to a Commons amendment, considered.

Clause 123

CONTROL OF THE SEASHORE, ADJACENT WATERS AND INLAND WATERS

Commons amendment:In page 79, line 31, at end insert:
(2A) A district or islands council may make, in relation to inland waters, byelaws for the same purposes as they may, under subsections (1) and (2) above, make byelaws in relation to the seashore and adjacent waters.
(2B) Byelaws may be made under this section only if—
(a) the district or islands council have complied with subsection (2C) below and made such other inquiries as may be reasonably necessary to ascertain the existence and identity of each person having—

(i)in the case of byelaws under subsection (1) above, a proprietorial interest in the seashore;
(ii)in the case of byelaws under subsection (2) above, a proprietorial interest in relation to the adjacent waters;
(iii)in the case of byelaws under subsection (2A) above, a proprietorial interest in or in relation to the inland waters; and
(iv)in any case, a proprietorial interest in any salmon fishings;
being a proprietorial interest which may be affected by the byelaws;
(b)subject to subsection (2D) below, every person whose consent is required under paragraph (a) above has consented to their being made; and
(c)the district or islands council have, in connection with their proposal to make the byelaws, consulted such person or body, if any, as appears to them to be representative of persons who engage in each sporting or recreational activity which may be affected by the byelaws.
(2C) The district or islands council shall give public notice of their proposal to make byelaws under this section and of the effect of subsection 2B(b) above in relation to that proposal in a newspaper circulating in the area where the byelaws are proposed to have effect.
(2D) If a district or islands council have complied with subsections (2B)(a)and (2C) above, but the consent of a person whose consent is required under this section cannot be obtained because his existence or identity is unknown, or he cannot be found or fails to respond in any way to a request for his consent, the council may nevertheless proceed to make the byelaws but shall not proceed earlier than one month after the date of the advertisement under subsection (2C) above or, if there were more than one advertisement, the later or last of those dates.

Lords amendment,in section (2B)(b),leave out
whose consent is required under

and insert
having a proprietorial interest such as is mentioned, in relation to the byelaws, in
agreed to.

Insurance Companies Bill [Lords]

Considered in Committee

[MR. BERNARD WEATHERILLin the Chair Clauses 1 to 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

EXISTING INSURANCE COMPANIES

11. 43 pm

The Solicitor-General Sir Ian Percival): I beg to move amendment No. 1 in page 3, line 23, after '(b)', insert 'it'.

The Chairman: With this we can discuss Government amendments Nos. 3 to 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13.

The Solicitor-General: The Committee will know that in considering these Bills we have the enormous advantage of the assistance of the Joint Committee and I am happy to tell the Committee that the amendments that we now have to consider have all been considered by Lord Roskill, who is the Chairman of that Committee. I shall be happy to enlarge, for reasons of clarity, if and when asked. The first group of amendments are of a printing or drafting nature.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 5 to 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

APPLICANTS FROM OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY

11. 45 pm

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 2, in page 8, line 22, leave out 'section 7 of the Administration of Justice Act 1965' and insert
section 38(7) of the Administration of Justice Act 1982'.

The Chairman: With this we can discuss Government amendment No. 14.

The Solicitor-General: These amendments merit longer consideration because they arise out of the necessity to cope with other Bills going through the House. Amendment No. 2 arises out of the Administration of Justice Bill, which has been returned to another place. It amended one of the statutes consolidated in this Bill by substituting for a reference to a section of the Administration of Justice Act 1965, repealed by the Administration of Justice Bill, a reference to a section of that Bill.
Amendment No. 14 is a transitional provision, which preserves the reference to the repealed section of the 1965 Act until the reference to the substituted section comes into force. It also preserves the penalty provisions in the consolidated statues until the new provisions of the Criminal Justice Bill come into force.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 10 to 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

GROUNDS ON WHICH POWERS ARE EXERCISABLE

Amendments made:No. 3, in page 29, line 15, leave out from'(c)'to the end of the line and insert 'on the ground that a'.

No. 4, in page 29, line 17, leave out 'specifying' and insert 'specifies'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 38 to 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 47

RESCISSION, VARIATION AND PUBLICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

Amendment made: No. 5, in page 36, line 12, leave out '(4)' and insert '(5)'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 47, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 48 to 52, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 53

WINDING UP OF INSURANCE COMPANIES UNDER COMPANIES ACTS

Amendment made:No. 6, in page 43, line 21, after 'for', insert 'costs for' .—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 53, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 54 to 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71

OFFENCES UNDER PART II

The Solicitor-General: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in page 55, line 37, after 'conviction', insert
'in England and Wales and Scotland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale and, on summary conviction in Northern Ireland,'

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 9 and 11.

The Solicitor-General: These amendments take account of the new provisions for fines in the Criminal Justice Bill, substituting levels on the standard scale in place of monetary references in England and Wales and in Scotland for offences which can be tried only summarily.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 8 in page 56, line 17, after '51', insert '(other than subsection (2)(c))'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 71, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 72 to 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81

PENALTIES AND OFFENCES UNDER PART III

Amendment made:No. 9, in page 62, line 38, after 'conviction', insert
'in England and Wales and Scotland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale and, on summary conviction in Northern Ireland,' .—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 81, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 82 to 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

LLOYD'S UNDERWRITERS—FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Amendment made:No. 10, in page 64, line 44, leave out 'such'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 84, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 85 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88

UNREGISTERED COMPANIES

Amendment made:No. 11, in page 66, line 32, after 'conviction', insert
'in England and Wales and Scotland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale and, on summary conviction in Northern Ireland,' .—The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 88, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 89 to 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 94

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS

Amendment made:No. 12, in page 68, line 42, leave out

Subject to subsection (4) below'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Clause 94, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 95 to 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 1 to 3 agreed to.

Schedule 4

SAVING AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendments made:No. 13, in page 83, line 5, after '1974', insert
'which repealed and re-enacted provisions of the Insurance Companies Amendment Act 1973'.

No. 14, in page 83, after paragraph 19, insert—

'—Until the coming into force of paragraph (g) of subsection (2) of section 46 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, the reference in section 9(7) of this Act to section 38(7) of that Act shall be construed as a reference to section 7 of the Administration of Justice Act 1965.

.—In relation to offences under this Act committed in England and Wales before the coining into force of section 38 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 or in Scotland before the coming into force of section 53 of that Act the reference in each of the following provisions of this Act, namely—

(a)section 71(3).
(b)section 81(2) and
(c)section 88(2)
to level 5 on the standard scale shall have effect as a reference to £400.'.—[The Solicitor-General]

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Schedules 5 and 6 agreed to.

Motor Vehicle Tests

11. 50 pm

The Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mrs. Lynda Chalker): I beg to move,
That the Motor Vehicle (Tests) (Extension) Order 1982, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23rd June, be approved.
The order is part of a package of measures implementing the European Community directive on roadworthiness testing. The roadworthiness directive is probably not bedside reading for all hon. Members, so it may be helpful if I remind the House briefly of what it is, before explaining where the extension order fits into the wider scheme of things.
The roadworthiness directive is designed basically to harmonise testing arrangements for commercial vehicles in member States. It deals with the testing of lorries, buses and coaches, taxis and ambulances. It does not affect private cars, but it does cover large passenger vehicles—those with more than eight passenger seats—whether or not they are used for hire or reward. The measures we are talking about tonight therefore apply to vehicles such as works buses as well as to buses and coaches which carry fare paying passengers.
The directive does not specify in detail how tests are to be carried out. That is done nationally. It does, however, list the items which are to be tested—brakes, steering, lights and so on—and it requires that tests must be carried out annually, starting when the vehicle is one year old. It provides the basic framework of requirements which have to be embodied in the testing arrangements in each member State. Member States are free to impose more stringent requirements if they wish, but the directive lays down the minimum. It is on the whole a rather modest and sensible measure, and one which should bring some useful gains in road safety in many parts of the Community.
In this country our testing arrangements are already comprehensive, and for the most part already meet—or even exceed—the requirements of the directive. The inspection of public service vehicles goes back many years to between the wars. I shall not go over the history of this matter, but in general it is fair to say that our standards are at least as good as those in the rest of Europe.
We have had to make a few changes. The main one, which hon. Members with an interest in the bus industry will be well aware of, has been the introduction of a new formal annual testing scheme for public service vehicles, to replace the informal inspection system which we operated. The arrangements for that scheme were set out in the Motor Vehicle (Tests) Regulations 1981, which were accepted by the House last year.
The other principal change which we are having to make to implement the directive deals with the age at which vehicles have to be tested for the first time, and that is what this order is about. I have said that the roadworthiness directive requires vehicles within its scope to be tested annually starting at one year old. We are already home and dry with goods vehicles. Annual tests, starting at one year old, have been required for goods vehicles since the scheme was introduced in 1968. But the other categories of vehicles to which the directive applies come under a different testing scheme in a different legislative framework. Taxis, ambulances, big passenger vehicles which are not PSVs, and private cars all come

under the Ministry of Transport scheme. That scheme requires the first test to take place at three years old, not one year old. In order to comply with the directive, we have to ensure in future—from 1 January 1983—that all taxis, ambulances and large passenger vehicles, as well as PSVs, have their first test by the time of the vehicle's first birthday. That is what the order achieves.
I know that the order seems complicated. In fact, it is simple in its achievement. Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 which deals with compulsory test certificates for specified classes of vehicles, provides the teeth for the MOT test system. It makes it an offence to use a vehicle on the road that has not got a valid test certificate if it comes within the specified category.
Hon. Members will also know that the age for the first test under the MOT scheme has been progressively reduced from the original 10 years to the present three years, in each case by means of a Motor Vehicles (Extension) Order, much like the present one. The last was passed by the House in 1966.
The new order before the House revokes the earlier one. It brings down the age of first test from three years to one year for the roadworthiness directive vehicles—taxis, ambulances and passenger vehicles with more than eight passenger seats. Formally speaking, public service vehicles are under the same regime. They also come under section 44 of the 1972 Act. The provision therefore applies to them although the arrangements for carrying out the test are quite different.
The order begins on 1 January 1983. From that date, any vehicle which is within one of the specified categories and is more than a year old must have a test certificate. I can perhaps assure any hon. Member who feels that this is a short deadline that our intention to bring in the order was widely publicised in 1981 and that arrangements for testing vehicles in order to meet the proposed new requirements have been operating throughout the whole of this year. I must emphasise again that private cars are not involved. Hon. Members will see that article 5 of the order provides for the three-year period to continue in force for all vehicles except the special roadworthiness directive categories. For private cars there is absolutely no change. Indeed, apart from the new testing regime for public service vehicles, there is not much change at all.
I hope that, on the information I have given, the House will feel itself able to approve the order.

11. 56 pm

Mr. Robert Hughes: The Opposition welcome the provisions of the order as—I suppose this is becoming a hackneyed phrase—a positive contribution to road safety. We appreciate the reasons for the introduction of the order and give our full support. We welcome the order even though some of the provisions, as the Minister has fairly stated, are unnecessary or even redundant. For example, taxis are already required to be tested at least once a year. In some areas, testing for taxis is required as often as every three months. It is interesting to recall that police authorities in Scotland—I daresay this also applies in England—are already issuing what are called certificates of compliance with the EEC directive.
As the Minister fairly stated, the intention to apply the directive from 1 January 1983 has been well canvassed. All the authorities are aware of it. I wish therefore to ask in all seriousness why it is necessary for the order to contain the obscure language which states:


This Order shall come into operation on the fifteenth day after the day on which it is approved by resoltuion of each House of Parliament.

Why could it not simply have stated the date of 1 January 1983? The formal instruction given in Government Departments is that a positive order should include this general phrase just in case the deadline is missed. In this case, it should have been possible to use clear language. I hope that the Minister will therefore do better next time.
A similar order was last debated in 1968. On that occasion, the speech of the principal Opposition spokesman took four minutes. I do not know whether I have broken that record. I wish, however, to commend the order to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Motor Vehicles (Tests) (Extension) Order 1982, a copy of which was laid before this House on 23rd June, be approved.

Council House Rents (Birmingham)

Motion made, and Question proposed,That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Trippier.]

11. 59 pm

Mr. J. W. Rooker: I had not intended to be here at this late hour, though I make no apology for raising the issue of Birmingham council house rents. As is apparen: from the Order Paper, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham. Erdington (Mr. Silverman) was due to initiate the debate, but he was taken ill during the day and is now in Westminster hospital. I know that hon. Members and his constituents, of whom I am one, will wish him a very speedy return to full performance.
Fortunately, my hon. Friend had made preparations for the debate and a copy of his speaking notes came into my possession and will assist me in making the case. There are about 135,000 council tenancies in Birmingham. That represents a substantial proportion of the dwellings in the city and the tenants have recently suffered a rent increase averaging about 13 per cent. That represents an average of £1·75 a week, but in some cases it can amount to £3 a week.
It is the second rent increase in 1982. For the lower-paid workers in the National Health Service—and, contrary to current Government propaganda, there are many such workers in the NHS—the rent increase would more than wipe out the pay increase offered by the Government. Rent increases in the past three years have totalled about 130 per cent. I do not know whether that is a Birmingham figure or a national figure, but I know that rents in Birmingham have gone through the roof and I have had many complaints from my constituents.
Figures provided by the city housing department show that there are about 50,000 pre-war council houses. The gross rent and rates for a three-bedroomed, pre-war house, which is unimproved and not even modernised, are 34p short of £20 a week. It does not take much effort to calculate that it is possible for house-owners to be paying less than that in mortgage payments for similar properties.
My hon. Friend the Member for Erdington has been an hon. Member since 1945 and he reminded me that he recollected that when he was a member of the city council 37 years ago the gross rents of those pre-war houses in Birmingham was 9s 6d a week—47½p. The increase has been 4,000 per cent., which is well above the rate of inflation over the years. The houses are the same bricks and mortar. Interest rates were 2½ per cent. when the rents were 9s 6d a week, but even at present rates of interest it is difficult to justify the current rents.
As I have argued on behalf of my constituents, the latest rent increase does not seem to be justified by the accounts of the housing department. There was no deficit which called for a further increase this year, and interest rates are falling rapidly because of the recession—as they did in the 1930s.
The average rent increase is alleged to be £1·75 a week. I do not know how accurate that is over the whole city, but I have three examples that I have managed to check with a constituent who raised the issue with me recently. A woman told me at a surgery that the rent of a four bedroomed house with two toilets and central heating, built about 10 years ago, was going up by £3 a week, while the rent of her three-bedroomed house, which is about a quarter of a mile away and has no central heating and only


an outside toilet, is going up by £2·40 a week—a difference of only 60p. That is in the Great Barr and Perry Beeches area. In Perry Common, the rent of a similar three-bedroomed, pre-war house, with an outside toilet and no central heating, is going up by £1·90 a week. So the same house has a substantial difference in rent increase of 50p, and for one of the houses the difference is 60p a week in increase, without the extra bedroom, without the privacy of one indoor toilet, let alone two, and without central heating. I asked the city housing officer for an explanation, but as yet I have heard nothing.
In addition to the greatly increased rents, there has been a decline in the amount and standard of repairs. Previous Conservative-controlled local authorities in Birmingham attempted to privatise, and that was before we even knew what the word meant. The result of that in my constituency was scaffolding falling down around four houses. It was a miracle that no one was killed. Subsequently, the Health and Safety Executive prosecuted. So there has been a decline in the amount and standard of repairs, notwithstanding the massive rent increases. My hon. Friend says that sometimes it has been difficult in his constituency to get any repairs at all done, and there are long waiting lists.
Moreover, there is the wholesale depreciation of many council houses in Birmingham, as a result of lack of repairs over the years, following various cutbacks. In the case of void houses—of which there are many in Birmingham—the depreciation is disastrous. No one is getting anything out of them in rent or accommodation. It is a ridiculous waste of public expenditure.
Council houses in Birmingham are not evenly distributed throughout the city. My constituency is not unique: about 35 per cent. are council dwellings, 63 per cent. are owner-occupied, and there is a small percentage of privately-rented property. I have a large proportion of owner-occupied property in my area which is in the north part of the city. In the south part, in a constituency such as Northfield which, as we all know, has no hon. Member to represent it because of the tragedy which took place, the percentage of council dwellings is 62 per cent. So people there who have had massive rent increases twice this year are suffering disproportionately to the rest of Birmingham.
I know that the Government are planning to remove housing subsidies next year. The housing benefit and rent rebate system is about to undergo a fundamental change, the significance of which I am sure neither the Government nor local authorities yet appreciate. Nevertheless, the council tenant in Birmingham will be paying not just an economic rent but in many cases one that is substantially more than can be justified as an economic rent. I know that the owner-occupier gets relief on the interest that he pays on his mortgage, and that the interest depends on the kind of mortgage. I make no criticism of that, although I believe that it should be limited to the fiat rate of tax. However, the council tenant is still paying his interest, via his rent. The council tenant pays his interest to the council and does not get the relief. There is no system such as the mortgage option scheme, brought in by a former Labour Government for low-paid people not paying income tax who could not get relief. It is true that in this respect the position of the council tenant is no different from that of the private tenant, who also gets no relief on his rent. However, the private tenant gets a compensating benefit of rent regulation which

at least stops his rent from continually going through the roof. I know that people complain about private rent increases, but there is rent regulation. In the case of the council tenant, the rent regulation is in reverse. During the past three years the Secretary of State has increased rent to levels which the Government consider desirable, no matter what the political complexion of the local authorities. It so happens that, at this moment, the present controlling group in Birmingham has taken an extra bite at the cherry. The Secretary of State forced even the last Labour-controlled council in Birmingham to increase rents to a greater extent than was justified by the figures in the books.
I want the Minister to explain to me, to my hon. Friend the Member for Erdington, who will read the debate, and to the citizens of Birmingham, particularly the 60 per cent. or more council tenants in Birmingham, Northfield, exactly how he can justify what is an unjust anomaly.
At the Conservative Party conference the Prime Minister said that we are one Britain. Yet at the same time the Government are treating millions of council tenants as second class citizens.

12. 10 am

The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Sir George Young): May I endorse what the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Rooker) said at the beginning of his speech when he recorded his regret at the fact that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Mr. Silverman) was unwell? We wish him every speedy recovery from his ailment.
It was fortunate for the hon. Member for Perry Barr that the speech of the hon. Member for Erdington was so well written in advance and that he was able to use it. It is equally fortunate that there is apparently one subject on which Labour Members are prepared to agree. We welcome that rare degree of unanimity.
I am glad that we are debating the position of council house tenants in Birmingham tonight. However, I must say that the picture that the hon. Member painted was a partial one and highly misleading. If we look at the way that Birmingham is tackling its housing problems, we must recognise that the energy, drive and commitment of the city council is impressive. Its achievement over the past six months is commendable. It represents a far better deal for Birmingham tenants than could remotely have been hoped for, say, a year ago. In the spring of this year we saw the arrival of a new vigorous Conservative council, determined to sweep away the inefficiencies, restrictions and obstructions of its Labour predecessors. The proofs of its success are clear—startlingly so after such a short period of control.
I understand from the chairman of the housing committee that this financial year the council has completed 1,000 more repair jobs than the Labour council had managed to do by the same time last year. That by itself is excellent news for the tenants who have benefited directly. For each and every tenant it is a clear signal that past delays have been slashed in getting done essential jobs like re-roofing and re-wiring.
On average, the pace at which repairs are now being done is up to 20 per cent. higher than in the days of the Labour council, and that is in autumn weather. During the summer, I understand that the difference in output was over 25 per cent. I learn also that entry-phones are being put into tower blocks in the city. That is the sort of


initiative which every person living in tower blocks can welcome without reserve and which demonstrates a dedication to making the best of the housing stock and refusing to be overwhelmed by the problem.
Birmingham is also paying particular attention to installing wardens where staff on the spot are called for. It recognises that people with special needs deserve special measures. It is an impressive achievement, for instance, to have wired up flats which are under the care of wardens, not only to the warden's own flat but as a 24-hour emergency service to the housing department. That is the record which the city council displays after six months, and which the hon. Member did not refer to in his speech.
So far, I have concentrated on what is now being done for those Birmingham tenants who wish to remain so. However, there are many others who want to take advantage of their right, their unambiguous legal right, to buy their own homes. For far too long they were prevented from exercising their right by the deliberate obstructive-ness of the last Labour council.
The facts speak for themselves. Our Housing Act reached the statute book in the summer of 1980. The right to buy took effect from October 1980. Between then and May of this year, almost 5,000 tenants were accepted by the city council as having a right to buy. However, the remainder of the story is not hard to guess. There were delays, difficulties and dilatoriness. Over 100 tenants actually went as far as to complain to my Department about the frustrations they were suffering. At the end of the Labour period, a mere 300 dwellings had been sold. It required constant Government pressure to achieve even that miserable total out of the 5,000 admitted cases.
By contrast, over the past three months alone, the Conservative council has succeeded in getting more than 1,200 houses sold. The new applications have been flooding in. Over the past three months there have been 5,000 of them. They are still, I understand, coming in at the rate of 100 a day. In other words, the number of cases which the city council is prepared to accept as a result of tenants' action over the past three months is already the same as the number of cases admitted over a 19-month period by the Labour council. It hardly needs to be added that this is cast-iron evidence of the suppressed demand that was damped down during the go-slow period. At last, the right to buy in Birmingham is on the move. Both present and former tenants can see only too well who has their real interests at heart.
I should like to think that Government action will, wherever possible, reinforce Birmingham's own determination to increase efficiency and provide a better deal for its tenants. One contribution, which the hon. Gentleman touched on, will be the partial start of the new housing benefit scheme next month. This will enable rent assistance for tenants formerly on supplementary benefit to be paid direct to the city council. This step cuts down a transfer of cash via the tenant and thus eases his life as well as making for improved efficiency in the housing department.
I now turn to some of the points raised by the hon. Gentleman. Perhaps I ought to make it clear first that the central Government do not—as might have been inferred from the hon. Gentleman's remarks—control or carry responsibility for the level of council house rents in Birmingham—or, for that matter, anywhere else. Local authorities themselves have statutory discretion over the rents which they set for their tenants. Under section 111

of the Housing Act 1957, they are empowered to make such charges as they think fit for the particular circumstances of their area—as long as these charges are reasonable.
Against that background, it was rather invidious of the hon. Gentleman to direct his strictures at Birmingham in particular. There are in the West Midlands authorities whose average rent this year is likely to be at a similar, or even higher, level—examples are Nuneaton, the Wrekin, and—topping them all—Sandwell. Then again, Birmingham is not the only authority in the West Midlands to have gone for an autumn rent increase. This autumn Wolverhampton is reported to be making a rent increase of broadly comparable dimensions. Now all the authorities I have mentioned are perfectly entitled, like Birmingham, to exercise their statutory discretion as they choose. But each and every one of them is Labour-controlled. And the hon. Gentleman did not direct so much as a whisper of criticism in their direction. In attacking council house rent levels and rent increases he was somewhat selective.
We must, however, go further into the question of Birmingham rents even if they are not a direct Government responsibility. I have already outlined the improvements and achievements of the new Birmingham city council. It would be nonsense to claim that the improvements it has set its hand to can be achieved for nothing. There is a cost; it emerges in the mid-year because the new council only came into office and got things moving in May, and it is not unreasonable that it should be reflected in higher rents—especially given that the rents of the neighbouring Labour authorities that I have mentioned are either comparable or visibly higher.
Further, the hon. Gentleman conveniently ignored the fact that rents charged in Birmingham are not necessarily the same as rents paid by tenants out of their own pockets. Some 55 per cent. of tenants over the country as a whole receive rent assistance in one form or another. I do not have the precise figures for Birmingham, but there is no obvious reason to suppose that the pattern of these differs markedly from that applying nationally. On this basis, some 30 per cent. of tenants at present receive supplementary benefit. For them, the entirety of any rent increase is met in full. A further 25 per cent. of tenants—including, I hope, many of those on low pay whom the hon. Gentleman mentioned—are on rent rebate. This generally meets 60 per cent. of their rent increase. But it is only right to make the point that the rent assistance schemes are intended to, and do, cater for those on very low incomes or dependent on benefit. So in talking of rent increases, we need to take account also of the fact that protection for the least well off exists: and that it is misleading to quote rent increase figures as if they fall in their entirety on all tenants. There can be no question of rent assistance on its present scale being a palliative. It is a fundamental element in any discussion of policy nationally or of the impact on individual tenants locally. I hope that Opposition Members also see it in the same way and will do what they can to encourage the take-up.
I have concentrated on the position of council house tenants in Birmingham because that was the main thrust of the hon. Gentleman's remarks. But, since the hon. Gentleman has commented on the role of the Government, we should get certain facts straight. The Government do indeed, around now, make known their expectations of the average rent increase for the financial year ahead. That is nothing new. It took place under the previous Labour


Government as under this Government. But our expectation of what the average rent increase will be does not detract from the responsibility of each individual authority to take its own decision on rent increases, and thus on rent levels. The difference, however, between the last Labour Government and ourselves is that we do not propose, as they did, to offer firm policies, and then take refuge in soft options when the going gets tough. The previous Labour Government, for example, proposed keeping rents
broadly in line with movements in money incomes".
Instead, they handed over to us a position where rents had been allowed to decline over their period of office to their lowest real post-war level. The Labour Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Barnett), actually said in the House:
I believe that we are right to plan in the longer term for the proportion of housing costs to be borne by rents to grow from 43 per cent. in 1976–77 to 50 per cent. by 1980.—[Official Report,10 March 1976, Vol. 907, c. 453.]
He said that on 10 March 1976. By 1980, the proportion had slumped to 38 per cent. Had the Government carried out their policy, the increases which were subsequently introduced under the present Government would have been far less.
The hon. Member mentioned the withdrawal of housing subsidy which has affected Birmingham, among other authorities, since we took office. We have, indeed, introduced a new subsidy system—the same, incidentally,

as in the Bill which was introduced shortly before the previous Labour Government left office. We make no apology for cutting subsidies. Within the funds available nationally for housing, our priority had to be to safeguard capital investment, and to get it to increase which is now the position, and thus to curb the indiscriminate revenue support. I hope that these last few points place this debate in a national context. The hon. Member implied that council house rents in Birmingham were now above the fair rent level. I would like to see the evidence for that, as he implied that council house tenants did not receive the protection extended to private tenants afforded by the rent tribunals. He implied that council house rents were now above private rent levels. I should like to see the evidence for that. The hon. Member implied that, when he read the speech that his hon. Friend the Member for Erdington drafted for him. He also touched on subsidies to council tenants and to owner-occupiers. When I last examined the figures—this, I confess, was some months ago before the change in interest rates—the average subsidy per owner-occupier was less than the average subsidy per council tenant. As far as I can see, the new Birmingham council deserves to be congratulated, not least by its own tenants, on the initiatives that it has taken over the past six months. I hope that that is the message that will come through from this debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-one minutes past Twelve o'clock.